**Naval War College Review**

Volume 31
Number 2 *Winter*

Article 1

1978

# Winter 1978 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

## Winter 1978



# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

## FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. Reproduction of articles published in the *Review* is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and treaties of the United States, to the extent that they are applicable. Caution should be exercised in the case of those articles protected by copyright, as may be indicated by a copyright notice at the beginning of such articles. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

Manuscripts must be submitted in typewritten form, double-spaced or triple-spaced. Manuscripts are submitted at the sender's risk. The *Naval War College Review* neither offers nor makes compensation for articles accepted for publication and assumes no responsibility for the return of the material, although as a matter of practice every effort will be made to return manuscripts not accepted for publication. In submitting an article, the sender warrants that it is original, that it is the sender's property, and that it has not been published elsewhere.



The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published quarterly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade 0-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices.

# CONTENTS



Volume XXX, Number 3/Sequence 266 Winter 1978

Cover: "Tripolar Equilibrium" by Ian Oliver, Naval War College Graphic Arts Branch.

# BOARD OF ADVISORS
# TO THE
# PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

# FIRING LINE

I was both surprised and pleased during my first week as President of the Naval War College, to have had so many of those well-wishers who stopped in or phoned include in their remarks comments on the *Naval War College Review*. Many friends—active and retired officers, congressmen, educators, and others—closed our conversations with "keep the *Review* coming." Not all its articles escape critical comment, but that is hardly surprising. This quarterly publication is not a house-organ, cranking out a particular party line, but a scholarly journal intended to stimulate and challenge its readers and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas.

I disagree with both the thrust and conclusions of some of the *Review's* articles myself, but my opinions do not necessarily detract from the value of those compositions. For instance, in this issue I take exception to Professor Hitchen's writing on the Code of Conduct. The subject is, of course, very close to me and I have read countless articles about, and heard many proposals for revising the Code. His is what I might call the "outsider's" viewpoint; shared by many, it focuses on Article V ("... I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth ...") as a flawed stipulation requiring revision. It has been my observation that those who have not served as prisoners of war but who write on such matters invariably assume that Article V is the "heart" of the Code. My further observation is that few of those who have been prisoners of war for a significant period of time have any trouble understanding or dealing with it. The Article is just a piece of good advice: to utter as little as possible except for the four items required under international law, at least until one is sufficiently certain of his ground to be able to use his words as weapons against his captors. That's what Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall meant when he wrote it, and that's what it says.

If Article V was flawed, it was given clearer meaning in a Presidential Executive Order signed in November 1977. However, scarcely noted by commentators, a second, more important Executive Order was also signed at that time. That one dealt with Code provisions that have great significance for "insiders"; it dealt with command authority within a prison camp. The Code says that if one is senior he will take command and, that if not senior, he will obey the orders of the senior prisoner and back him up in every way. The shocking discovery for us who returned from North Vietnam was to be told that the Code did not have the force of law. Had this fact been generally known in prison I'm afraid our PW military organizations would have been much less effective. Now that "the cat is out of the bag," President Carter's new Executive Order should go far toward remedying what could have been a serious problem in the next war. As

for Professor Hitchen's question: "Is the Code of Conduct required at all?", I believe that the answer is "no" for about 60 percent of the American fighting men. However, some of us need its moral support to hitch up our courage, and a few of us need a little fear of the law to keep it hitched up.

Institutional nepotism aside, I thought Captain Platte's multipolarity article was the finest in this issue. However, he isn't immune from disagreement either. He believes the U.S.S.R. best suited by experience to play the "balancer" in a tripolar world. I would argue that China is equally experienced. The Chinese Communists' World War II performance in fighting two enemies simultaneously, alternately siding with each against the other, must have set a record for aplomb and agility. At any rate, they certainly smoked the true nature of their conflicts by the man on the street in the United States. Americans, Captain Platte and I agree, will have the least affinity for three-cornered confrontations. Visualizing all the bad guys on one side and all the good guys on the other will never get us by.

I don't intend these notes merely to be a rebuttal or even a comment on every article. Rather, I intend to use this space as a sounding board to float a few ideas of my own.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle, differing with his teacher Plato, held that although both are dear to us, piety requires that we honor truth even before our friends. I address this to my friends the strategists, the analysts, and the tacticians. The truth to be honored is that your analyses, your equations, your principles, and your plans too often are based on incomplete if not erroneous assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of war. The extension of rational management principles to planning and waging a war is obviously not without value. Indeed, to ignore those tools is crippling and criminally dangerous. Equally dangerous, however, is the belief that the uncritical application of those principles will bring victory in war. War is an irrational undertaking and there are no tenets of rationality to which all men subscribe. We may cry with Job, "Oh that mine adversary had written a book" but he hasn't and yet we err in ascribing our own values, reactions, cultural processes, etc., to him. This "mirror imaging" is often warned against but as often forgotten. It is a blind spot or perhaps more properly, a false view, a mirage, that we must rid ourselves of. We must do it nationally and we are going to do it in our courses of instruction here at the War College. In a future issue of the *Review* I wish to look into some specific aspects of this subject.

In the first article of this issue, The Honorable Edward Hidalgo warns that striving to avoid error is not the same thing as seeking the attainment of a positive goal—that avoiding failure is not success. I intend that my term as President of the Naval War College be devoted to the quest for the positive goal, but that will require good judgment. It has been said that good judgment is based on experience, but that, unfortunately, good experience is based on bad judgment. Once upon a time I zigged when I should have zagged. At any rate—

The old order changeth, yielding
place to new,
And God fulfills himself in many
ways,
Lest one good custom should
corrupt the world.

J.B. STOCKDALE
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

# AN ADDRESS

# By

# THE HONORABLE EDWARD HIDALGO

# ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

## (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, AND LOGISTICS)

## ON THE OCCASION OF THE

## ACADEMIC CONVOCATION, NINETY-FOURTH CLASS

## NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

## 15 August 1977

Every profession deserving of the title advocates continuing education for its membership and, very often, backs its advocacy with incentives of rank, honors, or material reward to foster member participation in professional education and growth programs. Continued education is essential to the vigor of a profession, especially in this era of lightning change and quantum increases in the volume of knowledge confronting the individual.

The profession of arms in this country has been in the forefront in recognition and fulfillment of this professional requisite. Indeed, among the many magnificent features of the U.S. military career is the dedication of the profession to the notion of educational growth as evidenced in precept and in the tangible efforts made and the resources devoted from the very origins of each Service.

It is my hope that you remain mindful of this in the course of your impending academic voyage and also in the years ahead as you exercise your enriched professional abilities.

Today I am going to urge you to be mindful of several other matters as, in the months ahead, you move through your particular curriculum plowing back into history; adjusting and readjusting your looking glass on the operations, management, and technology of your profession; and as you run free with the strategic and politicomilitary notions that cluster and react like charged particles about the central theme of our national interest.

As some of you begin by revisiting Sparta and Athens with Thucydides as your guide, I would ask that you be mindful of: men's passions and the stubborn durability of prejudices and human animosity that are reinforced in bizarre irony by the very values we hold most dear—family ties, religious beliefs, ethnic and cultural roots, and each man's legitimate search for identity.

Observe closely that, by and large, good intentions pave the avenues of history leading to and from Greece and other centers of civilization that predate or follow. You will find, too, that rare is the capitol city that has not hosted saints, scourges, builders, brigands, oppressors and saviors.

And having analyzed all that separated one great people and two great city-states, one authoritarian, the other democratic—one a landpower, the other oceanic—one a reasoned culture, the other disciplined—I would urge that you then contemplate in comparison not just today's nation-state to nation-state parallels but also that you reduce these parallels to your own experiences—in our profession, our institutions, and indeed, our own streets. If you will do this, then by his own words, Thucydides, "will be found useful."

I would ask that you be discriminating and not lose sight of the fact that the most articulate and gifted recorders of man's affairs, those whose penetrating analysis, perceptive hindsight, and critical evaluation are as necessary an element in our education as any encyclopedic account of facts, remain in the final measure, authors of flawed products. Distressed goods, marked by the prejudice and bias of the author, shaped and contained by events, rubbed and polished by the intellectual currents of the time, and almost invariably fashioned to advance a theme, an ideology, a nostrum, or a self-serving, albeit noble puprose of the author.

Useful?—quite so.
Necessary?—indeed, indispensable.
Valuable?—sometimes beyond calculation!

I would ask that you be mindful, as you continue your historical journey, of the intrinsic value of failure—of disappointment, temporary defeat—and recall that only through failure has it been possible to achieve progress. In terms of the classic quotation: "(to) rise on the stepping stones of their dead selves to higher things."

Those who fear failure and those who have not tasted failure will not be found in your history books. Only those who dare, who measure the risk and make the plunge, who rebound from failure to try once more—only those men who know defeat ever find success and thus have made their mark on mankind. I speak of defeat, of course, in a material or cosmic undertaking, never in the observance of basic principles.

Perhaps I'm wrong but I sense a predilection, perhaps stronger in the bureaucratic environment than in the private sector, that seeks to dedicate excessive talent and resources to ensuring against failure as if the result will, by default, be judged success. This striving to avoid error is not the same as seeking the achievement of a positive goal—avoiding failure is not success. If we allow ourselves to focus solely upon avoiding failure there can be no question about where we are fixed on the curve of progress and the downward direction of its slope.

There is the related syndrome of which one becomes so keenly aware in our Capitol City. The speed and dexterity with which countless numbers of

kindly or unkindly souls second-guess those who have a responsibility to bear, be it executive, legislative or judicial. No, indeed, says the critic: I would not do it this way or that, the judgment is flawed, the reasoning is unsound, the intentions suspect.

Prejudice, high-minded patriotism, ignorance, commercialism, nobility, idleness, excessive zeal, malice—these and other motivations play their single or cumulative role in the never-ending process of attack, be it on the golf course, in the bars, in the corridors, or in the public marketplace.

How much easier it is to destroy than to build! Watch the demolition of a building it took years to build, and you'll know what I mean.

To end this aspect of our theme, I remind you of the words of Theodore Roosevelt at the turn of the century:

> It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer or deeds could have done them better, the credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.

I would ask that you be mindful of and recognize, as you look for the umpteenth time upon our strongest adversary on the world stage and ponder, as only free men can, that which shows itself as good among the unlighted recesses of the totalitarian landscape, that a discipline imposed cures few of a society's ills. Never mind the attractive packaging, the new brand names, the catchy slogans and promises of instant relief—oh what a relief Euro-communism is—but reality and intellect combine to affirm and reaffirm that allocation of resources in a modern state, management of human endeavors, and the growing demands of technology levy themselves upon all societies with political impartiality and economic equity. The society committed to imposing discipline upon itself must unremittingly give priority to the enforcement of this mandate and only the residue of its time and other resources remains available to deal with the issues of management, human motivation and the demands of a surging technology.

Dollars and rubles are only symbols and the manipulators of each are really saying yes and nyet to allocation of the same scarce resources.

The better life may be a relative concept but people everywhere want it just the same. Your problems and my problems are shared by countless others in the world—transcending the political or economic philosophy that envelops each sphere of existence.

The line mechanic in a Mig squadron curses the supply system and instinctively must long for changes in his life as his counterpart in the U.S.

Navy does in his very different level of existence. The officers of *Moskva* contend with problems of leading and discipline, maintenance and operations, self-fulfillment, personal ambition, as, in a fundamentally different sense, do their opposite numbers in *Enterprise*, and so it goes.

The problems of technology, of leadership, of resource allocation and management can be neither wished away nor mindlessly disciplined away. Neither side holds a monopoly or a clear majority of unique problems over the other.

I would ask that in your review and study of the technology of the profession, the management of resources, capital equipment, manpower, and money and the operational techniques for their employment, you be mindful of your own experience with the men, with the ships, with the aircraft, and weapons system of the fleet, do not undervalue your experience and the insights that it formulates. All too often men fall victims to the seductions of the systems, the institutions and the processes that were intended to be tools and that with time, become entities, arts, specialties—creatures of their own, with little or no relation to their original purpose.

How many of you recognize the saltwater seasoned officer who goes ashore and becomes fixated with ship or weapons design as an end in itself and forgetting how unforgiving is the sea, helps to produce a system that can't be operated and maintained to the unrealistic standards and demands prescribed?

Or, the aviator who becomes similarly enamored with the magic and mysteries of flight and forgets that the deck remains for his successors just as hard, just as short, and in constant motion, as it was when he was looking for the meatball.

And those who become administrators and managers, par excellence, of money and people—how often have we seen their systems become the dominant consideration, masters and not servants of the clients they were once supposed to serve?

To those who this year come upon the notion for the first time of staffing, planning, and military problem solving in a formal sense, I urge you from personal experience to remain mindful that plans are carried out by men, that formats are to assist, that communications must convey understanding, and that warfare rarely conforms precisely to the course of events projected by either contending party. Learn well these procedures but never lose sight of their purpose.

Be mindful then of your own experience—your own instincts and recognize the desperate need we have in the Navy today to relate our people and our experience to our technology. For herein lies the key to our continued success as a leading maritime power or the seeds of our eventual eclipse as an oceanic influence.

I also ask that you be mindful of a nation's treasure, our own, our friends', our enemies' and the treasures of enemies and friends throughout history. For

there are lessons of enduring application in how and under what circumstances the treasures are divided—who shares and when—what rationales have prevailed over the passage of time.

Logisticians like to belabor us with the axiom that wars are lost for the want of a nail but a better case can be made that wars, nations, civilizations are won or lost in the tenacious vigor, optimism and wisdom of man, as well as the material resources at his disposal.

Those who do not want to lose wars are well-advised to learn to identify those human and material resources, marshal the facts, pose the arguments, and earn the right to share the treasure. If there is any question in your mind as to the principal business conducted daily in the Pentagon, let it be laid to rest now.

This task becomes more important and concurrently more difficult in the technological age and the ensuing intense pressures exerted upon senior decisionmakers enhance the potential for critical error at a frightening rate.

And here it is that we return to our fundamental purpose today, to convoke the NWC classes of 1978 and charge them with their duties. For it is with you that our future as a seapower rests. It will be your strategies, your technological achievements, your knowledge, and your influence upon the decisions of the hour that will shape our destiny. The year ahead will have great impact upon your professional discharge of these responsibilities and I entertain great confidence in your ability and the influence of this institution in preparing you for this duty.

After formulating the laws of Athens, the mighty Solon left for a period of years and then returned. A procession was given in his honor.

The first procession was that of older men with bowed backs and feeble step. The banner above their heads said: "We have protected the state."

"Yes," said Solon, "those were glorious days for Athens but they are gone."

A second procession of men in middle life carried the banner: "We protect the state."

"Yes," said Solon, "but what will become of Athens when you are no longer her defenders?"

Then came the vigorous step of young manhood with a banner bearing the inscription: "We will protect the state."

"Praised be the gods," shouted Solon, "the state is safe."

In closing I would ask you to remain mindful of one other matter—an important one—yourself. Find time this year to do something you've wanted to do but which has been cast aside by the press of professional duties, look

to your own state of personal tranquillity, your self-esteem, your physical well-being, and the state of the union with family, friends, companions new and old. At this closing point, a quotation from the gigantic mind of Oliver Wendell Holmes is irresistible:

> . . . the joy of life is living, is to put out all one's powers as far as they will go; that the measure of power is obstacles overcome; to ride boldly at what is in front of you, be it fence or enemy . . . ; to keep the soldier's faith against the doubts of civil life . . . ; to love glory more than the temptations of wallowing ease, but to know that one's final judge and only rival is oneself.

And so, reemerge next summer ready to return to your profession—refreshed—whole—eager to take on the task and responsibilities held in reserve for you. Know that your return is awaited eagerly, that your help is needed and that our Navy and the navies of the free world represented here will be strengthened and sustained by the Naval War College classes of 1978.

*The Theme of the Naval War College's 1977 Current Strategy Forum was "U.S. Policies and Naval Forces in the Pacific, 1977-85." In this paper, adapted from an address he gave at that Forum, Professor Marshall discusses the strategic significance of the area, considers the triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China and the interests pairing them in cooperative or competitive combinations, and reminds us that planning for the future is chancy business.*

# THREE POWERS—TWO OCEANS

by

Charles Burton Marshall

The ocean areas of my topic engross about 70 percent of the globe's water surface and more than 95 percent of its islands, preponderantly in the Pacific, and are abutted on by 45 percent of the world's countries aggregating 75 percent of its population. Each of these two oceans in its own way arouses strategic imagination. In the large the Pacific is an open ocean, but its western edge consists of a 6,000-mile string of almost closed seas delineated by the East Asian coast and offshore islands. More warships lost or destroyed by the U.S. Navy lie in those waters than in all others. Considered as a discrete tactical episode, what is said to be the longest battle in U.S. military history, with the most U.S. ships and U.S. troops involved and the greatest number of casualties suffered, was fought there within living memory. The United States has sustained war across that ocean with mixed success through 15 of the past 36 years. In our experience, the Pacific stands as the most bitterly contested of oceans. By comparison, the Indian Ocean is virtually a closed sea. Constraining points, such as found among the local seas in the Western Pacific, are dominant features of the whole Indian Ocean. Strategically, the contiguous countries have not been an appreciable factor. Control has been a function for outsiders. There as nowhere else Britannia ruled the waves from the Napoleonic epoch until very recent years, making the Indian Ocean the strategically most stable of the oceans—a fact of great benefit for us, though not one borne in general awareness. With the British having abdicated that function, a critical question concerns what strategic order effected by what power, close by or remote, will succeed.

Strategic interplay between the two oceans is notable. Japan's approach to one of the three constricted channels

of entry, challenging British dominance in the Indian Ocean, prompted the U.S. embargoes which in turn precipitated Pearl Harbor. An unanticipated early show of military activity on our part in the Western Pacific—I refer to the Doolittle raid on Tokyo—frightened the Japanese into pulling back from an effort which, if persevered in, might well have overturned Britain's thin control of the Indian Ocean. Britain's accesses to supply sources especially in India and, even more importantly, the lend-lease channel through the Persian Gulf, critical in sustaining Soviet resistance to the Nazis, were not sundered. If one accepts J.F.C. Fuller's estimate, as I do, that fact was determinative of victory over the Axis in World War II.

Our strategic concern now in the Indian Ocean area rests almost exclusively on supply considerations. Mineral resources in Southern Africa are of indisputable importance. I shall merely mention gold. South Africa also appears well on the way to achieving second rank among uranium-producing countries. I specify uranium as only one in a long list of stringent and strategically critical materials concentrated in that region. Petroleum comes to mind even more dramatically. Two-thirds of the world's known petroleum resources are deposited along the northern reach of the Indian Ocean.

Power to interdict or to assure the flow of industrial energy over much of the globe hinges on strategic factors focused on the Indian Ocean area and various appurtenant constricted channels. Without that supply Japan, once our enemy, now a friend and a strategic client dependent on the Indian Ocean for 90 percent of its petroleum, would languish. Our European Allies with a counterpart dependency of 80 percent would be in similar predicament if cut off. The United States is proportionately less but still too much dependent on the same sources and would be domestically on very hard times if denied access. The U.S. world position would be drastically damaged. Whether active in war or latent in other times, power to intercept the flow of oil out of the Indian Ocean is an instrument of enormous strategic implications.

I turn now to the triangle featured in my topic. In the spring of 1951 U.S. forces, under symbolic U.N. sponsorship, were entangled in hostilities on an appendage of the Asian mainland. Communist China had interposed to salvage stalemate from debacle in a war improvidently promoted by the Soviet Union and was the main enemy in the field. The options for the United States lay among indefinite protraction of indecisive fighting, an infusion of increments to pursue victory at huge cost and risks in what General Bradley called "the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy," and a quest for a cease-fire. The last course was preferred.

An obstacle was lack of any channel for confidential communication with Communist China, even indirect. Several of the few governments in formal diplomatic relations with the United States and China were considered untrustworthy as channels. Two others declined to try a middleman role. The remaining one disclaimed having practical access to the other side. Measures to bridge the obstacle included a variety of expedients and improvisations, recounted in Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation*. The one pertinent here—mentioned on page 532 of that book—was the dispatching of someone with official standing to Hong Kong to try from that vantage to convey surreptitiously to Peking some basic points about U.S. foreign policy attitudes in hope of stimulating motion toward a cease-fire and, with luck, of getting negotiating preliminaries underway.

McCarthyism was then active, and

the MacArthur uproar was at the forefront of attention. Because of those touchy circumstances, utmost secrecy was applied. Five or six persons, no more, in the executive branch were informed. Only oral instructions were given. The civil servant performing the mission spent 6 weeks on the scene in mostly tedious, occasionally adventurous, and, for him, highly educational endeavors but never learned the effects beyond an assurance that at least one of the various potential intermediaries found for him by the CIA did get through to authorities in Peking. The aspect in point here is the substance of the message forwarded in that makeshift way. I give it in drastic compression—and with full confidence, having been the one sent on the mission.

The first part was a review, from the U.S. standpoint, of the hiatus in relations with mainland China emphasizing the constraints on the popularly accountable U.S. Government imposed by traditional attachments to China among large segments of the public and by general chagrin over the accession there of a regime with an outlook and purposes antithetic to American attitudes and aims. I cited as offsetting facts the United States' avoidance of direct involvement in China's civil war, the early refusal to interpose to protect the Chinese Nationalists' offshore refuge on Taiwan, and the attempts to keep open the U.S. Embassy and consular offices on the mainland. In the U.S. view, I stressed, the Communist regime's harassments to force closure of those facilities reflected a psychic need for an external enemy—a role, in the logic of circumstances, befalling the United States.

The war in Korea had interposed as a painful fact replacing mere animosity with palpable hostility. The embittering effects were bound to last a long time. I stressed considerations extremely important for the Peking regime to understand. The U.S. Government perceived not China but the Soviet Union as the strategic adversary. The United States was intent to avoid war with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the issues between them were sharp and basic, and communications with the Soviet Union had become critically difficult and tenuous with Stalin's approach to senility and the reintensification of terror within the Soviet domain. The danger of slippage into unwanted active hostilities was therefore considerable. For all their then current enmities, the United States and China had one big thing in common: in their highest mutual interest, China must not become involved on the Soviet Union's side in a war against the United States. That consideration must temper their enmity.

Protracting the conflict in Korea could only prolong the danger of inducing general war. That war had reached a stage of diminishing returns for both sides. Therefore the immediate necessity was to wind down the fighting. Embittered but cognizant of the necessary limits to their mutual grudges, the United States and China would probably have to continue holding each other at arm's length in the sequel to hostilities. At some juncture ahead—I stressed this point—a substitute external enemy for Peking would probably materialize in the Soviet Union. That development would provide a logical occasion for moving toward overtly improved relations between the United States and China.

So much for that hush-hush mission. At worst it proved not a hindrance. Armistice overtures soon surfaced. A cease-fire materialized after 2 more difficult years. I elide the 15 ensuing years of mutual sulking and growling. The United States had contracted itself into the defense of the Nationalist regime's position on Taiwan. The United States was intent also to preserve China's

U.N. franchise for the Taiwan regime, mainly excluding the Communist regime. In pique for having been labeled as aggressor in Korea, China underwrote that exclusionary policy by a show of studied aloofness and for a while even trying with no success to found a rival and successor world organization.

What is pertinent is the eventual shift toward amelioration with the United States, reflecting developments between that most profuse and ethnocentric land and the Soviet Union. Tension between the two was latent from the moment of Communist accession in China. I recall vividly from my Hong Kong venture an intimation to me of the Chinese Communists' assumption of cultural superiority to the Soviet Union's. It came from Chang Kua-tao, in exile as an ousted member of the Peking Politburo: "China was an ancient civility when Russians were painting themselves blue and wearing animal skins." The Chinese eschewal of satellite status surfaced in the refusal to join the chorus echoing Khrushchev's posthumous denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress. The difference had to be accounted for on doctrinal grounds rather than publicly acknowledged as a clash of national interests and cultural outlooks. Two papacies now vied for the same church, as it were. China made known its aspirations to rival and even to supplant the Soviet Union at the Communist apex.

A quick succession of three events some 9 years ago sharpened Peking's anxieties: the Soviet-led suppression of Communist deviancy in Czechoslovakia, the pronouncement in Moscow of a so-called Brezhnev doctrine asserting the Soviet Union's historic prerogative to enforce doctrinal rectitude throughout the Communist realm, and a sudden tripling of Soviet troop strength bordering China. Pressed by such palpable security threats, China substituted initiative for indifference in certain aspects of external affairs. First, China hinted affirmative interest in a U.N. connection by thanking several governments for their perennial opposition to our exclusionary policy thereby assuring its early undoing. More important, in an age-old practice of playing off adversaries against each other, Peking sought an opening to the one country with material capabilities to provide a counterweight to the Soviet threat. China's ping-pong initiative, Dr. Kissinger's secretive calls, and Mr. Nixon's theatrical visit capped by a joint communique prefiguring progress to normal relations came in remarkably quick order.

The Soviet response to that sequence of gestures reflected anxiety lest the incipient connection should mature into something akin to an alliance. Ambition to garner bonus effects in the form of subsidized preferential access to inventiveness and productivity (catering to an American preconception linking commerce and peace) supplied an auxiliary stimulus to the cultivation of Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. The culmination was their joint journey to Moscow 5 years ago.

The mere fact of a much-trumpeted melioration in U.S.-Soviet relations was nothing new. Such junctures had recurred many times, beginning with the Roosevelt-Litvinov parley of 1933. Yet one palpable quality does distinguish the turn in 1972 from the ones before. The volume and variety of U.S.-Soviet agreements then and thenceforth produced—they touch on such diverse matters as cultural interchange, commercial accommodation, technological transference, collaboration in space exploits, political concord, human rights, and the strategic equation—are unprecedented for so brief a span in the history of diplomatic relations between these two governments and probably between any other governments. If futurity inheres in what documents

promise, then what has been accomplished is stupendous, and Mr. Nixon's hyperbolic claims concerning the transformation wrought were realistic.

The luster did not last. I shall not labor that observation with concrete details. I wish to focus rather on some illustrative conceptual differences bearing on the transactional relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a basic point, a contract is an expression of linked intentions which the respective parties can properly and reciprocally accept as reliable predictions of actions so that they may shape their own conduct accordingly. The key terms must convey the same senses to both sides. Otherwise a valid contractual relationship is lacking. Miscarriages of agreed arrangements ascribable to confusions of common terms are not extraordinary in human affairs. A dozen old stories about contracts aborted over discrepancies of meanings come to mind. A thirsty wayfarer ordered a screwdriver at a country inn and was handed a screwdriver. A bishop sent a bellman to fetch a pot of tea and a tart and was brought his tea and a tart. An astronaut on Mars tried to buy a six-pack and was handed a bra. Here I am concerned not with foulups due to simple split definitions. I refer to profound discongruities reflecting divergencies of value and purpose.

As a point of reference consider a mutual pledge entered into at Moscow in 1972 and elaborated during the Brezhnev visit to Washington a year later for exchanging information and collaborating on behalf of peace in crisis situations wherever occurring. The Soviet Union's subsequent actions have included secret provisioning of the Yom Kippur attacks on Israel, unilateral initiatives toward direct intervention after a shift in the tide of battle against its clients, abetting of the petroleum embargo by the Arab oil-producing states and utmost efforts, though in vain, to get the embargo prolonged; continued efforts to impede the United States' step-by-step efforts to abate the Arab-Israeli quarrel, prompting the North Vietnamese in overrunning South Vietnam in violation of the Paris accords signed by the Soviet Union as a guarantor, and unilateral intervention in the Angolan civil war in scornful repudiation of the U.S. Secretary of State's entreaties. As borne out by that record, the meaning of peace and of the promotion of peace diverges profoundly as between the United States' and the Soviet Union's operational codes. The discrepancy bears examination, for it presents a serious impediment to prospects for contracting about peace.

Soviet discourse is as wont as ours to celebrate peace as a policy goal. In a theoretic sense, also, Soviet concepts parallel those prevailing here in regarding peace as the norm and war, by corollary, as deviant. The rub is this. In the Marxist-Leninist dogma, the aberrations giving rise to war are seen as rooted in differences between classes defined in relation to varying functions in the processes of production. The causes of conflict are seen as knotted into the very fabric of societies at variance with the Soviet Union's postulates, practices, and scheme of authority. The achievement of peace as a pervasive human condition is for a remote tomorrow when Marxist-Leninist dogma will be no longer challenged. That consummation is supposedly predetermined by history's laws.

In keeping with the Marxist-Leninist dogma, the Soviet ruling group professes to regard itself as supreme guardian of the principles linked to that putative truth and as history's agent in promoting momentum to the predetermined goal. Until that consummation and subject to the requirement of not jeopardizing everything by direct imprudent involvement in war

the pursuit of peace entails prosecution of unremitting enmity toward every differentiated political entity and belief, not simply for the sake of Soviet interests and preferences as such but in service to the teleological ends supposedly inspiring Soviet interests and purposes. Peace in the Soviet lexicon stands for promotion of Communist aims in what is called "class struggle between systems." Whatever is contributory thereto is by definition peaceful. Because the United States is the mainstay of resistance to that postulated momentum of history, the Soviet version of service to peace calls for the isolation, neutralization, and ultimately the effective elimination of the United States as a counterfactor. Thus enmity is waged under the rubric of peace, employing every device of strategy short of explicit war.

The United States' approach to peace reflects a privileged historic past, remote from theaters of strategic competiton, with security a bestowed condition, peace demonstrably the inherent situation, and war therefore regarded as obviously abnormal. In that outlook, strategy encompasses concepts and practices applicable only in the breakdowns but otherwise to be banished from general concern. The thing to do in order to perpetuate peace is to forestall breakdowns—not by attention to strategic factors but by communicating, engaging in commerce, sharing benefits, and following agreed rational procedures.

In the 20th century's two world wars the U.S. formula for perpetuating peace thenceforth was the creation of an international organization—first the League of Nations and then the U.N.—to institutionalize a nonstrategic approach to peace in a world expected to be so abundant with friends as to obviate having to calculate how to deal with putative enemies. With the U.N. demonstrably incapacitated for its peacekeeping purpose by a rift over the conditions of peace between the main two members of the prevailing coalition supposed to serve as the nucleus for the undertaking, the United States in the containment policy ventured into a strategic approach to maintaining peace.

The provisionary character of that turn needs stress. No thread runs more consistently through the pattern of U.S. foreign policy covering three decades than the thought, the dream, of vindicating the goal of a nonstrategic basis for peace by dissuading the Soviet Union from its waywardness and thus converting it into a reliable collaborator for peace according to the U.S. perception. That prodigy is conceived as achievable by depriving the Soviet ruling group of opportunities for expansive successes, undermining thereby the group's confidence in the Marxist-Leninist image of the future, and at long last bringing the Soviet Union around to tractability and cooperation. President Truman put the expectation into his message enunciating the Truman Doctrine. Secretary Acheson repeated it in testifying for the North Atlantic Treaty. President Eisenhower paraphrased it in his first Presidential speech on foreign policy. Thenceforward into the present, spokesmen for five successive Administrations have articulated the same vision in diverse styles.

The Soviet dream anticipates a United States worn down to ineffectuality and acquiescence. The American dream envisions a Soviet Union rendered pliant and cooperative by a combination of frustration and wooing. Each dream foresees its version of peace triumphant and the old opponent rendered submissive. Those conflicting dreams—they could not both come true—underlay, if that is the right tense, the strenuous competition called the cold war. The same tension between incompatible concepts carries over into a muddle of meanings

between "peaceful coexistence" and "détente."

The former expression is the Soviet term-of-art for the Soviet version of a sequel to the cold war and for the processes promoting that outcome. Thus "the strategic purpose of peaceful coexistence"—I quote President Brezhnev—"is to assure favorable conditions for the world-wide victory of socialism." "Détente" is the favored word expressing the contrasting version of a sequel to the cold war treasured in policy on this side, with the Soviet Union cured of its presumption to be a universal cause and content at last to function simply as a state pressing its own interests as such. The Soviets now use both terms interchangeably, as if the practice of détente entailed acquiescence to Soviet rampancy and aggrandizement. The Soviet style—"peaceful coexistence"—is adopted in the pertinent official documents subscribed by the United States in Nixon's time and since, but the alleged accomplishments are represented to the public in terms of détente according to the U.S. perception. The confusion is exemplified when statesmen, according to their wont on both sides, speak of making détente irreversible as if the word had a settled and definitive meaning. It has no such meaning but two antithetic meanings—Soviet desistance and an end of resistance to Soviet persistence—so that irreversible détente in one sense means the confounding of détente in the other.

The mismatch has a counterpart in strategic concepts, a matter of palpable importance so that I wish to apply utmost care and precision in discussing it. Conducting policy in peacetime under the rigors of strategic competition entails constant attention to the contingencies of war. The irreducible principle is never to afford one's putative adversary a basis for feeling optimistic about the probable consequences of launching war or of pushing an issue to a point of inducing hostilities. There is more to the matter than that, however. In a situation charged with contention, and with one side optimistic in that sense and the other pessimistic and each side knowledgeable of the other's estimate the probability of war is not high. The constraints, however, are unequal. The side on the heavy end of advantage will be in position to come out ahead at the adversary's expense. In a contrasting controversy, with neither side feeling optimistic about a hypothetical outcome, the constraints tend toward equality, and danger of actual hostilities is low. A strategically and politically stable relationship obtains. Thirdly, for both sides in a contentious situation to feel optimistic in the relevant sense heightens the chances of slippage into war.

The assets which accrued to the United States and put it in the advantaged situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the earlier stages of its first venture into conducting policy in peacetime under conditions of strategic competition included such nonmilitary matters as undamaged civil and institutional morale, a matchless capital plant left intact and even much expanded and improved by the experience of war, great industrial and agricultural productivity, and a uniquely stable currency. To these add strong military resources exemplified in having armed forces attuned to victory and unchallengeable preeminence in military aviation, in naval power generally over the globe, and in nuclear technology with its prodigious strategic potential. Some of those assets were destined to decline in a relative measure because of factors beyond this country's ordaining. The last one listed, preeminence in strategic nuclear power—the anchor of the strength conveyed by grant and pledge to countries far and wide, was abdicated voluntarily in a decision dating from roughly 10 years ago.

The idea behind relinquishing the strategic nuclear advantage, by tapering

off and letting the Soviet Union catch up, was to open a way to establishing an equilibrium of pessimism about the outcome of a putative war between the superpowers. Then each side would feel pressed to back away from war and be in no position to invoke the image of war as an instrument for having its way on issues in contention—a version, as it were, of a nonstrategic basis for peace. The Soviet Union's predisposition to settle for such a standoff and to abstain from striving to supplant the United States in the favored position was assumed without critical examination.

Eight years of exacting negotiations, productive of a succession of intricate agreements, the major one being the centerpiece for the Nixon-Kissinger pilgrimage to Moscow 5 years ago, have not vindicated that last assumption. Does the Soviet Union seek only to complement the U.S. design for nuclear parity and the annulment of nuclear competition as a component of international politics, or does it to the contrary aspire to establish nuclear strategic superiority, which would be susceptible of being brought to bear as an instrument for forwarding the Soviet version of peace as an indefeasible dynamic force propelling toward global triumph for the Soviet Union? As between parity and superiority as Soviet goals, the present U.S. negotiator, Mr. Paul Warnke, professes not to know. In epistemological precision, the verb is correct. One does not *know*. One can infer. Soviet discourse does not replicate U.S. phraseology for expressing a nuclear standoff. Soviet internal writings consistently support the larger estimate of Soviet ambitions. The verified scope of momentum of pertinent Soviet programs can scarcely be reconciled with any other assumption.

An analogy from sports seems appropriate not to prove but only to articulate an idea. Any organized sport is a mixture of ritual and contest. The formular aspects are those equalized by regulation. Contest occurs in the interstices. In football, for example, the size of the gridiron and the allowable number of players in action at any moment are among the matters regulated. Agreement on such dimensions does not write off every game of every season as a tie but only sets broad limits to the contest. Woe to the side which takes the field under a contrary illusion and even, in a fit of sportsmanlike innocence, concedes the other side a dozen or thirteen players to its own eleven or, in a misguided unilateral urge to economize, restricts its own participants to ten or nine. Whether quixotic or stinting, such concessions can only excite the other side's ambition to prevail.

To the disappointment of more committed and sanguine supporters, the negotiations about nuclear arms probably cannot succeed of themselves in prescribing and effectuating a standoff. At best the process may set outer limits without eliminating competition. The gross quantities agreed upon will not succor us but can only set boundaries on the endeavors with which this country must save itself.

Nuclear strategic superiority for the United States is probably irrecoverable. The important thing now is to avoid descent into nuclear strategic inferiority. That matter is to be determined by our own efforts, for the strategic arms talks of themselves are not going to rescue us from that predicament. With that in mind, I earnestly wish for an abatement of this government's anxiety to obtain agreement—the approach which casts our negotiators as the suppliants in bargaining with Moscow.

In Professor Richard Pipes' words, "There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both, and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for himself." As someone has said, the United States is

predisposed to maypole dancing, while the Soviet Union insists on tug-of-war. No third party watches the two superpower contenders in that disjoined match with more avid interest or ventures into the arena more opportunistically with its own version of what game to play than does China. I am loath to give judgments about the land. I have never been there. Those who, having been there, write give me little light. I have a hard enough time understanding the determinants of policy even in my own society. Those operative in China abound, for me, with impenetrable mysteries, but I can at least resist a temptation to believe China's leadership to be endowed with transcendant sapiency. "Do you know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?" Count Oxenstierna inquired three and a half centuries ago. The query is at least equally applicable to China as here or anywhere else. Watching the two superpower societies at the apex, set aside by their exclusory capability to attack and even to destroy each other, China's hierarchs inveigh against the superpowers, both as oppressors and exploiters and profess to eschew superpower status. The show of renunciation probably exemplifies the sort of piety which leads men to denigrate what they most covet.

Conceptually, the dogmatic elements in China's image of the future are akin to the Soviet Union's. What is repellent is the idea of Moscow, rather than Peking, as the New Jerusalem. To elbow Moscow from that summit, the Chinese Communists presumably would do anything within limits of whatever power they may ever attain to. Moscow's awareness of that ambition on the Peking regime's part impels a counter-ambition either to mend fences with China by somehow wooing the regime to conform with Soviet ambitions or to reduce China and thereby to render it subservient or inconsequential to Soviet purposes. Awareness of those contingent intentions makes China's hierarchs fearful of some form of political penetration or of attack and partition from the Soviet Union.

Precaution against any such development is what impelled China to cultivate the United States—but not quite as an ally. China's political hierarchs are too ideologically possessed, basically too abhorrent of the United States, for that. Yet as of the time being they need the United States or at least the shadow of its power. China strategically is not enough to count as a determinative factor but enough to make some difference in the U.S.-Soviet equation. China, moreover, disposes more strategic potential if poised against the Soviet Union than if against the United States. So for a short run, however long it may prove in the test of events, it is prudent to have China as a strategic factor more or less on this side rather than unequivocally opposed. U.S. policy toward mainland China is premised on China's remaining antithetic to the Soviet Union. Making opportune use of the situation is wise, but, in view of China's inscrutability, it would be improvident to stake much moral or material capital on China's constancy.

I now turn to projections. I do so with diffidence. This is not the first time of my letting the Navy down as a seer. A dozen or so years ago a panel of actual and aspirant admirals asked me (I was a consultant on a study of the strategic future of these same waters) to provide a sneak preview covering the following 15 years. I pleaded incapacity. They expressed willingness to settle for probabilities. I expounded the ambiguity of the concept "probable"—citing, in the case of a horse rated as the most probable winner in a race at 5 to 1, the higher probability for a less-probable horse to beat out the most probable. Their expressions signified innocence about playing the ponies. How—this was the next question—can one plan ahead without foreseeing the

future? That question prompted me to a favorite discourse.

We must plan ahead not for a foreseeable future but for the unforeseeable future. Like navigating in heavy weather without a radar, we must look intently ahead because we cannot see ahead. We only discern various possibilities. We try to rate their varying potentials for coming true, for harm or benefit, and for being affected by our own choices. Then we see to the allocating of resources not to conform to prefigured probabilities but to try to affect probabilities and above all to ensure that those in authority later on shall not be deprived of choice, and therefore of freedom, in face of exigencies not now perceivable. Another observation: In such matters we are masters of our own courses but never of how others beyond our fiat may discern and respond to them, much as we may try to anticipate.

It is chancy business. The Japanese did make war in face of our embargo to dissuade their advance toward the Indian Ocean and did surprise our fleet at anchor in a bay and our planes in supine rows on the ground. Adversaries did construe an opportunity for conquest from the lack of guarantees and defenses for South Korea. The Chinese did interpose and find a gap in our lines approaching the Yalu. The other side did exploit our improvident assent to making the demarcation line first item in the Korea armistice talks, risklessly testing the U.S. will with 2 additional years of attrition. In Vietnam our enemies saw and exploited, to ultimate success, the contradiction inherent in our decision to contest for an area whence we longed for exit against forces intent to get in and stay. The thin-skinned *Pueblo* did get pounced on.

The point of that dismal list—I could expand it considerably—is simple. The other side's failure to match our anticipations can land us in perplexity which is what policy analysts classify as a worst-case outcome. Let no reader exemplify the practice, which persists in face of experience and logic, of ruling out worst-case outcomes as marginal and paranoid. "You cannot evaluate policy alternatives on the basis of extreme speculative consequences," the President's counselor on national security affairs, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, recently retorted to a question about consequences of the phasing-out of ground forces from Korea. That counsel is wrong. Such consequences do occur. They must always be taken into account.

Every occurrence on my random list, moreover, had the Western Pacific as its locale. For us it has been a recalcitrant region, prone to confound our premises. I suspect the Indian Ocean of similar perverseness, up to now concealed from us by its century and a half of unmatched strategic stability, under British naval dominance. In both ocean areas, as over the great globe itself, the years just ahead should be expected to present a quickening rate, not a diminution, of challenges and crises.

The pervasive basic circumstance, manifesting itself in a miscellany of local and regional troubles, will be the continuing problem of Soviet purposes and power, dealing with which has been the central feature of U.S. policy in the past three decades. Dr. Brzezinski's recent words about the United States challenging the Soviet Union to cooperate with our aims or "run the risk of becoming historically irrelevant to the great issues of our time" are an exercise in romance. The real situation, rather, approaches fulfillment of Brezhnev's boast in 1970 of a time when "no question of importance in the world can be solved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might."

The Soviet Union is not going to convert to cooperativeness with our preferences and designs. The ruling dogma sets precisely the opposite course. The regime's grasp on power

over its own society depends on that dogma. The regime will not—it cannot—abandon the dogma. The regime will continue, as in the past, to wrestle with production problems and consumer demands, but its command system for allocating resources will not be deflected from emphasis on military programs. The sector of life where the regime feels, with reason, most confident about contesting its adversaries is the military. The Soviet Union will not reciprocate in our projects for a strategic standoff but will approach strategic negotiations as, to use the apt internal phrase, "a highly effective form of class antagonism." Some time soon new leadership must take over in the Soviet Union. There is no reason to expect the younger successors to be less boldly opportunistic than the present leadership. The opposite is more likely to be the case.

As for China, some measure of rapprochement with the Soviet Union—a highly consequential development for us—should not be ruled out of calculation. The Chinese will watch exactingly with what prudence and constancy the United States manages its affairs, especially in respect of countering Soviet power, and will determine their own courses accordingly. China will maintain its irredentist claim to Taiwan, as for reasons of pride it must. Paradoxically, by breaking with Taiwan (if that is in the cards, as I suspect it is) in order to open a way to full formalities with Peking, the United States may satisfy a point of pride at the price of damaging its own reputation for constancy. The result of our impulsion for formally improving relations with Peking may well be substantively to impair them.

As for the United States, I note on the present scene relevant to my topic a propensity to presume the conclusiveness of the U.S. say-so, as if linkages among external issues were ruled by our preferences rather than determined by the nature of things. Because our plans so ordain, the contemplated troop withdrawal from South Korea is supposed to bear no adverse consequences. My doubt duplicates my skepticism in 1951 over London's confided assurance against any change in strategic conditions to follow a projected British pull-out east of Suez.

A companion tendency is to count on the continuity of any convenient circumstance merely for its convenience. A Japanese swing away from disarmed dependency on U.S. strategic protection to a choice between armed neutrality and an accommodation with the other side would indeed be upsetting. So docility is attributed to that historically mercurial nation. I should regard a rekindling of Japanese nationalism, bringing on a basic realignment, as a plausible response to the unilateralism practiced by the United States in the demarche with Peking, the Lockheed affair, and now the decision to remove ground forces from Korea, which bears so directly on Japan's security.

An excessive inclination to trust in pacts, to believe in the feasibility of any desideratum by documenting it in an agreement, is a further characteristic of U.S. policy. A recent illustration is the diplomatic initiative to demilitarize the whole Indian Ocean. How in a practical sense could that be done for an ocean area within the ambit of one side's airpower and not the other's? Candidly, I must question the reliability of any standoff arrangement over such strategic stakes with an ambitious rival practiced in subversion and in waging proxy wars. If we are to maintain our interests there, it must be by naval power on the scene.

Is U.S. policy in a phase of overhasty self-confidence? In asking, I have in mind the current approach to the Arab-Israeli confrontation, with its obvious potential for affecting matters in the Indian Ocean and far beyond. The urge now is to push toward a resolution this year for a set of contentions whose roots are traceable back to events

recounted in the 21st chapter of *Genesis*. Neither side in the chronic quarrel, so I venture, can afford to make the concessions required by the other for a genuine and definitive settlement. Those are issues to be nursed along, not to be heightened by exercising a zeal to get things done wholesale and forthwith.

My last point of particular concern is about Southern Africa, an area of which I feel sufficiently knowledgeable that I wish I might have made it the subject of my whole discourse instead of having its complexities dismissed in a paragraph. There, in my view, policy is not reflecting patience, wisdom, and a grasp of realities commensurate with the magnitude of the stakes. It operates on a basis of clichés rather than of comprehension and presses for so-called settlements and solutions beyond practical reach.

I remember the late Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen's pessimistic estimate concerning the United States' want of realistic insight and of staying power to sustain strategic competition with a dogmatic, enduring, and resourceful adversary. His doubt is yet to be refuted. The new Administration is exceptionally verbal—meaning that it talks much. It has a bent for dubious aphorisms, a favorite one being (test it with a forest ranger in a season of drought) that "fire is better fought with water than with fire." Concerning the new outfit's substantive qualities, I do not as yet feel able to distinguish between transient and ingrained traits. I am open-minded. My hopes are ardent because the needs are so compelling.

The basic necessity is to maintain the strategic nuclear deterrent. To permit the deterrent to become deterred would disqualify us for every other sort of strategic competition. Maintaining the deterrent, however, is only a necessary, not a sufficient, consideration. There are myriad other vexing and expensive tasks, including the maintenance of conventional military strength at a cogent level, to be performed year by year in countering Soviet expansion while avoiding strategic and political isolation. Not to persevere in those tasks must land us in the situation—to paraphrase Machiavelli—of having lost no enemies and kept no friends.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the University of Texas, Charles Burton Marshall received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. After service in the Army in World War II, he served the government in several positions. He was Professor of International Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, from 1965 to 1975. His books include *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (1954) and *The Exercise of Sovereignty* (1965).

*The Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize is a cash award given by the Naval War College Foundation to the author of the best of the professionally worthy essays submitted by a resident student. This, the 1977 prizewinner, argues that the cruise missile is stabilizing, adds an effective element to deterrence, and is an inappropriate arms limitation bargaining chip to squander in order to achieve Backfire Bomber basing restrictions.*

# STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE CRUISE MISSILE

by

Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Ohlert, U.S. Navy

## Nuclear Deterrence Today.

**Elements of Deterrent Policy.** The introduction of large numbers of deliverable nuclear warheads into the Soviet arsenal engendered a new U.S. foreign policy aimed at the prevention of nuclear war through deterrence. U.S. strategy attempts to integrate strategic weapons *procurement*, proposed *employment methods* (targeting doctrine), and strategic *arms limitation* efforts into a coherent design thus increasing the net security of the nation by reducing the probability that a planned or accidental nuclear war will occur. These interactive elements stimulate, and are stimulated by, counterpart programs within the Soviet Union. While different historical experiences and strategies may mold differing perceptions of nuclear war within each nation, the necessary interrelationship of their respective strategic elements yields guidelines for evaluation of procurement alternatives, indicates optimum targeting doctrines to achieve national objectives, and highlights areas for common agreement in arms limitation.

Under the persistent pressure of a vigorous Soviet procurement program, U.S. perceptions of deterrence have evolved from "clear superiority" through "mutual assured destruction" to "flexible response options," ideas expressed largely in terms of refined targeting options. Although changes in Soviet capabilities and U.S. employments imply significant change in mission requirements for the supporting force structure, the realities of weapons procurement–high investment costs and long development times–have resulted in maintaining forces not best suited to present strategy.

The cruise missile, with high prelaunch survivability and usage flexibility simplifies the decision requirements of

second-strike warfare, making the system better suited to a true flexible response strategy than alternative systems. When deployed in combination with present strategic systems, the cruise missile diversifies the attack modes required of Soviet first-strike attempts, provides better coverage of certain elements of the target structure in a retaliatory strike, and avoids undesired Soviet reactions likely to be provoked by alternative systems.

Given an effective guarantee against the outbreak of nuclear war, the cruise missile contributes to subnuclear deterrence by significantly upgrading the capabilities of present general operating forces in otherwise critically deficient areas and thus provides the United States with a credible response less than nuclear war. The combined contributions to nuclear and conventional forces well suit the requirements of flexible response.

**Flexible Response.** The massive Soviet strategic arms program that followed the Cuban missile crisis caused Secretary of Defense McNamara to define "mutual assured destruction"—deterrence through terror with each side possessing the capability to inflict "unacceptable" damage on the opponent even after absorbing a first strike. With nuclear war thus deterred, only conventional war could conceivably occur, and emphasis was given to rebuilding conventional forces of the nation to ensure subnuclear deterrence. The resulting deemphasis of strategic weapons deployment resulted in a steady increase in the relative nuclear power of the Soviet Union (see Table I), nonetheless perceived as nonthreatening as long as "strategic equivalence" was maintained and the Soviet Union could not gain significant advantage in a first strike.

From its inception, however, assured destruction has been beset by a lack of worldwide credibility. European doubts that an American president would condemn U.S. cities in response to an attack on NATO generated pressures for proliferation and a desire that the nuclear deterrence function protecting NATO be autonomous with respect to that covering the United States. This

TABLE I—HISTORICAL CHANGE IN STRENGTH[1]

| | U.S.A. | | | U.S.S.R. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | ICBM | SLBM | Bombers | ICBM | SLBM | Bombers |
| 1962 | 294 | 144 | 600 | 75 | | 190 |
| 1963 | 424 | 224 | 630 | 100 | 100 | 190 |
| 1964 | 834 | 416 | 630 | 200 | 120 | 190 |
| 1965 | 854 | 496 | 630 | 270 | 120 | 190 |
| 1966 | 904 | 592 | 630 | 300 | 125 | 200 |
| 1967 | 1054 | 656 | 600 | 460 | 130 | 210 |
| 1968 | 1054 | 656 | 545 | 800 | 130 | 150 |
| 1969 | 1054 | 656 | 560 | 1050 | 160 | 150 |
| 1970 | 1054 | 656 | 550 | 1300 | 280 | 150 |
| 1971 | 1054 | 656 | 505 | 1510 | 440 | 140 |
| 1972 | 1054 | 656 | 455 | 1527 | 560 | 140 |
| 1973 | 1054 | 656 | 442 | 1527 | 628 | 140 |
| 1974 | 1054 | 656 | 437 | 1575 | 720 | 140 |
| 1975 | 1054 | 656 | 432 | 1618 | 784 | 135 |

doubt has been mollified only by the continued presence of U.S. troops, introduction of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, inclusion of allied planners in targeting decisions at Omaha, and separation of Western Europe from U.S. statements about no first use of nuclear weapons.

A Nixon-Schlesinger reevaluation of the inadequacies of assured destruction resulted in a stated requirement for "flexible response options" which have characterized U.S. deterrence during the 1970s. President Nixon expressed his underlying fears.

> Should a President, in the event of nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?[2]

The major goals of flexible response are

1. To deter a broad range of Soviet military options;

2. To provide incentive and demonstrate U.S. capability to limit war should deterrence fail;

3. To permit continued negotiation even after the commencement of hostilities;

4. To terminate hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States and her allies.

A long sought entrant into U.S. nuclear policy is strategic arms limitation. The high cost of weapons systems, the dangerously unsettling effect of rapidly accelerating weapons technology on world stability, and the unpredictability of result (both in terms of system performance and net security improvement) created a desire to "cap the arms race"—limiting the amount expended on weaponry that one hopes will never be used. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Interim Offensive Agreement (SALT I), Vladivostok Understanding of 1974, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and Environmental Modification Treaty are present agreements resulting from strategic arms limitation efforts.[3]

**Strategic Asymmetries.** The United States and the Soviet Union have not shared identical experiences, nor do they have identical political, military, or cultural characteristics. These asymmetries foster differences in the perceptions of each nation about the relevance of nuclear war to foreign policy, the probable course of war should it occur, and the necessary composition of force structures.

The government of the Soviet Union draws much of its legitimacy from continued primacy in the international Communist movement. Loss of leadership to China or any other nation would remove the basis for Soviet claims to authority and could affect the internal stability of the clique in power if not of the government as a whole. Detente, while reducing direct tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, could not imply an end of support for conversion of nations to communism. Brezhnev's statements in support of continued "wars of liberation" and Soviet efforts in Africa attest to the continued vitality of Soviet expansionism. As the party seeking change, the Soviet Union has the advantage of choosing the time, place, and intensity of confrontation.

Earlier "uprisings" in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and incidents in Poland and the Soviet Union indicate that "population control" is a more serious problem for the Kremlin than for the West. While one party within a Western country may lose its popular support, there are few instances where there is little support for the *type* of govern-

ment. Nor are U.S. troops present in NATO countries against the desires of the host population. The stability of Pact governments, and the continued basing of Soviet troops, requires formal police control and military occupation. The ability of the Soviets to commit presently deployed troops to a mobile front war of uncertain outcome is impaired as unexpected reverses with extended logistic lines might well encourage insurgency among their allies. Further, with dual tasking for occupation troops, larger forces would be required.

While the Soviet Union is at a serious disadvantage in access to open ocean, her land position confers compensating advantages. Soviet industry is connected to its resources, and her allies to her industry, by relatively invulnerable land transport. Road and rail routes are "hard" targets and easily repairable. U.S. sea lines of communication are vulnerable to open ocean interdiction, terminal blockade by SSNs and mines, and destruction of terminal facilities. Thus, isolated from natural resources and probable areas of conflict, U.S. industry will be unable to contribute to an allied war effort until the end of nuclear hostilities permits rebuilding ports and airfields. Interior land lines of communication will favor the Soviet Union in a long war, while the NATO countries will be unable to commence economic recovery until the Soviets permit terminal restoration.

The proximity of NATO allies to forward-deployed Soviet ground forces renders them vulnerable to a rapid investment which would complicate targeting the invaders without sustaining significant collateral damage. Seizure of populated NATO industrial areas represents a nontargetable prize the equivalent of which is not available to Western planners. Concentration of Western industry and population increases their vulnerability (particularly in the absence of civil defense). The natural dispersion of Soviet population and the forced dispersion of industry complicates targeting Soviet economic recovery capabilities. Such targeting favors the Soviet Union more than the United States, and the Soviet Union has an economic "fallback" position in seizing border countries whereas the United States does not.[4]

Past national experience may be expected to affect strategic thought. The United States, isolated from 20th-century land conflict by the oceans, has not suffered severe population losses. Russia, on the other hand, has a long history of wars fought on her soil at high cost in individual lives. (Further, the Soviets have sacrificed millions of lives in execution of domestic policy.) Thus, history has demonstrated to the Russians that war extracts a high price in Russian lives—but a price that Russian and Soviet governments have been willing to pay. Soviet damage limitation efforts may be interpreted as an attempt to ensure that there will be no more Leningrads, while the United States' preoccupation with preventing surprise attack may well stem from the Pearl Harbor experience. Further the United States long enjoyed a nuclear superiority that permitted nuclear war to be pushed out of mind as too terrible for consideration. The Soviet Union has been forced to consider foreign policy ventures in terms of the impact of an oft-threatened massive retaliation. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 appears to have been the catalyst for a procurement program that generated the present force structure. The combination of these national experiences directly affects the basic premise of mutual assured destruction—the guaranteed ability to inflict unacceptable damage on valued items. *Unacceptable* must be correctly defined, and the opponent must *value* the target items. The United States' assignment of unacceptability represents a curious crossing of cultural bounds, and while

historical evidence (the dismantling of German factories) supports high Soviet regard for industry, there is little to indicate that the loss of unskilled population is too high a price to pay in the furtherance of either foreign or domestic policy.[5] Not only is it a speculation for the United States to presume deterrence by the prospect of losses the *Soviets* consider unacceptable, but Soviet civil defense programs and industrial dispersion eventually will blunt U.S. countervalue capability.

The force structures of the United States and the Soviet Union vary more widely than can be explained by technological lag. In 1976, the Soviets had deployed 2,342 warheads of 1 megaton or greater, while the United States had deployed less than 800. Many of these Soviet warheads were post-1975 systems with accuracy and yield efficiencies adequate for the hardest industrial target. Soviet procurement programs remain active long after U.S. ICBM production has ceased (the United States has maintained 1,054 ICBMs since 1967), and Soviet deployments outnumber those of the United States significantly. Greater throw-weights, improving accuracy, and more efficient yields characterize a Soviet strategic rocket force inappropriate to "city-busting" in a countervalue strike.[6] Soviet procurements are plainly guided by mission requirements other than those of mutual assured destruction.

In summary, international Communist competitions force Soviet leaders to be expansionist. Limitations on conventional forces restrict their use and tie them closely to nuclear forces. While the United States postulates that the use of nuclear weapons will be in last resort, the Soviets view them as the spearhead for conventional forces. Targeting against economic recovery most threatens the United States, and American force structure is designed for such a strike. A counterforce strike most threatens the Soviet Union and Russian weapons have counterforce characteristics. The strategic objectives of the two nations appear different.[7]

While the United States views nuclear war as totally undesirable, and U.S. policy is actually one of war avoidance, the Soviets view nuclear war in a traditionally Clausewitzian sense.

> The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons lead war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary . . . immeasurably more effective means of struggle are now at the direct disposal of state power.[8]

**Strategic Cruise Missiles.** To implement its deterrent policy and guarantee long-term stability, the United States has maintained a force structure composed of three major elements—land-based ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and manned intercontinental bombers. The combined characteristics of these systems are intended to

1. render simultaneous first strike upon them impossible;

2. provide a capability for striking required targets;

3. ensure that a technological breakthrough does not simultaneously neutralize all systems.

System characteristics for any individual element of such a system are that it must be *survivable*, *capable* of delivering a warhead to a target, *flexible* to permit use against a variety of targets, and it must be *efficient* if it is employed. If the cruise missile is to be considered a procurement candidate, it must be judged on these characteristics.

only on very important targets that are sure to be destroyed by the expenditure.

With the use of MIRV weaponry, the decision tree is more complex. As Soviet reserve force elements are detected, a value judgment is made justifying expenditure. Next, judgment must be made as to the time sensitivity of the target (e.g., mobile and escaping, or in firing readiness). If it is time sensitive and valuable, a MIRVed missile must be expended on it, thus wasting the warheads not required for its destruction. If the target is not time sensitive or its value does not justify the expenditure of an entire missile, the target is placed into a queue. With targets being detected throughout the world, the responsibility area of each queue must continuously be determined via a mapping function which maximizes the number of targets within the footprint of the delivery vehicle. When an area queue is filled, a MIRVed missile may be expended on it, efficiently using each warhead in the destruction of a valuable target. Queue management is an extremely complex process requiring remapping and reevaluation of the summation of target values in the queue with each new target discovery. This process consumes more time than the decision process for single warhead weaponry, and requires greater capabilities in sustained surveillance, command and control. Extensive computer support is required for queue managers. If Soviet counterbattery capability for backtracking along the course of a missile to localize the firing platform (e.g., a submerged submarine) is suspected, an additional decision must compare the value of all warheads onboard against the targets in a single queue. Alternatively, the size of the queue assigned to a multitube platform may be expanded by targeting every warhead onboard and conducting a rapid complete fireout when the queue is filled. This further increases the time from detection to attack and again burdens sensor systems with a tracking problem and data renewal requirements. To grasp the resulting control problem, consider a *Trident* submarine loaded with 24 missiles, each carrying 14 warheads. For optimal fireout with one warhead per target (some targets may, however, require additional warheads to achieve an acceptable kill probability) 336 targets must be detected and tracked. Then integrate the *Trident* into the national decision structure with other *Tridents*, Minutemen, bombers, etc. Clearly this is an immense problem to consider, let alone solve optimally. Computer size considerations indicate that this type of war, with MIRV weaponry, cannot be fought from an airborne command post and can be fought from ground-based command centers only if surveillance feedback and high data rate communications survive. Yet, with a nuclear force significantly reduced by a Soviet first strike, failure to use every surviving warhead to maximum efficiency will lower the postwar relative power of the United States versus the Soviet Union and degrade chances of achieving an acceptable settlement. The strong implication is that if the United States should find itself in a nuclear war in the near future, it will be armed with weapons ill-suited to the decision requirements of such war.

**Theater Nuclear Weapons.** Present stockage of theater nuclear weapons in Europe has created concern for their vulnerability to assault or sabotage. The range of the cruise missile will permit its emplacement in more secure, but tactically ready sites.

**Tactical Cruise Missiles.** Under any effective guarantee of nuclear deterrence, conventional forces assume increased importance in preventing lower order conflict not credibly deterred by nuclear threats. The cruise missile,

conventionally armed, complements present land and naval general purpose forces, and contributes to subnuclear deterrence.

Use Modes. There are three general categories of conventional usage of the capabilities represented by the long-range cruise missile;

1. strike of fixed site point or area targets;

2. strike of mobile targets acquired by onboard guidance systems;

3. forward pass of ordnance from a "storage" platform to a controlling or designating agent.

Striking fixed position targets requires prior intelligence or a targeting loop with supporting reconnaissance and communication facilities. Examples of targets in this category include headquarters facilities, communication sites, ammunition depots, fuel dumps, bridges, rail and road freight transfer points, pipe or electrical line energy supply, troop and armor formations, and routes of imminent passage. Not all of these targets are amenable to attack by warheads presently under consideration and define a need for area coverage as well as point target destruction.

Striking mobile targets acquired by onboard guidance is best illustrated by the proposed sea version of Tomahawk which is capable of terminal guidance against shipping. Development of a similar capability for acquisition ashore would permit striking land mobile targets within a wide geographic area. Moving trains, mobile SAMs and tracked armor or artillery are targets in this category.

Forward pass of ordnance to a user from a central storage point would seem to be the category of greatest promise for cruise missile variants. Delivery on call or time schedule to forward deployed missile controllers would permit heavy ordnance delivery by light infiltration teams on land. Delivery of midcourse controllable ordnance would permit replenishing forward platforms without requiring their return for rearm. For example, airborne combat air patrol aircraft defending against a large Backfire raid will rapidly expend their air-to-air missiles. Launching additional aircraft may not be possible if the carrier deck is being respotted or has sustained battle damage. Given the speed of the Backfire and its missiles, there may be insufficient time for a deck-launched interceptor to gain a firing solution. The loiter characteristics of the cruise missile (or a recoverable variant) would permit "busing" additional air-to-air missiles from a picket ship to F-14 aircraft for their automatic control during peak threat times or high intensity engagement.

Cruise missiles under local control could precede a manned aircraft strike, reducing the threat to aircraft penetration. Missions of potentially high attrition could be assigned to cruise missiles, sparing aircraft assets for missions requiring greater flexibility. The presence of cruise missiles within a strike group would multiply the targets that must be acquired by the opposing air defense net, contributing to saturation. The low payload characteristics of V/STOL aircraft might be given some relief by requiring only that the aircraft carry missile control equipment and use forward passed ordnance upon arrival at the target. Systems already in advanced development will add to the potential uses of the cruise missile or complement the system in the forward pass mode. Advanced Multipurpose Missiles, Copperhead and Hellfire, Ground Laser Locator-Designator antiarmor systems, Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor Systems, and Standoff Acquisition systems are a few programs with potential contributions.[9]

**Specific Deficiencies Aided by Cruise Missiles.** Cruise missile systems may significantly restore credibility to conventional deterrence in the Central Front area of Europe. As mentioned previously, the potential exists for rapid investment of Soviet ground forces into fallout sensitive areas within allied nations. The low collateral damage of the conventionally armed cruise missile will permit targeting in such circumstances. The presently perceived threat of a rapid armor/mobile infantry thrust into Europe diminishes when one considers that all known Soviet fuel depots, ammunition storage sites, transportation nets, communication sites and even headquarters could be struck by accurate, low-flying cruise missiles within 2 hours of the outbreak of hostilities. Routes of advance—even in unexpected directions—could be mined and forward Soviet units delayed or isolated from supply and reinforcement. Present Army tactics call for a zone of attrition to reduce the Soviet impact upon arrival at a main battleline. Attrition teams need only be armed with target designators and communications equipment, unhampering their mobility and allowing them to remain undetected.

Declining naval gunfire capability in the face of sophisticated defenses has thrown the amphibious mission of the Marine Corps into some question. The strategic importance of areas such as Iceland and Denmark imply that the requirement for amphibious capability has not declined. Destruction of fixed site targets and the forward passing of ordnance to infiltration teams will reduce the enemy's ability to oppose a major assault. The rapid all-weather availability of cruise missiles may restore some of the responsiveness in supporting fire not available from carrier-based air. Owing to its low trajectory, naval gunfire is unable to engage defiladed targets, while the cruise missile with terrain-following capability does not share this disadvantage.

Platforms for at-sea carriage of the cruise missile can be the escorts for the high value unit, thus decentralizing a portion of the projection power of the carrier task force. The multiplicity of targets within any task force capable of an offensive role will force the Soviets to attack all units, thus diffusing the forces opposing the carrier task group. Given present prehostilities rules of engagement for a carrier in a high threat environment, the first engagement of U.S.-Soviet naval forces is likely to be followed by an attempt to extract a damaged carrier after it has been struck preemptively. The offensive strike power of the escorts then would be critical to carrier survival.

**Cost Considerations.** While the cruise missile may be viewed as an expensive system, there are significant efficiencies which reduce the life cycle costs of the system.[10] Its employment may free expensive aircraft from high attrition missions, and preclude destruction of otherwise vulnerable NATO forces.

Package deployment and central stockage will reduce maintenance costs compared to alternative systems. Training requirements are small compared to pilot training, and recoverable missiles may be used. The long range of the system permits an area defense rather than prepositioning at several forward points—some of which might be vulnerable to enemy interdiction and others out of the area of conflict. As in the nuclear area, Soviet counters to the conventional warhead cruise missile will likely include defense upgrading, which will reduce funds available for offensive investment, thereby lessening the defensive requirements of NATO.

The rapid response of the system against the logistics of a major attack on NATO will permit stabilization times measured in hours instead of days, thereby saving territory and equipment from destruction and enhancing NATO counteroffensive capability.

High threat operating areas impose unacceptable attrition rates on manned aircraft. Missions demanding flexibility and an onscene decisionmaker will require that aviation assets be husbanded. Cruise missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, and manned aircraft complement each other in a cost/capability spectrum that dictates roles for each. Thus, high attrition missions requiring low flexibility are best handled by a cruise missile, while low attrition high flexibility missions are best handled by manned aircraft.

Summary. The very large force structures deployed by both the Soviet Union and the United States cannot be justified solely on the basis of guaranteeing the assured destruction of a percentage of the enemy's population and industrial base. The survival of only a few warheads would accomplish this relatively simple task. Only the desire to guarantee that, in postwar conditions, the opponent does not have sufficient unopposed reserve nuclear forces to conquer the world accounts for the large numbers. In a deterrent strategy based primarily upon demonstrated capability to reestablish strategic equivalence, the cruise missile demonstrates "war-fighting" characteristics superior to MIRVed systems. Inflight vulnerability of the cruise missile will require coordinated tactics for its use with other strategic elements, and second-strike ad hoc targeting of reserve nuclear elements will require substantial reconnaissance and communications support.

The prelaunch survival characteristics of the cruise missile, in the tradition of the present members of the TRIAD, demand that it be attacked by means that can not take advantage of surprise. The difficulty of coordinating an attack on *all* elements of a QUADRIGA will reduce further the possibility of surprise nuclear war.

Likely Soviet response to the cruise missile involves a buildup of conventional forces, representing a diversion of assets from fallout-producing ICBMs. An improved Soviet defensive capability will permit the Soviet decisionmaker more time for consideration in a crisis and aid in relieving him from a decision to "go nuclear" early in a crisis to avoid elimination of his force structure.

The cruise missile will contribute to subnuclear deterrence by upgrading general force capabilities and by providing a conventional warhead able to perform previously nuclear missions, thus raising the nuclear threshold.

The cruise missile represents the ideal in offensive weaponry for a second-strike-oriented nation. Its slow flight speeds preclude its use as a first-strike weapon, while its high prelaunch survivability deters an opponent's first-fire decision. Further development of highly survivable offensive systems coupled with treaty-mandated defensive development may permit restoration of the dominance of policy over strategy in nuclear warfare, area for maneuver for statesmen, and initiation of a national policy of mutual assured survival.

Conclusions.

—Deterrence under flexible response is achieved by ensuring that the Soviet Union does not have an attractive nuclear option in attacking the United States. Rather than the assured ability to destroy Soviet cities, an assured ability to reestablish strategic equivalence on second strike better accounts for U.S. procurements.

—This deterrent strategy mandates that a weapon system be survivable, capable, flexible and efficient. MIRVed systems complicate the decision requirements of second-strike warfare while single warhead systems lead to a form of decision efficiency critical to optimum use of strategic assets.

—The cruise missile is "stabilizing" in that its slow flight time precludes first-strike use and its conventional

capability permits a delay in the decision to "go nuclear" for lack of adequate conventional response.

–Over-the-horizon targeting and wartime control dictate requirements for complementary system development, particularly in reconnaissance, data processing, communications and control.

–The cruise missile will contribute to nuclear deterrence, add an effective element to TRIAD, and contribute to subnuclear deterrence, augmenting existing general purpose forces.

–If the cruise missile is to be restricted through arms limitations, a more commensurate trade than proposed backfire basing restrictions (easily violated in crisis) is appropriate.

–Given the active cruise missile development programs of several nations, U.S. unilateral restraint in developing and deploying cruise missiles will remain unilateral.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1966, Lieutenant Commander Ohlert served in several electronics and weapons associated billets in VA-34, VA-72, and U.S.S. *Oriskany*. He received an advanced degree in Electronics from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1974 and was a student at the Naval War College in 1976-77. He is now assigned to VA-82.

## NOTES

1. *The Military Balance 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 73. Note that the capability of a force structure is composed of many elements–numbers of launchers being only one measure. In general, Soviet missiles have larger payloads and less accuracy than U.S. systems. Fewer are MIRVed. Technological gains permitting greater accuracy, efficient MIRVing, and improved-yield warheads will further accentuate the *trend* highlighted by Table I.

2. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 35.

3. Donald Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977), pp. 49-50.

4. Henry Young discusses the economic incentives facing Communist leadership in crisis in the November 1976 Naval Institute *Proceedings* article "Holocaust for Happy Valley."

5. Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that 20-25 percent population kill and destruction of 75 percent of Soviet industry would constitute unacceptable damage. A 20 percent population kill, 40 million persons, would approximately equal the Russian losses in World War II and the purges combined. Recent studies of the Soviet civil defense program, however, question the ability to kill more than approximately 13 million–less than either World War II or the purges, thus challenging the term "unacceptable."

6. Better area coverage of a "soft" urban target can be achieved by a number of small warheads than by a single large warhead. Accuracy is required only if one wishes to strike a specific portion of the urban area and minimize collateral damage. "Hard" targets, such as ICBM silos, are better struck with accurate large yield warheads. While large yield warheads on older systems may be interpreted as an attempt to overcome inaccurate guidance, large warheads on modern accurate systems indicate that counterforce is their intended use.

7. U.S. intelligence agencies noted the apparent disparity in objectives and characterized Soviet strategy as "war winning." Presently deployed Soviet capabilities do not warrant characterization as beyond war survival or damage limitation; however, this is perhaps a narrow distinction as a war-fighting capability is essential to each of these strategies. Continued Soviet counterforce deployments will lend credence to the consideration that their goal is a war-winning capability.

8. "Communist of the Armed Forces" as quoted in *Soviet World Outlook* (Washington, D.C.: University of Miami Center for International Studies, 13 February 1976).

9. Rumsfeld, pp. 167-168.

10. Secretary Brown's comments following President Carter's June decision on the B-1/Cruise Missile issues stressed cost effectiveness of B-52s upgraded with cruise missiles over the B-1.

*A review of balance of power theory reveals that three nations, each in competition with the others, seldom enjoy that stability of relationship necessary for extended peace. The United States-China-Soviet Union triangle may prove to be different because of increasing emphasis on and attention to communication; it must prove different because of potential consequences.*

# REFLECTIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY

by

**William A. Platte**

Perceptions and beliefs of a society are difficult to change. William James' conception of society as a huge flywheel, whose tremendous inertia can be overcome only by repeated nudges, has been validated.[1] A major validation of the "flywheel thesis" concerns the international political system. It required roughly a decade for Americans and others to begin to realize that their world was no longer "bipolar."

It had been easy, if unpleasant, for American society to accept the concept of a world led by two superpowers, two giant nation-states, each leading a camp composed of sometimes ardent, sometimes reluctant "client" nation-states. World War II brought about this new phenomenon: of the victorious Allies only two remained major world actors. Without going into the several interpretations of the origin of the cold war,[2] it nevertheless can be stated that it was not difficult for both camps, Soviet and U.S., East and West, to slide into entirely Manichaean views of the world, each holding that the other embodied evil.

A continuing series of crises, nearly all of which involved some application of military power, reinforced the view of a dichotomous world. But during the 1960's a phenomenal transition in world politics began. Unnoticed by all but a few astute observers, world politics began to move from a bipolar to a "tripolar," or "triangular," orientation of power.

To be sure, a bipolar world had been, by and large, a theoretical expression, a model, only in part a true description of the international political system. The innovative school of modern systematic political theorists usually differentiated even a bipolar world. Among six theoretical world political systems, Morton Kaplan conceived loose bipolar and tight bipolar models and thought that post-World War II international politics more closely resembled the former.[3]

By 1963, it was predicted that in the next 10 years "the system of polarization of power will cease to be recognizable; that other states will count for so much in world politics that the two present great powers will find it difficult, even when cooperating, to dominate them."[4] Theorists began to search for international political models more apropos of the present decade. One of the most provocative models derived from this search was Rosecrance's prescription for a "bi-multipolar system."[5]

The newer models were not conceived on the basis of hard evidence that great international political changes were in progress. However, considerable evidence of change had been recorded by a small group of Western Sinologists and Sovietologists who, admittedly somewhat after the fact because of the necessity for the time-consuming decipherment of Communist esoteric communication, discerned the initial cracks in the theretofore monolithic Communist empire.

Although North[6] had chronicled the disregard, if not outright hostility, shown by Moscow to the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920-1945 period, it was Zagoria's *tour de force* in 1964 that, after examining the record of the erstwhile international Communist compatriots in the 1956-1961 period, authoritatively revealed the high potential for a definite and lasting split between Moscow and Peking.[7]

Major additions to the literature on the Sino-Soviet rift were made by Griffith,[8] Mehnert,[9] Brzezinski,[10] Ulam,[11] and Crankshaw.[12] By the late 1960's, literature and documentation on Chinese-Soviet relations was fairly comprehensive. In 1968, Gittings chronicled the dispute in book form through 1967.[13] Clemens related the dispute to arms control efforts by Washington and Moscow, and gave modest attention to the triangular relationship developing between Moscow, Washington, and Peking.[14]

However, the triangular relationship, or tripolarity, between Peking, Moscow, and Washington was not the major focus of these works. As the 1960's ended, interested readers could forage through excellent volumes on the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, or on U.S.-Soviet relations, including strategic warfare and deterrence, or on U.S.-Chinese relations since the end of World War II.

However, there was no single volume that treated in detail the new situation in world politics at the turn of the decade. There was some news commentary and a few magazine articles, but even these did not begin to appear until the Sino-Soviet rift erupted in widely publicized border fighting from March to August 1969.

Harsch was one of the first news analysts to acknowledge the new world political phenomenon and to question its implications.[15] In late 1969 he noted, "Life in a triangular-power world is going to be more fluid, less predictable than it was in the old two-power world which now recedes into history behind us."[16]

Others analyzed "the big triangle in world relations" and explored the policy implications of a Sino-Soviet war for the United States.[17]

In December 1969, Davies published a provocative analysis of the triangular relationship: "The U.S. Invented the Imbalance of Power" alluded to the theoretical aspect of a triangular international system.[18]

In 1970, triangular power relationships were more regularly discussed.[19] But the analysis of the triangular power relationship was still inadequate and often directed only in part toward the major international systemic phenomenon.[20]

The common characteristic of scholarly effort and news commentary on Chinese-Soviet-U.S. relations was its emphasis on balance or equilibrium. Most authors, representing commonly held sentiment, voiced their preference

for peace and stability, or the status quo, or at most, very gradual change. They evidenced real trepidation at the emergence of a tripolar situation involving three nuclear nations, for this was a heretofore unknown development in history. Having become accustomed, in 25 years, to a "bipolar equilibrium," their implicit question was "Can there be a tripolar equilibrium?" There must be some grounds on which to base an affirmative answer, for there had to be at least a possibility that three superstates somehow could achieve a balance or equilibrium. Any one of the three powers could adjust its position ever so slightly away from the second and toward the third power to maintain balance and avoid the possibility of all three plunging into the abyss of war. The three powers may be viewed as aerialists balanced on a frame mounted atop a great tower—they must interact in very coordinated fashion or their frame becomes destabilized and, in company with the aerialists, falls to the ground.

But difficulties in translating an aerialist model to the reality of international politics are substantial. Aerialists can see and communicate and feel the results of the others' moves immediately, and therefore respond rapidly and accurately to adjust their collective balance. International diplomacy unfortunately exhibits many of the opposite characteristics: nations keep secrets from each other, they often refuse to speak to each other, and their perception of moves by the others has been regularly in error. Aerialists must perform successfully in order to earn their living. National decisionmakers, on the other hand, may deem it advantageous, within limits, to upset an existing equilibrium. Once this is done, for however limited an aim, the prevalence of misperception and over or underreaction in the past record of international political performance indicate that there is a fairly high probability that the other states concerned may act so as to further destabilize the equilibrium rather than restore it.

Estimating this probability has been a major occupation of political theorists, historians, and commentators since time immemorial. The body of theory, commentary and outright speculation on the balance of power in all its ramifications is huge. But in considering the ramifications of the present at least tripolar world, it will be useful to search the balance of power literature for theory on tripolar or multipolar systems.

The concept of balance of power has been expressed in four basic ways; as propaganda, as a policy prescription, as a system, and as a mode of analysis of the international political scene. Governmental information agencies will sound an alarm that the balance is being endangered, or cite the need for maintaining or restoring a balance of power in justification for national actions. Politicians, diplomats, and statesmen often assist this propaganda effort, but tend to emphasize the use of the balance of power as a prescription for national actions—the balance of power should be "enhanced," or "maintained," or "restored," or "institutionalized"—as the case may be. Both statesmen and scholars have been concerned with the balance of power as a system. In systematic terms, the concept is one in which some states work away from an equilibrium, causing other states to work to restore it, a process that can be seen as dangerous or beneficial. If the former view prevails, the balance of power system should be destroyed and a substitute found. Thus Woodrow Wilson fought for collective security in the League of Nations. If the latter view prevails, the balance of power system of course should be enhanced by any means available.

Scholars have tended to concentrate on the analytic definition of the term.[21] Distinctions have been made

between static balances of power and dynamic balances of power, between regional or limited balances of power and universal balances of power. In considering a static balance, a distinction may be drawn between an equal, or balanced, condition or an unequal, or imbalanced, condition. In considering a dynamic balance, a distinction usually is made as to whether the balance is the result of either an automatic or a manual process involving a nation or nations in a conscious role as the makeweight or "balancer." (The automatic process is referred to as the "Hidden-Hand" mechanism.) Regional or limited balances of power, while certainly of some applicability today, are better defined as phenomena of yesteryear. Universal balances of power, on the other hand, are modern phenomena if the concept of the "known limits of the ancient world" is disallowed.[22]

Scholars began making these analytical distinctions many centuries ago, for the concept was known and applied in the Greek city-states, Egypt, India, and China.[23] A "prevailing notion of ancient times,"[24] the concept of balance of power declined to insignificance during the days of the Roman Empire. However, it revived and achieved wide recognition thereafter. Especially after the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, the balance of power became a cardinal feature of international politics.[25] According to Friedrich, Bernardo Rucellai, related to the Medicis, first explicitly stated the doctrine in modern times.[26] Machiavelli's comments emphasize a concept of triangles or trilateral relations. He spoke of balancing processes between three states in *The Prince*, under three headings:

> "Active Alliance Wins Friendship." (. . . irresolute princes, attempting to escape present danger, most of the time follow the neutral road and most of the time fall. . . .)
>
> "Alliance With A Weak Prince May be Profitable."
>
> "Never Make a Voluntary Alliance With a Stronger Power."[27]

Machiavelli's advice to the prince effectively made the transition through the centuries. Friedrich noted that there has been a "balancer behind each balance."[28] The balancer was highly desirable, if not indispensable, and the keystone of the entire theory.[29] Herz made the "holder of the balance" one of three conditions for a balance of power resulting from conscious policies.[30]

Following World War II, accompanying the general realization that the world had become bipolar, scholars began to raise questions about the balancer. Morgenthau decided that the balancer was a variant of a basic form of opposition of two alliances, which was the more frequent form.[31] Others began to see the balancer merely as one of several ways in which a balance of power might be maintained.

Wright visualized a rather grandiose evolutionary scheme in which a bipolar balance of power was the result of a long process and perhaps the last step before a universal state:

> In operating the balance of power, small states tend to federate or to seek protection. Great states will frequently find it possible in spite of the balance of power to annex a small neighbor and will sometimes compensate one another by dividing, rather than defending, the small. Furthermore, the conditions of developing military technology tend to increase the relative disparity of the great and the little. This process of eliminating the lesser, then the middle sized, and finally some of the great states, tends toward a bipolar world—Athens vs. Sparta, Rome vs. Carthage, Bourbon vs. Hapsburg, France vs. Britain, Triple Alliance

vs. Triple Entente, Soviet Union vs. United States.

When bipolarity is reached, each of the centers of power fears attack by the other. No allies are possible because all are now associated with one or the other center of power and consequently the center of power against which time appears to be running is likely to start a war. Eventual war is likely to be considered inevitable and consequently, even though the chances of success are not good, it would be better to run the risk now than later. Such conditions have in the past often led to a termination of a system of power politics by the establishment of a universal state through conquest.[32]

In the continental style, Aron was willing to give equal attention to bipolar equilibrium and to what he called multipolar equilibrium.[33] After analyzing the systems in some detail,

> The multipolar and bipolar configurations are as radically opposed as they are pure types. At one extreme, each principal actor is the enemy and the possible partner of all the rest. At the other, there are only two principal actors, enemies by position if not by ideology. In the first case, alliances are temporary, in the second they are lasting; in the first case the allies do not recognize any leader, in the second all the political units, save the two leaders, are subject to the will of the latter. In the first case several units remain outside the alliance, in the second all units are willy-nilly obliged to lend their allegiance to one or the other of the blocs.[34]

Aron decided that a bipolar system "may not, as such, be more unstable or more belligerent than a multipolar system, but it is more seriously threatened by a generalized and exorable war."[35] Without a "third man," the two great powers would be perpetually in conflict, either directly or through surrogates. Nevertheless, Aron was hopeful for bipolar stability in the nuclear age. Now, the means of destruction which the Soviet Union and the United States possess might change *the essence* of diplomatic-strategic competition. "On every level, differences of quantity provoke qualitative revolutions."[36]

The work of Rosecrance contains further analysis and a synthesis of Aron's view that there were possibilities for stability in a modern, nuclear bipolar world. Rosecrance's "bi-multipolar world," however, is regarded with even greater optimism:

> As a result of the threatened spread of nuclear weapons today, however, it is no longer certain that allies alone may enjoy the benefits of deterrent protection. India, in particular, may be able to retain her nonalignment while participating in nuclear guarantees of the big powers. If this occurs generally in the neutralist world . . . (outcomes which disadvantage allies and reward neutrals) . . . a considerable movement toward greater neutrality might be attained. . . .
>
> In such a case, . . . there would no longer be a difference between allies and neutrals. The growth of multipolar sentiment would presumably reinforce the *detente* between bipolar powers . . ..[37]

The pathbreaking theoretic work of Kaplan should be compared to the Wright-Aron-Rosecrance sequence. Following Wright, Kaplan traces the rise of a bipolar system consequent to the collapse of a balance of power system. He then differentiates between a loose bipolar system and a tight bipolar

system, the former bearing some resemblance to Rosecrance's bi-multipolar system, the latter more similar to Aron's bipolar equilibrium. Kaplan believed that a loose bipolar system could, given proper conditions, revert to a balance of power system (foreshadowing Rosecrance), but, with equal probability, it could transit to a tight bipolar system, a hierarchical system, a universal international system, or a unit veto system. His estimate was that the loose bipolar system could be marginally stable while the tight bipolar system was likely to be highly unstable. Unlike Aron, Kaplan was not particularly optimistic over the potential for a bipolar system to avoid war and maintain an equilibrium. In fact, he believed that suspicions generated in a tight bipolar system tend to undermine equilibrium and that, if there were an advantage in surprise, one bloc might strike.[38]

Thus it is possible to distinguish two viewpoints on the question of equilibrium, balance, and stability in the international system. One view would favor the balance of power condition over the bipolar conditon as more conducive to world peace and stability. The second holds at least some hope for a bipolar balance under modern conditions.[39] After an exhaustive review of the balance of power literature, one researcher concluded that post-World War II history *in fact has been* one of "dual predominance" in separated areas, which therefore would be best described as a "balanced" situation of two power blocs, albeit with some conflict but nevertheless avoiding Armaggedon.[40]

It may be asked whether any of these scholars and theorists have risked applying numbers to their balance of power theorems. The answer is "only very rarely." Wright speaks of numbers of nations only in general terms:

> The greater the number of states and the more nearly equal their power, the more stable is the equilibrium. In a system composed of a large number of equal states, no one can defy all successfully. Consequently, if all are ready to curb aggression, no aggression can be successful. As the number of states diminishes, the relative power of each against the whole becomes greater and the hope of successful aggression by the more powerful increases.[41]

Rosecrance notes, as favorable to the multipolar view, the Deutsch-Singer position that an 11-state world (assuming their relative equality of power) would avoid serious conflict.[42] Kaplan would probably concur in the "11" figure. He is on record with the view that *three* nations are too few for a viable system.

> A system of three large nations would probably have been inherently unstable. It might still be possible in a three-nation system for the nation defeated in a war to combine with the weaker of the victorious nations against the stronger victor. But the risks would be great and the opportunities to undo mistakes would be minimal. Such a system would place a high premium on striking first, on taking advantage of opportunity, on forming combinations, and on betraying allies. In a three-nation system, under conditions of conventional capabilities, turmoil and strife would be the rule; and the number would soon be reduced.[43]

He goes on to say that "In the 'balance of power' system a minimum number of five major nations probably was necessary for stability."[44] Looking ahead to the eventuality of a multibloc system in which each bloc, or its leading nation, had protected second-strike nuclear forces, Kaplan predicted not a system with balance of power characteristics but one with unit veto characteristics, a sort of nuclear Hobbesian state of nature.[45]

This review of the balance of power literature, particularly in regard to attempts to be more precise in numbers of nations required to maintain a balance, is therefore discouraging for the prospects of a tripolar world. Identifying a scholar-theorist who believes that a trilateral relationship between today's superpowers would be stable or balanced, is not possible. Only Aron has seen light at the end of the tunnel, and his light seems indistinct; he is more hopeful than scientifically persuasive. This, surely, is the main reason for his prayerful emphasis on prudence and circumspection as requirements for all world leaders.

Yet among current analysts specifically addressing triangular Chinese-Soviet-U.S. relations, Harsch and Davies stand alone as being overtly pessimistic over the portent. Harsch's commentary reads almost as though he had just laid aside Kaplan before putting pen to paper. In Davies' case, pessimism is based more on practice than theory. Davies believes that a modern tripolar system will not be workable or stable simply because of certain empirical evidence accumulated thus far. To wit, the United States will be insufficiently adept, diplomatically, to operate a triangular balance of power coherently. Thus he sees instability, disequilibrium, and the danger of general war not because of international systemic idiosyncracies but almost purely because of the record of prevalent human error or perverse judgment. This view, which holds that the international diplomatic record is more important than any theory, however persuasive, is worthy of attention.

If one were to imagine oneself in the role of decisionmaker in the Soviet, Chinese, or U.S. Governments under present circumstances, one probably would prefer to decide from the point of view of the balancer. The balancing, or makeweight, diplomatic role for a nation is obviously most advantageous, for it allows freedom of movement presumably not available to the other two powers. An ability to act effectively as the makeweight in a balance of power situation thus may be taken as a criterion for measuring the diplomatic record of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

Taking the Chinese case, there is available a long record of diplomatic flexibility and astuteness. Chinese decisionmakers from the earliest days of empire practiced balance of power diplomacy, often in triangular form, and regularly attempted to balance several triangular situations concurrently. China, vulnerable to attack and disruption not only from the hinterlands of Asia but from seacoast pirates, raised massive corvees to construct coastal fortifications and the Great Wall commenced by the Han emperors. But the Chinese were equally active, diplomatically. Their practice of playing "near barbarians" against "distant barbarians" is in many ways a classic case of balance of power diplomacy, with the Middle Kingdom acting as makeweight. The Mandarins supported one side, then the other. They threatened, bribed, rewarded, promised, or seduced various tribal or clan chieftains as necessary to maintain their own polity free from disruption. Their ultimate degree of diplomatic success, of course, is debatable—there have been as many "dynasties of conquest" as there have been "domestic dynasties," although the Chinese are known to have invited and then assimilated the "conquerors."

The last Chinese dynasty, the Manchu dynasty of conquest, encountered diplomatic, economic, and military pressures from outside Asia due to European and American expansion. If Chinese success against Asian disruptions had been equivocal, Chinese measures, including balance of power diplomacy, were fruitless against Western penetration. The self-centered and self-satisfied Chinese leadership was

hopelessly outclassed by the dynamic Westerners. One poignant tale is that of Chinese attempts to influence Czarist aims by embargoing the shipment of rhubarb to Russia.[46] Needless to say, a rhubarb shortage did not affect Russian policy.

By 1911, when Sun Yat-sen managed to give the coup de grace to the Manchu, China had become a shuttlecock in the badminton game of modern power politics. She had become relatively so weak that her opportunities to act as makeweight became nonexistent.

In the late 1920's and the 1930's, China became a pawn in the struggle between the Soviet Union and Japan, a device through which Stalin sought to enhance Soviet security. Stalin's policy in the period, to assist Chiang even at the expense of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should be viewed in light of the fact that Chiang was the Chinese leader best equipped to make China a fitting counterweight to Imperial Japan. The Soviet Union was practicing balance of power diplomacy, acting as the makeweight in a Tokyo-Moscow-Nanking triangle. The record in this case parallels Soviet interwar diplomacy in Europe. From Rapallo in 1922 to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, the Soviets maneuvered in astonishing fashion to achieve their goals. Between 1920 and 1937, Moscow entered into nearly 300 international agreements of all types. This record of diplomatic initiative and flexibility indicates full familiarity with balance of power strategy and little hesitancy in applying it wherever and whenever necessary.

After World War II, Moscow continued its emphasis on active diplomacy, and acted as a balancer on several nonnuclear occasions. Among the most important of these has been the attempt to build up India as a counter to an increasingly hostile China in the early 1960's (the Moscow-Peking-New Delhi triangle), mediation between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1966 (the Moscow-New Delhi-Islamabad triangle), and, lately, attempts to cement Japanese-Soviet relations as a counter to a completely hostile China, by trade and development agreements for Siberia. Moscow's diplomacy has come full circle: In the 1930's Stalin and Molotov tried to build up China to counter Japan; in the 1970's Brezhnev has wooed Japan to counter a hostile China.

In addition to these fairly obvious cases of Soviet diplomatic activity, there is the distinct but not often recognized possibility that Moscow in fact was supporting Maoist China in the period 1949-1960 as a counterbalance to tremendous U.S. power.[47] That this was a specifically designed policy by Moscow, acting in a balancer's role, may be open to some question. Nevertheless, an objective view of the history of those 11 years would be that Moscow did benefit from Washington's perception of a monolithic Sino-Soviet structure. The Soviet Union used the 11-year time span to gain strength vis-à-vis the United States. As Moscow grew stronger, the Chinese "partnership" became less necessary.

It has been said that the Soviet Union's one-party government is better suited to dealing with enemies than with friends,[48] and that the Soviet experience in dealing with internal borderland nationalities ill-prepared it for a diplomacy among equals,[49] neither of which opinions seem to detract from the Soviet record of active, advantage-seeking diplomacy and tendency to use balance of power principles; more specifically, to act as a balancer whenever possible.

The search for world order through world government and world law has been a distinctive feature of U.S. foreign policy since the turn of the century. Both publicly and privately, Americans can be said to have pursued diligently a utopia that was based on a static moral balance, or imbalance, of power. The

tragedy in this great American search is not only that such an orderly imbalance has thus far proved unreachable, but that in their quest Americans rejected or, at best, forgot balances in their concentration on collective security. In fact, the balance of power became a phrase of opprobium—America wanted nothing to do with it—it had so often "failed" with disastrous results—American policy would be based on much loftier premises.

It therefore has become fashionable to criticize American idealism, to assert that the United States must come back to hard reality and practice "power politics," the balance of power routine. According to some, failure to act as balancer on repeated occasions has been disastrous for the United States:

> Given four adversaries, our Government managed at each level to act so as to favor the stronger: Hanoi over the indigenous Communists in the South, Peking over Hanoi, and Moscow over Peking. And all this was done at exorbitant cost to the American people. For a quarter of a century Democratic and Republican administrations doggedly pursued a lavish strategy of our own invention—a strategy of imbalance of power.[50]

Over the long run, however, such criticisms may be very one-sided and unjust. It is easy to be persuaded by U.S. rhetoric and ignore U.S. practice. In the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress, through Benjamin Franklin, finally arranged for assistance from France to counterbalance British supremacy. Again in 1812 the United States was able to balance the two and emerge successful. In the Civil War both North and South sought European allies to balance the threat of the other. World Wars I and II may be viewed in the sense that U.S. entry into combat was an attempt to restore a faltering balance. Washington did not relish the thought of all Europe under German hegemony.[51] More recently, American policy could be viewed as motivated by a desire to promote a multilateral European counterweight (NATO) to Soviet action in Eastern Europe and a similar-felt need to erect some sort of viable structure in Asia to counter a resurgent China.

It may be fair to say that the United States has sought to eschew balance of power politics as a code of action but nevertheless has resorted, perhaps unconsciously, to the role of balancer when the need arose. U.S. rhetoric has been full of "collective security"—U.S. actions sometimes have pursued balances, collective or otherwise.

To summarize, changing the order of treatment to provide added emphasis:

The current Chinese diplomatic task seems to be best described as one of redeveloping or restoring a historic diplomatic capability and traditional penchant for balance of power diplomacy and adapting it to the modern international system, not allowing ideological tenets to obscure flexibility.

The task is somewhat complicated by China's political, economic, and military situation, which currently provides few assets with which to accent or reinforce a given diplomatic position. The question of importance is "Can China act effectively as a makeweight in a modern balance of power situation?" China, even though comparatively much less powerful in some respects than the United States or the Soviet Union, yet might be a successful balancer. The advent of ping-pong diplomacy and the followup diplomatic dialogue with Washington support a view that Peking at least is trying to balance off Washington and Moscow.

The American task, on the other hand, is one of achieving greater recognition of the possibilities for balance of power diplomacy in the modern world and taking advantage of them, of

insuring that decisionmaking is not hypnotized by sloganeering for collective security.

The Soviet task is comparatively much less demanding—Moscow may have recognized the potential of the triangle much earlier than either Peking or Washington; Soviet diplomacy is experienced in the balancer role; and ideological strictures thus far have not been allowed to hinder Moscow's diplomatic flexibility.

In the review of theory regarding numbers of nations required for a stable balance of power, there appeared to be little promise in tripolarity. Three nations or three blocs of nations, in which each is in competition with two others, seem to offer little hope for extended peace and stability.

The diplomatic record of three major international actors indicates that only the Soviet Union has a current and fairly well-developed talent as a balancer. Both China and the United States appear capable of pursuing a balancer role, but only after overcoming impediments.

Neither political theory nor diplomatic record thus seems to hold great promise for continuing stability in the modern world. The opportunity for misperception, misjudgment, and misresponse on the part of at least one of the great powers in a modern crisis situation seems omnipresent. Even should each of the actors diligently try to play the balancer role, there seems to be all too much chance that at least one actor might inadvertently disrupt the balance and plunge the world into war.

This is a bleak and foreboding portrait. However, the picture is incomplete. Other pigments are needed on the canvas. There may be some justification for optimism.

Those pigments highlighting nuclear weaponry may represent a stabilizing influence on the actors of a tripolar or multipolar world. A close review of the history of the nuclear age can be interpreted to provide considerable support to Aron's general thesis that "On every level, differences of quantity provoke qualitative revolutions."[52] We may be experiencing a qualitative revolution in diplomacy resulting from the quantitative increase in destructive power that science and technology have wrought. In a world where a few nations control massive megatonnage, tendencies in superpower diplomacy seem to be at least toward regularization if not consistently toward caution and great prudence.

Soviet-U.S. relations, and, to a certain extent, Soviet-Chinese and U.S.-Chinese relations suggest that nuclear nations become willing to gauge their initiatives and responses at a level well below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder in their relations with an equally strong nation, but not necessarily in their relations with a weaker nation.

Further, the records suggest that conflict situations which pose a clear and present danger of nuclear warfare (such as when general purpose forces are engaged and escalation seems imminent, or strategic forces are arrayed against each other and a dispute seems insoluble by other than military means) stimulate the powers to a dialogue designed to lessen tension through crisis control measures or explanation of their strategic postures.

Put another way, the acquisition of large nuclear weapons systems will not necessarily cause a nation to refrain from some international risk-taking, so long as its government believes that control of a crisis situation can be maintained through unilateral restraint and good communication with affected nations.

The nuclear nations' increasing emphasis on communication and dialogue is perhaps best illustrated by the development of "hot line" communications between them. The history of "hot lines" between competing

nuclear-armed nations suggests that when mutually imminent and threatening nuclear strike capabilities are achieved, nuclear nations will move to institute "hot line" communications. The decisionmakers of nuclear nations have seemed anxious to talk to each other after a certain point is reached on the nuclear weapons system deployment "curve." This point seems to be when a nuclear exchange becomes a thinkable reality for both sides.

Although good communications and continuing dialogue are no substitute for everlasting prudence, reflection, and restraint on the part of nuclear nation decisionmakers, the fact that these decisionmakers have attempted to establish good communications, on an almost personal basis, as a hedge against misunderstanding and accident, does indicate a much heightened awareness of danger. The record indicates that the decisionmakers of the nuclear nations have been in awe of the enormous destructive power at their fingertips. Considerable support can be accrued for McGeorge Bundy's thesis that not one world political leader will knowingly accept the total destruction of even one of his cities.[53]

Has the nuclear imperative sufficiently brightened the bleak and foreboding protrait of a tripolar of multipolar world to lend a sense of optimism to future international developments? The answer probably is equivocal on the basis of the past 31 years, but it must be affirmative if mankind is to survive into the future.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Designated a naval aviator in 1949 and commissioned in 1950, Capt. William A. Platte, U.S. Navy, has served in patrol, transport, and training squadrons and on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He commanded Training Squadron 29 and the Naval Air Facility Sigonella. He did graduate work at Stanford University and earned his Ph.D. degree in International Politics from M.I.T. in 1971. Captain Platte is Deputy to the President and Chief of Staff, Naval War College.

## NOTES

1. William James, "Great Men and Their Environment," in his *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1927), pp. 216-54, especially pp. 244-45. Also see the succeeding essay, "The Importance of Individuals," pp. 255-62, and Chapter 4, "Habit," in *The Principles of Psychology* (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Great Books, 1952).

2. E.g., the cold war resulted from the world view and objectives of International Communism (Charles Burton Marshall, *The Cold War: A Concise History* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965)); the idiosyncracies of Stalin personally (Marshall D. Schulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)); the errors and intransigence of U.S. policy (D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)); Gar Alperowitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); or the unpurposeful, undesigned but tragic interplay of tremendous forces led by mortals all too prone to great folly (Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967)).

3. Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 36-43. The loose bipolar system model accommodates other than national actors, such as multinational blocs or supranational bodies.

4. Hedley Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems: A Preliminary Essay," prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations Meeting of 20 November 1963, p. 21, quoted in Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 10, 1966, pp. 314-27.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-27. The Rosecrance article has been reproduced in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy, a Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 325-34.

6. Robert C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).

7. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (New York: Atheneum, 1964). A book by G.F. Hudson, et al., *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961), foreshadowed Zagoria's work, but concentrated on the events of 1960.

8. William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964); and *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).

9. Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: Putnam, 1963).

10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), especially chap. 16.

11. Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1968), especially chaps. 11 and 12.

12. Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking* (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963).

13. John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

14. Walter C. Clemens, *The Arms Raee and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1968). A forerunner of this book was Lincoln P. Bloomfield, et al., *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), which, however, did not emphasize the Chinese aspect. (Discussed in Chapter 8.)

15. Joseph C. Harsch, "U.S. Faces Nationalist Red Trend," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 June 1969, p. 1.

16. Joseph C. Harsch, "Three-Power World Reshapes Policies," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1969, p. 1. See also his article "U.S. Charts Sino-Soviet Split" in the *Monitor* for 2 September 1969, p. 1.

17. Max Frankel, "Tangled Web Binds U.S., China, and Russia," *The New York Times*, 12 October 1969, p. E3; Otto Zausmer, "Threat of Sino-Soviet War Burning Question for U.S.," *The Boston Globe*, 12 October 1969, p. A4; John K. Fairbank, "Peace or War Triangle," *The Boston Globe*, 6 November 1969, p. 23; Harrison E. Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China* (New York: Norton, 1969).

18. John Paton Davies, "The U.S. Invented the Imbalance of Power," *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 December 1969, pp. 50+.

19. Editorial, "Washington-Moscow-Peking," *The New York Times*, 5 January 1970, p. 36; Editorial, "Triangular Relationship," *The Christian Seience Monitor*, 20 January 1970, p. 16; Neal Ascherson, et al., "World Giants Enter 'The End Game,'" *The Obscrver* (London), 11 January 1970. They describe an "unwilling triple relationship, . . . a new and intricate pattern which may prove to be the dynamic of the seventies." The title presumably refers to the final stage of a chess mateh, when all pieces of secondary importance have been removed from the board.

20. See, for example, Kazuo Murakamy, *On the American-Soviet-Chinese Triangular Power Relations and Japan's Role in Asia in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, mimeographed, March 1970); A. Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, pp. 427-42; and two articles by Harry G. Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on Strategic Deterrence," *Orbis*, Summer 1969, pp. 407-34, and "Strategic Arms Limitations and the Sino-Soviet Relationship," *Asian Survey*, June 1970, pp. 265-89. A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischaur, eds., *The United States and China: The Next Decade* (New York: Praeger, 1970), the report of a March 1969 conference sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations, includes several specific references to the triangular situation, or multipolarity, by participants at the conference: Lincoln P. Bloomfield, p. 55, Allen S. Whiting, pp. 85-86, Kenneth T. Young, p. 166, Klaus Mehnert, p. 173, and John K. Fairbank, p. 199. Additionally, a number of other participants addressed the matter of concurrent U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. and China without referring to triangularity or multipolarity. (E.g., Theodore C. Sorensen, Harrison E. Salisbury, and others.)

21. This is not to say that scholars have not often propagandized or prescribed actions concerning the balance of power, or that some statesmen have not also been scholars.

22. There may have been a "universal balance" in the Mediterranean Basin at some time in history, encompassing the "known limits of society" to the inhabitants. But another "universal

balance" might concurrently have existed in, say, ancient China, whose inhabitants also thought their area comprised the known world.

23. Thucydides explained the Peloponesian war in balance of power terms.

24. David Hume, "On the Balance of Power," in *Essays and Treaties on Several Subjects* (London, 1788), v. I, p. 305.

25. "While other factors have had an influence, the concept of the balance of power provides the most general explanation for the oscillations of peace and war in Europe since the Thirty Years' War." Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), v. II, p. 759. Many other famous writers have expressed the same view, including Hume, Vattel, Cobden, Stieglitz, Spykman and Morgenthau.

26. Carl J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making* (New York: Norton, 1938), p. 123.

27. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. XXI, "How a Prince Conducts Himself in Order to Gain a High Reputation," in Allan Gilbert, trans., *Machiavelli, The Chief Works and Others* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965), v. I, p. 83.

28. Friedrich, pp. 126-27.

29. Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 12, 88-93; A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1965), p. 278.

30. John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 148, 153.

31. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 37, 187, 191-93, 336-37, 348.

32. Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 143.

33. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War, a Theory of International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 125-40. Aron notes "Authors generally attach the phrase *balance of power* to the systems I call multipolar," p. 128.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

37. Rosecrance, p. 335. See a similar argument by Hedley Bull, p. 21.

38. Kaplan, chap. 2.

39. Kenneth N. Waltz has spoken well to the second ordering. See "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power," *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 21, 1967, pp. 215-31. Space requirements have not permitted discussion of this article.

40. Alan Jones, "The Balance of Power," draft Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, M.I.T., 1970), p. VI/55.

41. Wright, p. 143.

42. Rosecrance, p. 328. The Deutsch-Singer position is contained in their article "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, April 1964, pp. 398-99: "It is perhaps not excessive to assume that the minimal attention ratio for an escalating conflict would have to be 1:9, since it does not seem likely that any country could be provoked very far into an escalating conflict with less than 10 percent of the foreign policy attention of its government devoted to the matter."

43. Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York: Wiley, 1961), pp. 32-33. (A less detailed statement is in Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 34.)

44. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Arthur Lee Burns, having examined several scenarios for a world of Red, Blue, and Yellow, comes down in favor of a 5-power world (or some greater odd number) as the most stable arrangement. "From Balance to Deterrence," *World Politics*, v. 9, 1957, pp. 494-529. Regretfully, space has not permitted further mention of this thoughtful article. Burns, like Aron, had hope for a bipolar equilibrium.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 315. The Kaplan unit veto system is "nonintegrated" and "nonsolidary" with a high level of dysfunctional tension to a point "where human agents of the actors . . . find it difficult to stand up under the strain." The unit veto system may "become chaotic." It would be highly unstable and unlikely to exist for a comparatively long period of time. Kaplan, *System and Process*, pp. 51-52.

46. Mark Mancall, "The Kiahkta Trade," in C.D. Cowan, ed., *The Economic Development of China and Japan* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 29. The Chinese were knowledgeable enough to realize that the Russians might then buy rhubarb from Britain, so they also embargoed rhubarb shipments through Canton.

47. This thesis is set out by John Paton Davies, p. 50. It is partially substantiated by

Moscow's insistence that Peking's split from the Soviet Union permitted the United States to act in Vietnam to the great detriment of International Communism.

48. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 407.

49. Richard E. Pipes, "Why the Russians Act Like Russians," *Air Force and Space Digest*, June 1970, p. 53.

50. Davies, p. 150.

51. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Associates in Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy, *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 67.

52. Aron, pp. 149, 13.

53. McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969, pp. 1-20.



*After the release of U.S. PWs in early 1973, the Department of Defense prepared a plan to review the Code of Conduct. In this article, a slightly revised version of a paper prepared originally for presentation at the March 1977 meeting of the International Studies Association, Dr. Hitchens discusses some of the factors which should be considered in a review of the Code, examines some of the experiences with the Code which underlie these factors, and comments on the findings and recommendations of the DOD Review Committee.*

# FACTORS INVOLVED IN A REVIEW OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE ARMED FORCES

by

Harold L. Hitchens

**Background.** The Code of Conduct was developed in 1955 following the Korean War. It was felt that American troops needed guidelines to cope with interrogation and indoctrination techniques used by the enemy during that conflict, and to reduce the incidence of what was considered as misconduct in captivity by some American prisoners of war (PWs). The Code included six Articles and an "explanation" of each. Following is the text of the Articles. The explanations are omitted here but may be found in the cited reference.

Article I. "I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense."

Article II. "I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist."

Article III. "If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy."

Article IV. "If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be

harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way."

Article V. "When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause."

Article VI. "I will never forget that I am an American Fighting Man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America."[1]

From the very beginning, operation of the Code led to considerable controversy and calls for its review or revision. Four of the Articles—I, II, IV, and VI—are all platitudinous in tone and were not the sources of any great discussion. Article III, with its call on PWs to "continue to resist by all means available" and to "make every effort" to escape did lead to some questioning, but it was Article V which created the most difficulty. It attempted to spell out restrictions on the information a PW could provide while in the captor's control.

Calls for a revision of this Article and the Code as a whole became increasingly frequent after the beginning of large-scale American participation in the war in Southeast Asia. What were the factors seen as important elements in such a review?

Certainly, the passage of time since 1955 is a primary factor. There was the accumulation of experience in application of the Code of Conduct in Southeast Asia and in other circumstances. There was also the realization that the Code had been based primarily on the Korean experience; it was therefore natural that there should be an inquiry concerning its application to other experiences. This was reinforced by the fact that the interpretation of the experience of American PWs in Korea which prevailed in the United States in 1955—and which influenced the decision to promulgate a Code—was modified to a considerable extent by research done in the following years. Finally, there was the likelihood that the United States might have to prepare for what was likely to take place in the next 10 or 15 years—another in the periodic international reviews of the laws of warfare. In such a review, America's experience with its Code of Conduct would play a primary part.

There have been questions about the feasibility of changing the Code of Conduct. Some persons are doubtful that the Code could or should be substantially changed. Circumstances would never be the same in any future war. Just as an honor code going beyond "... will not lie, cheat, or steal" is practically impossible to further define—so it is, say such observers, with the Code of Conduct. This, of course, can be countered by the argument that there are many variations in honor codes and codes of ethics, and that we know they have changed over the years. The argument that changes would be infeasible is therefore not valid. There might, of course, be other reasons why a review would not result in any substantial changes—any public mystique the Code of Conduct might have acquired, partly as a result of media and other public discussion; the natural inertia that operates to impede change; and possible technical and legal problems in service disciplinary codes should the Code of Conduct be substantially changed or abolished. The last might be pertinent even if it is recalled that U.S. military services had operated without such a Code for 180 years before 1955.

A final fact to be considered in evaluating the need for a review is the imperative for change many see reflected in the revised expectations regarding fighting men held in captivity by an unscrupulous foe. These expectations often took on the character of obligations under the Code of Conduct but also were influenced by the evolution of various practices–resistance as well as some accommodation–during the time prisoners were in the captor's control. The strength of feelings involved led to the emergence of interests which varied considerably in their conclusions about the captivity experience and hence in their recommendations for any change (or opposition to change) in the policies involved. Some have felt it is impossible to come up with anything more tangible than a wide span of findings about behavior in captivity.

**Utility of a Code of Conduct.** A critical element in any review or evaluation of the Code of Conduct is undoubtedly an assessment of its "utility," vague as such a term is, qualified by how and whether "utility" can be measured, and influenced by the political and psychological considerations alluded to above.

"What was the Code intended to do?" might be a starting point for any attempt to assess its "utility." One author (Kinkead) has stated categorically that it was promulgated as an attempt to prevent repetition of the type of American PW behavior which took place during the Korean War. He called the Code of Conduct the most significant result of the Army study of the behavior of its PWs in North Korea. Issuance of the principles of the Code meant, he said, that the Government of the United States " . . . because of what happened in the prison camps of the Korean War, is prepared to try to mold a new set of fundamental attitudes in its citizens in the armed forces. . . . " He noted then that the report of the committee which issued the Code concluded with the statement, "The Korean story must never be permitted to happen again."[2]

The validity of the assessment of the American PW experience in North Korea underlying such a position has been seriously questioned in much post-1955 research, but will not be looked at here. Instead, we will ask whether the Code has demonstrated utility as measured either against the perceived nature of the Korean experience or the letter and intent of its Articles.

The first (some say superficial) answer is that it has not. Nearly every American military man detained or held as a PW in the years since 1955–in "cold war" incidents, the capture of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, the war in Southeast Asia–was unable to abide by the letter of the Code as interpreted in the Department of Defense (DoD) publications dealing with it. The Pike subcommittee report on the *Pueblo* hearings, e.g., said that the committee was "unaware" of any member of the crew who did not in some degree violate the Code of Conduct.[3] Virtually every American prisoner in Southeast Asia confessed to providing the enemy with more information than that authorized by the strict interpretation of the Code–name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. If there ever was a myth that the American fighting man could withstand torture and abide by the Code, it was shattered in the Vietnam War, said a writer in the *Armed Forces Journal*.[4] The interrogation techniques of the North Vietnamese–especially torture and harassment–were the principal reason for this (plus to some extent the enemy's concentration on extracting media propaganda rather than military intelligence). Experts on PW experiences since World War II have stated that there is no such thing as resisting determined combat interrogation. We might add here the comment of the commanding officer of the *Pueblo*., "When and if

ever I get the chance, I would inform my superiors that the Code of Conduct was unenforceable and impractical and unrealistic in a case such as ours, when an entire ship's company with some documents falls into the hands of a ruthless enemy who doesn't shrink from applying torture methods to extract what they [sic] want."[5]

Thus, looked at literally, the Code apparently did not serve the purposes held out for it. It has been argued that the Code still has a basic spiritual utility—that it serves as a benchmark, sets forth principles an American fighting man should look on as guidelines, and is a moral guide akin to the Ten Commandments (no matter how often broken).

**Data from the Returnees.** In any discussion of the "utility" of the Code of Conduct, the testimony of men who actually had to apply it as prisoners—and who have returned—will have to play a role. The specific observations of Southeast Asia returned PWs will not be discussed here, but it can be said that returnees differ greatly on particular aspects of the Code. Classified data is available, and surveys and studies of the views of the returnees have provided a great deal of information. The weight to be assigned to their opinions will, of necessity, be a policy decision, since a great deal of emotion is involved. It is natural to listen carefully to the returnees' views. On the other hand, there are significant variations within their attitudes toward the Code of Conduct and possible changes to it; there is the question whether some of their views may have changed in the period since their release; the views of a sizable number of American PWs will never be known (those who were killed or died in captivity); and finally, the returnees' views must be considered in the context of the broader effects of actions with respect to the Code of Conduct. The last is especially significant when we realize the future conflicts will not replicate the conditions of the Southeast Asian war.

**Particular Factors and Problems.**

**Guidance and Training.** Implementation of the Code of Conduct in the guidance and training programs of the services has resulted in identification of a number of substantive problems. In the discussions leading to the Code of Conduct, as Biderman states, there was continual stress that any "solution" must be in the form of a simple rule that troops could easily comprehend and follow. But, as he pointed out, complex problems don't necessarily have simple solutions. There were clearly conflicting positions on what an American PW could or should do in captivity. The final form of the Code, says Biderman, reflected the [Defense Advisory] Committee's "ingenious" satisfaction of these conflicting positions, "... while at the same time it adhered to the political requirement that final policy on a matter of such great public interest must be uniform for the Services."[6]

Nevertheless, there were differences almost from the beginning. While the report of the Defense Advisory Committee setting forth the Code of Conduct authorized American PWs to fall back, under pressure, to successive lines of resistance to interrogation (as far as information divulged to the enemy), DoD pamphlet 1-16 implementing the Code required a PW to stand fast on one line—name, rank, serial number, date of birth.[7] And, as late as 5 June 1967 in DoD GEN-28 (after years of experience had demonstrated that American prisoners and detainees had almost universally departed from such a rigid practice), the American PW's guidance was expressed in the following language:

> The prisoner of war may be subjected to an extreme of coercion. Still, he must resist to the limit of

 

> his ability. He can't expect to fall back to successive lines of resistance. Once he has gone beyond the first—name, rank, serial number and date of birth—in almost any respect whatever, he has taken the first step leading to collaboration. On the first line he must endeavor to stand to the end.[8]

What was the basic difficulty? It was the undeniable fact that the problems and personnel of the various services were different. Many observers have noted, for example, the great contrast between an officer of the Strategic Air Command, carefully selected and highly trained in sophisticated tactics and missions, and the average member of an Army rifle company. The backgrounds of the two were totally different, the treatment they would be given as PWs would undoubtedly vary considerably, and the former, in view of their background and training, could be given a latitude in resistance techniques that might not be necessary or desirable in the case of the latter.

The Air Force position on guidance and training on the Code of Conduct has generally (except when interdicted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) taken off from such an assumption. Flying personnel differ from ground force personnel in that they are higher in rank, possess information which is more important and less likely to become obsolete, are less likely to have had a choice between capture and continued resistance, and historically were subjected to more intensive exploitation attempts. All are volunteers for hazardous service to their country. These are the kind of "troops" Air Force generals have in mind when they consider training for the event of capture or when they think about the motivational aspects of Code of Conduct training.[9]

The Army problem is considerably different. The bulk of its troops liable to capture are enlisted men, often with little education and training. These real differences in combat manpower, Biderman notes, have affected perceptions of the PW problem held by the Army and Air Force staffs, and, presumably, prisoner behavior. While the Air Force has insisted on a policy that could fully utilize the intelligence, dedication, and resourcefulness expected of its combat crews, Army spokesmen have argued for a "simple policy that every soldier could understand."[10]

OSD strove valiantly to encourage a common approach to the Code of Conduct. In testifying before the Pike subcommittee investigating the capture of the *Pueblo*, Brigadier General Benade, of the OSD office responsible for the monitoring of the Code, argued that the services tried to have uniform regulations to implement it. He said that he wasn't aware of a factual basis for the belief that the Air Force interpretation of the Code was more liberal, and that in cases since 1955 there was no difference in the way the various services applied the Code.[11]

The fact is, however, that the differences were real, and they marked the services' presentations to the original Defense Code of Conduct committee. After the promulgation of the Code, the Air Force, anticipating that the problems of its crew members in captivity would be different from those of other members of the armed services, placed great emphasis on resistance techniques. All these take more time, however, so it was necessary to accept avowed differences in training requirements among the services and apparently slight Army and enlisted personnel, for whom it proved difficult and impractical to allow so much time on resistance techniques.

The Army, and for a time the other services besides the Air Force, felt that training troops for fallback positions under severe interrogation would weaken their will to resist and lead to other dangers. This was scoffed at by

Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, who had worked with the committee which promulgated the Code. His assessment, as given in *The New Leader* of April 1969, was that:

> Far from limiting the American POW to name, rank, serial number, and age under interrogation, the Code frees him to resist by discussing almost anything . . . provided he does not betray the interests of the U.S. to its allies, or do anything to hurt his fellow prisoners. . . . It was written in 1955 specifically to give the POW this much freedom of action and to cut away from the former demanding requirement that was both unworkable and contrary to nature. But minds great and small have become confused by one article of the Code that contains an ambiguity. "I am bound to give only name, rank, and service number." This has been mistaken as meaning that the POW may recite only these things and then must clam up. What it means is that he is compelled to give this much information. . . . The next sentence (says) . . . "I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability." The key word here is "evade," which is quite different from "avoid" or "refuse." Its sense is that a PW may fence with his captors. . . . There is nothing wrong with the Code. The fault is that the Services, with the exception of the Air Force, did not try to make it work.[12]

The basic issue remains, as Lt. Col. Michael P. Murray noted in 1973, " . . . how can we develop a single set of prescriptions that will assure survival as well as resistance . . . " and phrase the prescriptions in "unequivocal language" that will suffice to meet the needs and understanding of individuals with low levels of intelligence, education, and experience, as well as the educated, superior ones.[13]

**Modifications in the Code of Conduct** (as actually practiced) since 1955. As noted above, virtually no American PW or detainee from the date the Code was promulgated was able to abide by it strictly, as it was interpreted in the implementing directives. Classified sources, particularly the reports of the returnees, are full of the details of the numerous, and in many cases ingenious, ways in which the PWs modified the Code to cope with the circumstances imposed on them by unscrupulous enemies. Data from classified sources will not be used in this paper; there is sufficient information in published sources to indicate the general kinds of modifications made by the prisoners. They consisted basically in the provision to the enemy, under duress, of varying types of information beyond name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, and in making of propaganda statements for enemy use. The modifications were, of course, far more intricate than such a simple statement can convey. In addition, the injunction of the Code to attempt escape and resist the enemy activity were, to a great extent, disregarded, or at least interpreted in a far more shaded fashion than permitted by a literal reading of the words of the Code. It is apparent in what the returnees have said publicly that the policies they developed in captivity, particularly those of forgiveness to the men they felt had gone too far in bending to the enemy, and the tacit understanding that "intelligence" should be used in resisting enemy pressures, were carefully considered modifications of the Code.

Modifications to the Code of Conduct emerged early. As William L. White describes their story, the RB-47 crewmembers shot down and taken prisoner

by the Russians in 1960 decided that to "clam up" in a Soviet prison was hardly sensible, for unless they answered certain questions, how could they prove they really had not crossed the Soviet border? They also decided it was stupid to give "silly lies" in answer to questions concerning their classified equipment; for the Russians already knew much and had excellent intelligence sources for checking. Outside of "hot" areas "it did not harm, and probably helped your case, if you admitted facts which (the Russian interrogator) already knew or could easily find out."[14]

The capture of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* led to the positive proof, soon after the repatriation of its crewmembers, that U.S. servicemen in the hands of the Communists were continuing to make modifications to strict adherence to the Code of Conduct—a conclusion that the Vietnam experience was already beginning to point to. In books written soon after their return, both the executive officer and the operations officer of the *Pueblo* revealed that they had found the Code impossible to uphold, and had deviated from it—in some cases to safeguard classified information, but also, as the operations officer, Lieutenant Schumacher, wrote, because the North Korean interrogator "... had all the weapons he needed to break me: terror, psychological shock treatment, and hard information, which made the Code of Conduct a mockery of the true situation ...." Asked why he had broken the Code of Conduct, Schumacher said that "... it becomes a matter of how much you can take before you find a way around the torture." He said it seemed far more sensible to maintain his wits for frustrating the captors than let himself be beaten into uncontrollable senselessness.[15]

There was a further and—at the time—stronger blow to the Code of Conduct when the U.S. Government made a fictitious confession about the *Pueblo*'s mission and actions, and then repudiated it (as tacitly arranged with the North Koreans) after the *Pueblo* crewmembers returned. As a writer in the *Catholic University Law Review* said, the effect upon the Code of Conduct (of the United States' coerced confession) "would appear to be a natural consequence. It would be unjust to expect an American PW to rigidly adhere to the Spartan Code of Conduct when the United States [Government] abandoned it in dealings with the North Koreans. To expect a soldier to conform to a higher standard of conduct than his country would not only be unrealistic, but also unreasonable."[16]

The Navy court of inquiry held after the return of the *Pueblo*'s crew did little to alter this viewpoint, according to the Pike subcommittee hearings. As the subcommittee's conclusion stated,

> The purpose of reviewing in some specific detail the apparently ambivalent views of the Navy on the Code of Conduct was to emphasize the infinitely greater difficulty that must have been experienced by the men of the USS *Pueblo* in trying to resolve for themselves these same questions. If the Navy captain who was counsel to the Naval Court of Inquiry, with all of the books and information, and consultants officially available to him, could come up with an erroneous opinion as to the applicability of the Code, and if the highest legal officer in the Navy found it necessary to change his own testimony before the subcommittee as to the effect of violating the Code, it is certainly impossible to expect that 82 lonely, untrained, and abandoned men suffering imprisonment and torture by the North Koreans could come up with any clear and proper adherence to it.[17]

**Flexibility of the Code of Conduct.** As indicated above, there was a developing and continuing realization that the Code of Conduct, as interpreted in DoD directives, was hardly ever adhered to. (Here, as throughout this paper, comments of this nature refer to the actual working out of the Code—its operational character—which is a very different thing from assessing its value as declaratory policy.)

The difficulty American PWs found was that the Code, as stated above, appeared to permit very little laxity; in Article V, for example, the emphasis was on not providing *any* information past name, rank, serial number, and date of birth.

A number of writers have challenged such a strict interpretation. One of the most influential is Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, who was a staff member of the committee which drafted the Code. As noted previously, General Marshall stressed that the drafters of the Code intended that it should be interpreted with flexibility. Furthermore, he said, the committee members understood clearly that a PW could be tricked or coerced into going far beyond the Geneva Convention requirement. Article V was therefore intended to give breadth to the new training, instead of permitting it to be constricted by "traditional but futile limitations."

A similar, flexible view of the Code had been given in 1965 by Maj. Gen. D.T. Spivey who earlier, as a colonel in World War II, had been the senior U.S. PW in a German prison camp where 9,000 captured Allied airmen were held. By indicating that he believed "wholeheartedly" in training and indoctrination for the eventuality of possible capture, General Spivey implied that a simple adherence to name, rank, serial number, date of birth only would not meet the needs of many PWs. He was more explicit on the Code of Conduct's Article III, which, he said, ". . . is good if not interpreted literally." (Article III enjoins prisoners to resist their captors at every opportunity.) General Spivey went on to say,

> I believe it is foolish and unrealistic to expect a prisoner or group of prisoners to resist by all means available. . . . If taken to the letter this would amount to suicide in many instances. I have seen individual prisoners resist reasonable orders just for the sake of being contrary and thus bring great discomfort and distress to their fellow prisoners with profit to none. Completely senseless.[18]

General Spivey had equally strong words about the guidance for prisoners in other portions of Article III. With reference to its injunction that prisoners should attempt escape at every opportunity, he said that if taken literally and not tempered by "common sense and group direction," this was equally unreal. He had given orders not to attempt escape without specific permission, and had the admiration and approbation of 95 percent of those in the compound for having given this order. Article III also tells U.S. prisoners not to give parole. General Spivey said that instruction was "neither desirable nor practical." He had given parole for good reasons on a number of occasions. His commonsense, said General Spivey, told him he was right in these actions, and he added that ". . . I could not have used common sense had I been tied literally to the Code."[19]

Writing in the *Marine Corps Gazette* 7 years later, Lt. Col. Charles E. Marean mentioned one of the developments American authorities already knew of by 1972 about PW circumstances in Southeast Asia—that the enemy was familiar with the Code, gave American PWs the hard-line interpretation, and told them that if they had given a single piece of information past name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, that they had already violated the Code (and that they might as well go on to further

"cooperation" with their captors).[20]

As a counter to this tactic, Lieutenant Colonel Marean stressed the flexibility of the Code of Conduct. It was not an arbitrary document, he said; it was "non-punitive . . . a creed. As a statement of belief, it leaves room for maneuver." Marean went on to argue that since, as a creed, the Code of Conduct was inherently flexible, it should be modified with increasing rank and responsibility. This meant two things: that a major or lieutenant colonel should be given greater latitude (than lower ranking personnel) to interpret the Code according to the situation he might find himself in; and, as Marean recommends, training in the Code of Conduct should be continued throughout a military man's career.[21]

**The Special Character of the Vietnam Experience.** In any assessment of the factors which should be considered in a review of the Code of Conduct, the special character of the Vietnam experience should correctly be assigned a paramount place. The Vietnam War lasted longer than any other defined war in our history (in such a categorization Indian wars, of which there were several lengthy series, are excluded); for the period of time involved, American PWs in the Vietnam conflict constituted a relatively small group; they also drew more intensive attention by their captors than U.S. prisoners in previous wars; and the enemy effort with respect to the American PWs assumed a character markedly different from that to which they were exposed in previous wars.

In the most recent previous significant conflict, the Korean War, which had brought on the Code of Conduct, the major enemy effort appeared to be ideological. The Koreans and Chinese placed great emphasis on trying to get American prisoners to change their minds about the United States and the war (hence the emergence of the term, "brainwashing"). In the Vietnam War, on the other hand, there was a remarkable focus by the North Vietnamese on obtaining propaganda statements from the American prisoners, and less attempt, apparently, to weaken their allegiance to U.S. and Western ideals.

Psychiatrists looking at the Korean War experience had noted (in testimony in 1956 before the Senate Government Operations committee) "weaknesses" in American prisoners which had, they claimed, made them succumb (high death rate, high degree of collaboration or cooperation with the enemy) to pressures in the prison camps applied by the North Koreans and Chinese. They came up with a number of explanations for this circumstance, even "weaknesses" in American society as a whole. Their prescriptions for remedying the situation took on an emotional tone, emphasizing hard-line resistance to the captor, "continuation of the battle" in the PW camps, etc. They also noted that once the Chinese took over prisoner handling from the North Koreans, there was generally little use of physical torture per se.[22]

The Vietnam War demonstrated significant differences—in the type of enemy (one not adverse at all to torture and, in fact, which relied heavily on it), in the type of PWs (not raw troops just coming off occupation duty and with little sense of unit or national identity, but for the most part highly trained, well-educated officers), and in the new emphasis on obtaining propaganda statements from the prisoners. (The last, discussed at more length below, is somewhat to be remarked, since it could be thought that 15 years later the world audience for propaganda statements would be supposedly more sophisticated and should be more likely to discount them.)

The emergence of so many differences—even from the previously most recent U.S. PW experience—means that any review of the Code of Conduct

should take into careful account the peculiar circumstances of the Vietnam War, and its special character from the PW standpoint. Such a conclusion does not mean, of course, that the Vietnam experience is likely to be replicated; in other words, we should not plan for the future solely on the basis of the last war. It does mean that the evidence from that war has to be given a great deal of weight. This will be true even after we filter out the emotional aspects involved and the obsessive nature of media preoccupation with various aspects of the conflict, including the prisoner situation.

**Propaganda Statements.** As we have seen, the war in Southeast Asia revealed a number of features which gave it a character considerably different from previous wars involving the United States. The enemy's attention to what he saw as possible propaganda value in the prisoners was probably the most distinctive. Becoming, as they did, victims of an unscrupulous enemy in an age of mass media, the American PWs become the objects of manipulation for propaganda purposes to a degree never foreseen. They were forced to write confessions of conduct violating international law, to write statements criticizing their country and the war, to participate in interviews with selected antiwar correspondents and make comments derogatory to the American cause, and to appear in video-tape or motion picture productions intended for propaganda purposes.

The effectiveness of such tactics on the part of the North Vietnamese has been debated. At least one American military observer has indicated his feeling that this aspect of our experience in Southeast Asia has undoubtedly become an unfortunate precedent for future captors who would incline to hold PWs hostage to world public opinion (for the purpose of achieving a political settlement) or in other ways exploit them to aver the legitimacy of the captor's cause. On the other hand, despite the public's addiction to mass media, particularly TV, there is some evidence that, in public opinion polls, it is assessed as not being especially reliable; and certainly there was early on a feeling, at least in the United States, that the "confessions" and similar statements were probably forced. The North Vietnamese claims were, of course, accepted in the other Communist countries, but this was no great propaganda advantage. In countries not close to either of the major participants in the war, the effect of the propaganda effort is more in question, and probably a great deal of research will have to be done to evaluate it with any confidence. North Vietnam's most ambitious effort to exploit the American prisoners for propaganda purposes was the film, "Pilots in Pajamas." There is some evidence that, in Western Europe at least, it was recognized as propaganda pure and simple, and not a portrayal of the true situation.

As is well known, North Vietnamese treatment of the American prisoners took a definite turn for the better in 1969. Some observers, including some of the returned PWs, have connected it with the new Administration's decision to begin an active campaign to publicize the enemy's disregard of all international law bearing on prisoner status and treatment. The improved treatment included a lessening of the efforts to get the prisoners to provide grist for the enemy's propaganda mill.

The general devaluation of propaganda statements was given great emphasis when, as mentioned above, the U.S. Government made a fictitious confession about the mission and actions of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and then (as the North Koreans had been previously notified) repudiated it after the *Pueblo* crewmembers returned. If Governments could engage in such an elaborate and transparent minuet of mutual collabo-

ration in declaratory self-serving, then it was not unreasonable that a poor prisoner, to bring an end to harassment and torture, should agree to write or say something apparently in the enemy's interest.

With the *Pueblo* agreement in the headlines, Rear Adm. Daniel V. Gallery, USN (Ret.) revived as the logical next step for prisoners a course of action he had proposed several years before. The President, suggested Admiral Gallery, should announce that, in view of "modern" interrogation methods, U.S. PWs could sign any paper, or make any statement. The United Nations would also be informed that all confessions of U.S. PWs were considered to have been obtained under duress, hence were invalid. Gallery's entire theory is predicated, said a writer in the *Catholic University Law Review*, on the assumption that " . . . the life and health of an American prisoner of war is a greater value to be protected than a Code which has been rendered obsolete by the Cold War." Gallery felt that his policy should not be construed as denigration of the integrity of American prisoners of war but as an attempt to prevent deception. Further, he felt, there was a very small chance of a PW's information giving the enemy a tactical advantage.[23]

The proposal by Admiral Gallery would seem to require at least cursory examination in any review of the Code of Conduct. It has an undeniable logic, but certainly a number of other factors must be considered before the United States authorizes its prisoners to make any statement they feel impelled to make. There are legal aspects involved, e.g., the possibility of a prisoner's confessing to acts which are in clear violation of international law or the law of the country in which he is held prisoner. Such confessions, even though forced, might place a prisoner in greater jeopardy than that in which he already finds himself. Another important consideration is that the boundary line between what is information harmful to the military aspects of the war effort, and what can be assessed in all likelihood as information intended for political and propaganda aims is certainly not clear; and the United States must consider whether the resulting ambiguity is likely to further its interests or not. The whole concept of martyrdom is wrapped up in the actions which Admiral Gallery's suggestion would eliminate, and along with it the moral and other intangible benefits that accrue from a prisoner's resistance to the captor. Certainly the captor has available the physical means to bring about compliance or death. There is some evidence that resisting as long as possible built up esprit de corps and solidarity among the prisoners, and that there was benefit to be derived in the longrun from making the enemy work for every bit of information or cooperation he could elicit.

**Command Relationships in the Prison Camps.** When prisoners of various services are held by an enemy, who shall command? The Geneva Convention has some provisions bearing on this situation, but in the Vietnam War the United States was confronted with an enemy which had refused to subscribe completely to the Convention. In most previous wars, the captor power had an interest in seeing that the prisoners it had taken formed some sort of organization, for it facilitated management and logistics problems on both sides. But the Communists, especially in the Vietnam War, subordinated all these considerations to propaganda and political purposes, and until 1969, tried to root out any organization of U.S. prisoners. A military organization developed, of course, with regulations and standard operating procedures and it became particularly effective after 1969.

Traditionally, the senior officer, regardless of service, held command authority among prisoners; and this

practice obtained as much sanction as most practices recognized under international law. It was brought into question after the return of the prisoners in 1973, and there were further problems. What about civilians, either employees of the Government or under some sort of other relationship to it? In nearly every previous conflict of recent times, these had been repatriated or interned, but the North Vietnamese and their associates disregarded this rule and held them as captives. Should a high-ranking civilian, say a GS-16, automatically assume command because of his senior rank in the normal Government rank-ordering? Or should a prisoner-of-war situation be considered as primarily military, akin to a ship at sea or an aircraft in flight, and should the senior qualified military officer be considered in command? As the Code of Conduct calls for obedience to the orders of those who are senior, these are questions which must be examined in any review of the Code. The legitimacy of a PW command structure needs to be clarified, and a senior officer's authority made clear. "If a commander ever needs authority, it is in prison," said a returned U.S. PW, Lt. Col. Richard E. Bolstad, as quoted in the *Armed Forces Journal* in May 1974. Problems of the commander of a PW organization are especially onerous, said Lieutenant Colonel Bolstad, for he has to deal with an environment in which pressures of one kind or another are always present. Some returned PWs have recommended that the commander or senior officer of a PW organization in a prison camp should have disciplinary authority, be authorized to make awards and promotions, and be given full court-martial authority.[24]

In the Vietnam War problems of prisoner command assumed a paramount place. For some prisoners, the evolution of a PW organization became symbolic of authoritarian strictures (even though the prisoners had voluntarily or under other legal means become members of a military organization). Even in the generally agreed-upon values of communication with fellow captives, as an essential ingredient for PW morale and organization and in countering the enemy, there existed the detractions of misperception and misuse. The problem of civilians' status is particularly troublesome. Some civilians returned from captivity by the North Vietnamese or their allies have urged that civilians in a combat zone and liable to capture be clearly placed under the Code of Conduct. This question and the other problems mentioned above will require a great deal of careful study.

**Relationship of the Code of Conduct to the Geneva Convention.** The language of Article V of the Code of Conduct indicated that the committee which drafted the Code was fully aware of the Geneva Convention of 1949, the most recent of the great international efforts to induce nations to ameliorate the cruelties inflicted by war on individuals, especially members of the uniformed services. During the Korean War, the Communists announced their adherence to the Geneva Convention, but with reservations to Article 85. The reservations provided the basis for their threat to treat American prisoners as war criminals. During the Southeast Asia war, the North Vietnamese made similar threats, but never carried them to the extent of formally trying American prisoners. The combination of discussions about the Geneva Convention, along with prolonged experience by the United States with its own relatively new Code for prisoners, inevitably brought up comparisons of the Convention and the Code. Specifically, the question was raised as to whether the two were in conflict. The Pike subcommittee which investigated the *Pueblo* incident noted a number of specific points on which there might be such conflicts between the Code

of Conduct and the Geneva Convention:

1. Between the Code's injunction to American prisoners for "continued resistance by all means available" as against the expectation expressed in the Geneva Convention that the captives would receive "humane treatment."

2. The Code of Conduct requires everyone to make an effort to escape; should this apply to medical and religious personnel, whose presence in a PW compound is of great value to other PWs?

3. The Code of Conduct forbids parole; the Geneva Convention allows it under certain conditions.

4. There is a discrepancy between the Code of Conduct's injunction to U.S. PWs to furnish the captor with name, rank, serial number, and date of birth only, and the 13 items of the capture card of the Geneva Convention.

5. The Code of Conduct has no guidance concerning private correspondence of PWs; the Geneva Convention says such correspondence is subject to censorship by the detaining power, and thus provides the enemy with names and addresses of family and friends and other information of possible intelligence value.

6. The Committee felt it was unrealistic for the Code of Conduct to forbid PWs to sign confessions or statements to avoid torture, when the United States as a nation did it in the case of the *Pueblo*. Under Communist bloc reservations to the Geneva Convention, signing a confession removes a prisoner from PW status and protection under the Convention, and he becomes a "war criminal."

7. Most important, the Committee felt, was the fact that the Geneva Convention applies only to PWs; North Korea maintained that since we were not at war, the Geneva Convention did not apply to the *Pueblo* crew. Since in absence of armed conflict or a state of war, the *Pueblo* crew was not afforded protection under the Geneva Convention, should they have been expected to comply with the Code of Conduct as interpreted by General Order 4 of the Navy?[25]

The requirements of the Code of Conduct, particularly those urging continued efforts to resist and escape, have been looked at by Robert Walzer in a book which examines a broader context—the extent of an individual citizen's responsibility to his country. The analysis revealed to him some fundamental conflicts between the position of the Code of Conduct and the practices which have emerged over the centuries among nations at war—and which, to the extent feasible at the time, were embodied in the Geneva Convention. The very act of surrender, says Walzer, constitutes an agreement to give up fighting in return for life itself and then "benevolent quarantine" in a PW camp. The essence of surrender is the agreement not to fight (although Walzer neglects any examination of what might be a time element in the PW's surrender; does his surrender imply that he will never, no matter how long he is held, attempt escape?).[26]

The Code of Conduct's approach is an alternative view, as Walzer notes; it extends a state's claim over its citizens to include an official view of captivity and the status of PWs. A PW must refuse cooperation with captors, "... seek continually to escape, organize resistance networks, sabotage behind-line operations, require as many guards as possible." According to Walzer, "It is a little hard to see why any state at war would maintain prisoners who actually did or tried to do all these things, and insofar as the Code requires them, it is not entirely consistent with the idea of benevolent quarantine."[27] This view of the Code's requirements sees them as an extension of a nation's sovereignty but possibly neglects the fact that the Code was a reaction to North Korean and Chinese captors who paid little attention to "benevolent quarantine" in their

treatment of Allied, chiefly U.S., prisoners.

Walzer pays particular attention to the Code's requirement in Article III to resist by all means available. Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter Burgess said later that physical resistance was not required but only mental resistance to political indoctrination. That, says Walzer, "... is hardly made clear by the Code itself, and the lack of clarity was presumably intentional ...." A new kind of war had developed in the Korean PW camps, Walzer notes, and quotes Gen. Mark Clark's comments on the Koje Island mutiny (by enemy prisoners of the United States). This new kind of war was one in which prisoners remained combatants and carried out orders smuggled to them from their own high command. Walzer suggests, on the basis of these circumstances, that the Code "... not only intended to provide moral basis for resistance to political indoctrination but to encourage action ..." on the scale of the Koje mutiny.[28]

In looking at the behavior of PWs, Walzer comes up with an analysis of a prisoner's obligations (which, although Walzer doesn't say so specifically, certainly underlie some of the concepts of the Geneva Convention). He notes "negative" obligations: not to "sell out," or to betray his country or comrades; and "positive" obligations: to harass and attempt to escape. Walzer agrees that there must be some degree of resistance to collaboration if the PW regards himself as a citizen, but, he argues, no PW has a positive obligation—either to his country or his service—to work and take risks to further his own escape or that of other PWs, or to harass the enemy. "Benevolent quarantine" will break down if a whole PW camp is organized for escape. Its costs to the captor will be too high (and, although Walzer doesn't make the point, the captors are likely to retaliate strongly).[29]

Walzer then placed the PWs' situation in the context of a citizen's responsibility to his government. Attempts to specify obligations going beyond those which are "negative" are impositions on the freedom of the men concerned, he says, and sometimes a cruel threat to their security. "That is why they are largely ignored by the prisoners." We may hope that some can be heroes, but that is also a denial of captivity, perhaps a refusal of benevolent quarantine, and a potent threat to prisoners who choose not to be heroes. Walzer concludes that, contrary to the injunction in the report proposing a Code of Conduct, "the fight does not continue after the battle.... It is the responsibility of civilized men to insist that (benevolent quarantine) always be offered and to repudiate decisively and without compromise the very idea of a 'total war' to be fought within as well as without the bounds of the prison camp."[30]

In a more pragmatic manner, Major General Spivey, as noted above, expressed a similar position when he argued that "common sense" indicated that it was "foolish and unrealistic" to expect a prisoner or group of prisoners to resist by all means available, or to attempt to escape at every opportunity. On the other hand, we have also noted the values, admittedly subjective, of a resistance posture on the part of prisoners—values in the area of morale, esprit de corps, and probably a reduction in the total amount of propaganda statements and other tangible acts of collaboration extracted by the enemy. The resistance of American prisoners in the Vietnam War was in particular not in conflict with the spirit of the Geneva Convention (if we read it as assuming that essentially the PW has been put in quarantine), according to some observers. Neither, they recognize, was it a manifestation of the Code of Conduct's emphasis on continued resistance. Instead, prolonged resistance developed in so many cases because the captor was

not approaching anything like adherence to the spirit or letter of the Convention. We may also note a related factor—alluded to above—that the North Vietnamese announced reservations to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention. Readiness to cooperate, especially in the matter of "confessions," might, under such an enemy's interpretation of international law, including the Convention, subject the prisoner to trial for "war crimes" or violation of the internal law of the enemy state. This consideration, along with the other discussed in this section, should certainly be included in any review of the Code of Conduct. In particular, the whole argument based on the "quarantine theory" of PWs must be examined carefully. If it is determined that such a reading of the spirit of the Geneva Convention is correct, then we will have to see if other values of the Code of Conduct are such that they might outweigh any tacit or explicit recognition of the "quarantine theory" as being inherent in the Geneva Convention.

**Relation of the Code of Conduct to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.** Is the Code of Conduct binding to the extent that a violator of the Code can be punished for an infraction of military law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice? This sounds academic now, since every returned prisoner from the Southeast Asian war admitted to some violation of the Code, and only a few had charges preferred against them. Nevertheless, confusion reigned concerning the relation of the Code and the UCMJ as late as 1969, when the Navy's court of inquiry met after the return of the *Pueblo* crew and during the Pike subcommittee's investigation of the *Pueblo* incident. To a superficial observer, it seems that it need not have, since the Army Judge Advocate General declared as early as 1960 that

> Conduct in contravention of the Code of Conduct can only be punished if the conduct also violates some provisions of the UCMJ. The Code of Conduct is not intended to be a penal code. It is, rather, a moral guide for conduct while a PW. The Code of Conduct does not direct the members of the armed forces to measure up to the standards of the Code of Conduct, and it contains no language indicating punitive consequences for its disregard.

Three unpublished opinions of the Judge Advocate General were cited to this effect.[31] Further, in 1968 the Air Force JAG declared officially that the Code was not a vehicle for enforcement of a PW's obligations, and the Vice Chief of Staff established this as Air Force policy in early 1969.

A good many members of the armed services, including some who became prisoners during the Southeast Asian conflict, nevertheless were under the impression that the Code was penal in nature. To them a violation of the Code of Conduct was punishable, either by virtue of the Code itself, or because it was a part of military law. The confusion over this point did not appear only at the lower levels. The Navy captain who was counsel to the court of inquiry held after the return of the *Pueblo*'s crew came up initially with an opinion that the Code of Conduct was applicable in the case, and the confusion extended even higher during the Pike subcommittee hearings on the *Pueblo* capture. On 28 April 1969, Rear Admiral McDevitt, the Navy Judge Advocate General, said violation of the Code of Conduct could be charged as a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, since Navy General Order 4 promulgated the whole Code of Conduct and the Executive Order issuing it, as a General Order of the Navy. A violation of the Code of Conduct was therefore a violation of a Navy General Order and hence was chargeable under the UCMJ. Two days later, on 30 April,

Admiral McDevitt had apparently undergone a change of mind. In a letter to Congressman Pike, he said the additional language in the Code was instructional in nature and not penal, so General Order 4 of the Navy did not operate as a General Order within the meaning of Article 92 of the UCMJ.[32]

In fairness to Admiral McDevitt, it should be added that during his testimony before the subcommittee he pointed out that the specific language of the Code of Conduct " . . . is not always duplicated in the Uniform Code . . . [the latter type] enters into the picture only when the conduct of the individual to the extent that it is not in compliance with the Code of Conduct is also judged to be something for which he should be tried and possibly punished." Admiral McDevitt added that " . . . we don't need to disregard the factor of duress when we apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice only in assessing a particular individual's conduct to determine whether or not he should be tried for that conduct." He then agreed with a committee member that " . . . if there is an infraction of the Code of Military Justice, this infraction could be ameliorated or nullified under proven conditions of duress. . . . " The subcommittee's conclusions in its report incorporate this view.[33]

Views of the returnees themselves varied. Some, as apparent in unclassified sources, considered the Code of Conduct as primarily a guide and training device and saw no need to make it a specific part of military law; others felt it should be incorporated into the UCMJ as military law, and pointed out that a good many of the U.S. prisoners in Vietnam assumed that the Code did constitute a valid standing order.

For the time being, the resolution of this question is embodied in the Report of the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct (see below). The committee recommended " . . . that the Services continue to employ the Code as a general standard of conduct. It should not be converted into a statute. All servicemen should learn that their behavior in captivity or detention is fully accountable under U.S. law." Undoubtedly, this recommendation by the committee was affected by its consideration of some of the other problems and factors we have discussed. Certainly it was related to a positive decision with respect to the utility of the Code, not only *whether* it should be looked at as a useful instrument but *how* it provides, or can provide assistance to, prisoners of war. Accepting the risk of possible future, further confusion on the legal status of the injunction expressed in the Code, the committee apparently concluded that its principal value was moral and spiritual. The standard is high, the committee commented, and " . . . an individual must strive to achieve it." There was clear understanding that conduct of a prisoner which violated a provision of the UCMJ could be punished under that body of military law. As testimony and experience have shown, the factor of duress is likely to be considered, and the committee recognized that under certain circumstances an individual's efforts might fall short.[34] It is a conclusion which fails to remove completely the ambiguity in the minds of prisoners of war or in persons concerned about them. Such ambiguity might have merit in view of our uncertainty as to the nature of the next conflict in which American military men are likely to be subject to capture.

**Report of the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct.** After the release of U.S. PWs in early 1973, the Department of Defense prepared a plan to review the Code of Conduct. Phase one of the plan, individual Service Analysis and Evaluation of PW Experiences, was completed in August 1974, when the services forwarded their positions on Code of Conduct training to DoD. The Army

recommended changes to interpretive material and to training programs. In addition, the Army also recommended word changes to the Code itself to support their suggestions. The Navy recommended changes to the supporting training programs to solve problems of misinterpretation of the Code, and proposed an Executive Order to clearly establish the role and authority of the Senior Officer present. The Navy also recommended that the Code not be changed, either in language or intent, because it would weaken the value of the Code and because changes would cause new problems of interpretation disproportionate to the intended gain. The Air Force recommended a revision of current directives and training policies in support of the Code. The Air Force found that the language of the Code was generally clear and recommended it not be changed. However, if interpretive difficulties existed, Articles III (Parole) and V (Resistance and Disclosure) could be reviewed in depth for possible change.[35]

Phase two of the Defense Department's review was carried out by the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct.[36] Much of the committee's work involved interviews with "... ex-prisoners of war and hostile peace-time detainees, experts in PW behavior, representatives of organizations concerned with PWs, and members of the 1955 Advisory Committee." The committee desired to compare individual PW responses to the Code with the ideas of the Code's original framers. The committee clearly specified that it did not intend to obtain evidence of alleged misconduct or to hear accusations from the interviewees.[37] Following is a summary of the committee's major conclusions and recommendations.[38]

**Revalidation of the Code of Conduct.** The committee concluded that the Code of Conduct is a valid and necessary instrument which establishes high standards of behavior for *all* members of the armed services. Misunderstandings of Articles I, II, III, IV, and VI should be corrected through training improvements. Article V requires word changes to bring better understanding; training alone would not accomplish this task. The proposed word changes clarify and restore the original intended meaning. Here the committee quoted the present Article V (as it appears in this paper on page 48). The proposed change would substitute for the phrase "... bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth," a similar phrase but one which changes the word "bound" to "required" and eliminates the word "only." The proposed Article V would therefore read, "When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause." This was the only wording change in the Code recommended by the committee. As mentioned above, "misunderstandings" of the other Articles were to be corrected through training.

**Training.** The committee concluded that "... revision of the current DoD training directive is required." Such a revision should include training levels for all service members and centralize Code of Conduct training under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that a single service should act as OSD's executive agent.

**Command in PW Organizations.** "The Committee concluded that the implied authority of the SRO [Senior Ranking Officer] in the Code of Conduct is not clearly supported by Law because of contradictory wording in the MCM [Manual for Courts-Martial]. DoD

Directive 1300.7 should be expanded to include required PW participation in PW organizations."

**Investigations of Violations of the UCMJ.** On this point, which attracted considerable attention in the American press, the committee concluded that a careful investigation of possible UCMJ violations by PWs during captivity in Vietnam did not occur. In the future, appropriate investigations should be made in full accordance with the UCMJ and usual regulations in the interests of justice and in support of command authority during captivity. Such investigations could recognize honorable performance as well as identify any allegations of misconduct. The committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to ensure that future interviews of returned prisoners of war should include reports on possible violations of law, regulation, or policy.

**The Legal Status of the Code of Conduct.** Some particular points under this heading have been discussed above. The committee concluded that the Code of Conduct was "consistent" with the Geneva Conventions and recommended that in their training "... servicemen should become familiar with the general requirements of the Geneva Conventions as they pertain to the Code of Conduct."

**Clarification of Policy Concerning Surrender.** The committee concluded that Article II of the Code of Conduct is stated clearly enough so that no need existed to alter it. (There had been a few questions—nothing like the number raised concerning Articles III and V—about Article II's phrase, "I will never surrender of my own free will.") The Review Committee recommended that the appropriate DoD directive contain explanations of this Article so that "all members of the Armed Forces should understand that resistance to capture or surrender need not be carried to suicidal lengths."

**Escape.** The committee concluded that "... the Code of Conduct intends to require only reasonable attempts to escape. The senior member of the armed forces in captivity must have complete authority over all escape attempts. This authority includes his right to issue specific guidance concerning escapes of opportunity." The committee recommended that "... training directives should emphasize that desperate and ill-planned escape attempts are neither required nor desirable under the Code of Conduct."

**Disclosure of Information.** Here the committee concluded that Code of Conduct and related training should become more realistic concerning a PW's disclosure of information. The committee therefore suggested the revised wording of Article V of the Code of Conduct as above. The committee also recommended that the DoD training directive which deals with the Code be revised to stress successive [lines of] resistance and the rebound philosophy. The latter was intended to diminish incidence of what was often remarked on during the Southeast Asian war—a prisoner's feeling that because he had violated the Code of Conduct (as he regarded it) to a limited extent that it was useless for him to look on it as a guide in the future. This attitude, encouraged strongly by the enemy, stemmed from the erroneous hard-line interpretation of the Code. Actually, during their ordeal in the prison camps, the senior officers recognized that under torture and harassment, a man might go beyond what he thought were the limits permitted by the Code: They encouraged such men not to feel dominated by a sense of guilt but to try to "rebound" and in the future live up to the terms of the Code to the extent that they could.

**Periodic Review of the Code.** The committee concluded that frequent reviews of the Code of Conduct itself would serve as an unnecessary challenge to the validity of the Code. They recognized, however, that some periodic review of the Code was essential to ensure "... timely response to major changes in PW treatment by potential adversaries." It therefore recommended that, when "changing circumstances warranted, the Secretary of Defense should convene another Review Committee."

**Further Lines of Research on the Code of Conduct.** In the preceding pages, some of the factors which should be considered in a review of the Code of Conduct were discussed. Also examined were some of the experiences with the Code which underlay identification of these factors. Finally, note was taken of the formal review recently completed by the Department of Defense.

Certainly any further lines of research will be affected by the Defense Review Committee's conclusions and recommendations. But the action taken by the committee on the Code of Conduct does not and cannot set limits to research on a document of such significance in the history of our armed forces. The Code does have intrinsic historical significance. In addition, there will inevitably be circumstances in which some member of the armed services will be detained or held prisoner whether it is in a "neat" declared war or, which appears to be more likely, one which erupts suddenly or accidentally and might not appear to be covered by the established laws of warfare. (The latter of course are not accepted completely by all nations, in some cases for ideological reasons, in others because they have not acquired experience in the Western traditions which underlie the codified laws of warfare.) In such conflicts we might find the workings of the Code of Conduct to differ from its operation during the Southeast Asian war or in other incidents which took place after the promulgation of the Code.

Further research, based to a considerable extent on returned PWs' experiences with the Code of Conduct, should therefore presumably include some or all of the following.

1. Data on how the standards of the Code of Conduct actually worked; this would include information on the utility of the tactic of successive lines of resistance. Here, a careful analysis of data from the returnees will, of course, be significant. Over the years, questionnaires and surveys have produced or will elicit a great deal of information on aspects of the Code's operation and effects. We can hope that this will include data on the tactic of successive lines of resistance as employed by military personnel of different grades and responsibilities.

2. Relationships between the various types of resistance training and reactions by captives to pressures for information more than name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. Here it would be especially useful to find out what was actually taught at the survival schools over the years, about the requirements of the Code of Conduct, and compare this with the reactions in captivity of the successive groups of students during these years. Admittedly this will be difficult, but in the case of the Air Force survival schools, which taught the bulk of the officers who fell captive to the North Vietnamese, there are fairly detailed records of the guidance on the Code of Conduct given to their instructors at various periods. This is a factor which has not been adequately considered in the Report of the Defense Review Committee.

3. Analysis of factors entering into effective resistance to severe interrogation (and how these can be transmitted in training programs). Psychiatrists and psychologists who have studied the

experiences of persons under duress, especially prisoners of war, are generally convinced that there are some techniques—which can be taught—that will make a prisoner's resistance more effective yet not necessarily subject him to increased, or even severe, punishment. Several problems are involved, of course, although we will not deal with them at length here. In the first place, the psychiatrist or psychologist examining a survivor or returnee usually has available only the latter's recollections of what took place, or what he did; he does not normally have available data on the captor's particular intentions at the time or the rationale for his actions. Further, the circumstances of future captivity will never repeat those of the past, and the techniques thought to be effective in situations examined thus far may not be so effective in the future. There is also a great gap in the data for the social scientists examining resistance experiences; they have no way of taking into account the experiences of those prisoners who were killed or died in captivity, possibly while employing resistance techniques thought to be effective by some of the survivors, or on the basis of experiences in other circumstances. The specialized nature of the training required to master more effective resistance techniques also brings up the question of standardization of training, mentioned below.

4. Standardization of training. The very concept of standardization sounds "good"; it rings of our American feeling that everyone should be treated equally. It seems only "right" that there should be standardization in the preparation for all Americans subject to possible captivity, regardless of service, rank, or military specialty. This would include standardization of equipment, training objectives, training methods, and the content of training—from the standpoint of this analysis, the training and responsibilities required under the Code of Conduct. As we have seen, such standardization was never achieved, although efforts to that effect were instituted in many offices and over various periods of time. The practical experience of almost 20 years thus raises the questions of how feasible it is to aim for standardization of training and to what areas should it apply. There are undeniable special requirements for "high risk" personnel, i.e., those who have a high risk of capture and for whom captivity involves extra risk from the standpoint of the skills and information they possess and the particular benefits the captor hopes to derive from his acquisition of them. Therefore research is required into the possibility and means of reconciling the political and policy considerations that would argue for at least a declaratory gesture toward standardization with the actual, pragmatic recognition that American fighting men should not all be given the same preparation for possible captivity, that in fact it can be rather cursory for some but should be careful and intensive for others, and planned to extend through their careers, at least to flag rank.

The report of the Defense Review Committee of 1976 is at its weakest here. It concluded that the training had been inadequate and inconsistent, an easy ex post facto judgment to make (its only suggestion was that revision of the DoD training directive concerning the Code of Conduct "... should include training levels for all service members"). The Report therefore failed to "bite the bullet" and recognize, clearly and explicitly, the realities: service members who are officers, and particularly those of higher rank, are more important to the enemy than enlisted men; and that, as mentioned above, the resistance training for officers should be more intensive and should formally allow more latitude than for lower ranking personnel. (Like many articles written from an academic background, this one thus suggests what may be,

 

from a narrower political or military standpoint, undesirable or difficult to set forth publicly before the American people; very likely a declaratory policy should be phrased in more moderate, "democratic" terms.)

5. The Code of Conduct as an instrument of harassment. The North Koreans and North Vietnamese were thoroughly conversant with the provisions of the Code of Conduct. As we have seen, when a prisoner of war, under duress or by inadvertence, provided them with information beyond name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, they would point out that he had already violated the Code, and hence might as well provide additional information. This sort of harassment, stemming from what they perceived as requirements of the Code, keenly affected many of the PWs. Factors in preventing such harassment in the future might include the total elimination of the Code or its modification to allow specifically the flexibility with which it has actually been interpreted by most U.S. PWs. At any rate, clear understanding of the requirements of the Code, if requirements under it are continued, would seem to be a factor which might reduce its utilization as an instrument of harassment by the captor.

Use of the Code for harassment in another manner has been alluded to, though rarely; classified information may provide more information on this type of development. There was harassment of one prisoner of war by another PW. This occurred when PWs were unsure about the requirements of the Code, differed among themselves with respect to the extent and techniques of resistance called for under it, or differed with respect to the basic policies to be followed toward the captor. To justify their positions, prisoners frequently invoked particular interpretations of the Code of Conduct, and attempted to enforce them on other PWs, sometimes through the mechanism of a PW organization. To prisoners holding varying views of the Code, this frequently appeared to be a device under which they could be harassed, possibly as a means primarily of securing unqualified adherence to a particular PW command organization and its interpretation of the Code of Conduct, as well as international law with respect to prisoners of war generally. To prisoners holding variant views, the Code thus frequently appeared to be an instrument of harassment. This aspect of PW experiences with the Code was hardly dealt with by the Defense Review Committee. There should be further research on the extent and frequency of incidents of this sort, as well as analysis of the part the Code played in the captors' tactics with respect to the prisoners.

6. Effectiveness of the Code of Conduct in preventing or reducing the occurrence of certain types of conduct by U.S. servicemen in captivity. Such types of conduct were cited in the initial call by the Department of Defense after the Southeast Asian war for the services to review the Code of Conduct. They were listed as: "collaboration, acceptance of parole, 'ratting' on fellow prisoners, failure to organize or to adhere to POW organizations, failure to render mutual support, and failure to attempt escape." The same forms of behavior were to be assessed in relation to the U.S.S. *Pueblo* incident.

These are very specific terms under which to review the Code of Conduct. They describe types of behavior which have occurred in prisoner camps since time immemorial, and their listing here should be evaluated in light of further research or the PW condition in modern terms of captivity. To examine properly all the types of conduct listed would require a long, careful, and detailed analysis of all available evidence on the prisoner-of-war experience since 1955.

**Conclusion.** Any review of the Code of Conduct should start with the most basic question: "Is the Code of Conduct

required at all?" The Defense Review Committee has given us an answer in 1976, but the historians among us know that on any important question each generation is likely to provide a new answer. The "facts" are not so likely to change as our perceptions of their relative importance. The "ultimate" answer to this question must involve all sorts of political, emotional, and moral considerations as well as so-called pragmatic, and utilitarian factors. It should also take into account, of course, some of the considerations and factors discussed in the preceding pages of this paper.

There is another factor which is relatively new but possibly it is too difficult to assess its effect at this time. That is the pervasive influence of the American media. During and after the Korean War, the media—at that time mainly the press—tenaciously scrutinized combat units of all arms, and upon return of the prisoners, magnified pejorative interpretations of their experiences. Later, civilian and military sociological studies of the U.S. PW experiences in North Korea found that the differences between PW performance there did not—except that ideologically oriented Asiatic captors were involved, and that the sensational aspects were magnified by the press—vary greatly from that in previous wars. During the Vietnam War the principal media was television, which had available and used fully, reports of American PW conduct released by the North Vietnamese. Television is such an easy, comfortable, readily available medium for Americans to use that its existence cannot be ignored in any practical implementation of the Code of Conduct regardless of what our declaratory policy should be.

Finally, if a further review confirmed a continuing need for a Code of Conduct, the Code should be looked at not as a sacred, inviolable whole, but article by article, to establish where requirements are imprecise or otherwise impractical, whether some should be eliminated entirely, and to what extent we should emphasize the declaratory aspect of the Code, i.e., its role as an ethical and moral guide. If the latter category is to rule, a future Code of Conduct should be regarded as the distillation at any given moment of the American people's supreme expectations regarding their men taken captive in the service of their country.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Harold L. Hitchens is a Senior Research Associate in the University Center for International Studies and the Office of Research, and a member of the faculty of the Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to 1974, he served in the U.S. Air Force, in various combat, operational and staff assignments. Dr. Hitchens recently edited an eight-volume series presenting hitherto unpublished transcripts of selected executive session hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations), U.S. House of Representatives.

## NOTES

1. The Code of Conduct was put into effect on 17 August 1955, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10631. The text here is taken from *Air Force Manual 50-34*, 5 June 1976. The Code is, of course, reproduced in many other sources.

2. Eugene Kinkead, *In Every War But One* (New York: Norton, 1959), pp. 19-21, 23.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Inquiry into U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents*. Report of special subcommittee on U.S.S. *Pueblo*, 25 July 1969. 91st Congress, 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 1694.

4. Ray E. Butler, "POW Code Due for Revision," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 1973.

5. Lloyd M. Bucher, as quoted in John E. Wehrum, Jr., "The Status of United States Prisoners of War under the Code of Conduct by the Armed Forces," *Catholic University Law Review*, Fall 1971, p. 148.

6. Albert D. Biderman, *March to Columny, The Story of American POWs in the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 240-242.

7. U.S. Department of Defense pamphlet 1-16, "The Code of Conduct," numerous editions. The final one, dated 6 August 1959, was replaced by Department of Defense GEN-28, referred to below.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, *The U.S. Fighting Man's Code*. Department of Defense GEN-28, also published as Department of the Army pamphlet 360-522, 5 June 1967.

9. Biderman, p. 240.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents*. Hearings before special subcommittee on U.S.S. *Pueblo*, 4 March-28 April 1969. 91st Congress, 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), pp. 953-954.

12. S.L.A. Marshall, "The Code and the *Pueblo*—Some Questions and Answers," *The New Leader*, 14 April 1969, pp. 10-11.

13. Michael P. Murray, "Historical Analysis and Critical Appraisal of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States." Unpublished Thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1973, p. 308.

14. William L. White, *The Little Toy Dog; The Story of the Two RB-47 Flyers, Capt. John R. McKone and Capt. Freeman B. Olmstead* (New York: Dutton, 1962), pp. 84-85.

15. Frederick Carl Schumacher, *Bridge of No Return; The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 125-223.

16. Wehrum, pp. 146-147.

17. Pike subcommittee report, as cited in Note 3 above, pp. 1693-1694.

18. Delmar D. Spivey in "The John A. LeJeune Forum: The Soldier and the Prisoner," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1965, p. 43.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Charles E. Marean, "Questions Facing the Code of Conduct," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1972, p. 40.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

22. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Relations. Hearings before the permanent subcommittee on investigations, on "Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners," 84th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956), *passim*. See especially the testimony of Dr. Segal, p. 105.

23. Daniel V. Gallery, as quoted in Wehrum, p. 150.

24. *Armed Forces Journal*, May 1974, p. 19. Normally military seniority is determined by date of rank. During the war in Southeast Asia, when some men were prisoners for 7 years or more, seniority was sometimes difficult to determine. For example, a captain shot down in 1965 could be superseded by a major shot down in 1972, although at the earlier date, the major might have been a first lieutenant. Generally in Southeast Asia, seniority was determined by the date of rank at the time of capture of the earliest prisoner. This problem is discussed in more detail in "If I become a POW . . ." by J. Dunn and W. Hays Parks in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1976. The article is otherwise relatively superficial.

25. Pike subcommittee report, as cited in Note 3 above, pp. 1694-1696.

26. Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 151.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-161.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

31. Elizabeth R. Smith, Jr., "The Code of Conduct in Relation to International Law," *Military Law Review*, January 1966, p. 89.

32. Pike subcommittee hearings, as cited in Note 11, pp. 953-954.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 1069-1070; Pike subcommittee report, as cited in Note 3, p. 1696.

34. U.S. Department of Defense, "Report of Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct 1976," pp. 18-19. The report carried no exact date but was released in the middle of February 1977, as submitted to the Secretary of Defense for his approval. As established under a charter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 26 March 1976, the committee included a

chairman, vice chairman, and nine other members, including two returned Southeast Asian prisoners of war. The members are listed on page 4 of the report.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
36. See Note 34 above.
37. "Report of the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct 1976," p. 5.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-29.

*Students of the evolution of the Soviet Navy have long and correctly viewed that navy in the context of its Russian tradition and the Soviet economic system. If fact has not always followed projection, what may have been missing was closer consideration of that navy qua navy. Institutional perspectives, it is argued, suggest a Soviet Navy patterned more and more on the U.S. model.*

# PROFESSIONAL SELF-IMAGE AND THE SOVIET NAVY

by

Lieutenant Commander Kenneth R. McGruther, U.S. Navy

To understand the Soviet Navy it is not enough to consider it only in its unique Russian setting. In addition to being a product of its Russian heritage and of the Soviet Union's economic and political system, the Soviet Navy is, simply, a navy. As such, it has distinctive goals, norms, values, and perspectives which distinguish it from other Soviet organizations--even other military organizations. But these objectives also make the Soviet Navy remarkably similar in many ways to other navies, a phenomenon which may be useful for predicting its future course.

The argument that the institutional perspectives of the Soviet Navy have influenced its development does not negate the fact that the Soviet Navy exists within a very Russian political and geographic framework. Fundamental to understanding the Soviet Navy are a background of Russian history and geography, an understanding of how the centralized nature of the Soviet system affects military planning, an appreciation of the inherently insecure approach the Russian takes to national defense issues, and a feel for what constitutes the Soviet notion of "threat." The nature of the Soviet economic system must also be considered. The 5-year planning base, the influence of the Communist Party, and the crushing bureaucratic administrative system[1] all produce a high degree of inertia in Soviet planning, ensuring that any changes that occur in such a system will almost certainly be incremental rather than dramatic. If we ignore these features that engender continuity and thus predictability in the Soviet system, we do so to our own disadvantage.

Nevertheless, although the features just mentioned provide us with a broad framework for understanding the evolution of the Soviet Navy, they have to date been inadequate to explain or

predict developments such as the shift to forward deployment, which took place in the mid-1960's, or the advent of the *Kiev*, in the mid-1970's. In the former case Russian history, geography, and insecurity would all suggest that Soviet naval units would be kept in home waters in order to perform such defensive missions as protection of the homeland rather than being stationed in far-flung locations in the Indian Ocean and on the western coast of Africa as has been the case. The argument that the move to forward deployment was designed to counter the presence of American SSBN's[2] seems dubious when one realizes that the units deployed out of area have generally consisted of minesweepers, small landing craft, and surface ships armed with long-range, surface-to-surface missiles intended for the anti-CVA mission. Similarly, the continuity and the inertia inherent in the Soviet economic system would have led us to expect a slightly larger and more modern version of *Moskva* and its succeeding generation rather than *Kiev*, a ship more than twice the size of *Moskva*, equipped with VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) aircraft instead of helicopters, and capable of a wide variety of missions rather than just the ASW mission.[3] Clearly something has been missing from the model we have been using to understand Soviet naval developments. Russian perspectives and the nature of the Soviet economy are useful in providing the context and the rate of evolution of the Soviet Navy, but they have not—especially since the mid-1960's—provided the key to the specific directions which that evolution has followed.

**The Naval Perspective.** The missing factor consists of the perspectives, preferences, and objectives of the Soviet Navy *as a distinctive institution*. To date, no comprehensive explanation of the dynamics behind the development of the Soviet Navy has incorporated these perspectives. In fact, most analysts have assumed the contrary, arguing that there is no room in as highly centralized a government as that of the Soviet Union for subordinate organizations to implement their own preferences. But bureaucracy by its very definition is a hierarchical administrative system in which heads of agencies having power over subordinates report only to the next senior agency head. Most commentators now agree that the Soviet political system is highly bureaucratized and becoming ever more so.[4] Hence, assumptions that institutional perspectives cannot and do not thrive in the Soviet Union are made in the face of strong evidence to the contrary.

Modern bureaucratic theory focuses on the fact that organizations strive to acquire and maintain some degree of autonomy in the conduct of their affairs.[5] This pursuit will lead military organizations to develop such features as a distinctive doctrine, a separately maintained internal structure, and a say in how they go about their business both as to the platforms built and in the way forces are maintained, deployed, and operated. Some reputable analysts have already hypothesized that institutional perspectives have long since permeated at least to the level of the Soviet Defense Ministry.[6] It seems reasonable to infer that this process has also extended to the next lower level of the bureaucracy, that is, to the individual military services themselves. It is highly likely, for example, that the influence of the Soviet Navy in areas of ship design, operating doctrine, and force posture—areas which require specific professional competence—has been quite strong for some time.[7] Although such hypotheses are difficult to "prove" and must generally be reached by interpolation, to discount them because they are not verifiable by documentary evidence is to constrain

ourselves unduly in attempting to understand–and predict–developments in any of the subelements of the Soviet Government.

If such institutional perspectives do exist within the Soviet system and if, as argued, they are applicable down to the level of the Soviet Navy, there still remains the problem of coming to grips with these perspectives and of applying them in a predictive way to future hardware developments and force employment. To do so it will be helpful to consider the Soviet Navy's institutional perspectives in terms of three categories which I will call "professional self-image," "drop-dead analysis," and a "revolution of rising expectations."

"Professional self-image" is the initial collection of notions which leads a naval organization to set its requirements in terms of certain types and levels of forces.[7] This term refers to those intuitive–but quite real–ideas which naval leaders carry around in their heads of what their navy would be like if only they could have their way. Although professional self-image is hardly unique to navies, the peculiar nature of any navy's professional self-image will often stress those self-image aspects more than other national requirements. Hence, leading naval proponents such as Mahan have proceeded from conclusions about why navies are valuable in general terms to an argument that a larger navy was of specific value for their own country.

Professional self-image consists of general ideas about how a first-class navy should be structured and should operate, an innate pursuit of organizational self-respect, and a very human desire to be "number one," all of which culminate in a vaguely perceived "dream navy." The foundation of any navy's self-image is its capability to sail unhindered upon the oceans of the world, supporting what it perceives to be its nation's objectives, and promoting national interests in any manner and location where it is necessary or possible to do so. Thus, in the total absence of financial constraints, any navy worth its blue-water salt will strive to pattern itself after the very best navy around, but will nevertheless justify its own development in terms of specific missions which it is uniquely capable of performing for its own country. Although "absence of financial constraints" is not a realizable situation (and for that reason the fulfillment of professional self-image will almost surely be incremental) it is likely that over the long run–and to the extent that sufficient resources, commitment, and political opportunity allow–any navy will strive to develop steadily towards an all-purpose, "blue-water" navy oriented towards a strict Mahanian "command-of-the-seas" concept of naval strategy.

In addition to the intuitive essence of the organization, "professional self-image" includes such concepts as organizational integrity, autonomy, and institutional stands.[8] In practice, these more general objectives will be manifested in a series of specific aspirations including political favor, growth and modernization, flexibility and balanced forces, and ultimately, of course, in an increased share of the budget. Moreover, if the navy in question is successful in obtaining either a higher level of funding or more autonomy, it is predictable that it will endeavor to advance itself towards the fulfillment of its own ever-evolving concept of, on the one hand, its proper place in the world and, on the other, of how as a "dream navy," it should be structured and should comport itself. Viewed in these terms, the development of *Kiev* by the Soviet Navy would not have been an unexpected development, and more and better air-capable ships can be anticipated, whether or not strategic considerations seem to call for them.

"Professional self-image," in sum, consists of the collection of intuitive ideas which shape an institution's

objectives. A recent interview with a retired senior Soviet naval officer illustrates the point. Asked whether the Soviet Navy in fact wanted to develop aircraft carriers, despite the fact that it seemed to have no strategic need for them, his answer was direct and simple. "Of course. Every navy wants an aircraft carrier." *That* is what I mean by "professional self-image."

"Drop-dead analysis" is the process by which these vague notions become surrounded with a collection of justifications. This term connotes the process by which an organization's leadership takes its "essential" requirements and then looks around for a rationale to support them. Regardless of their derivation, if its requirements are challenged the organization will tend to rally around them pronouncing that its organizational "essence" or its very existence is at stake. In short, the organization takes the position that if its "essential" requirements are cut it will be tantamount to asking it to "drop dead."*

In practice, "drop-dead analysis" relates closely to program-oriented planning. Rather than beginning with contingencies and working through threats and missions towards necessary programs, program-oriented planning begins with existing programs as defined by production pipelines, existing force structure, and employment patterns and then develops missions that it can afford,[9] against threats and under circumstances in which it can reasonably expect to succeed. To the extent that such a planning basis underlies the development of a given country's naval policy, the missions of that navy might be thought of more as rationalizations than realistic reasons; that is, as outputs of the development process rather than as inputs. In short, in a program-oriented planning system (such as the one used in the Soviet Union) it is possible for an organization to build the forces which it is technologically and politically capable of building, and only then to seek missions for those forces to perform.[10]

"Drop-dead analysis" results in (1) fixed output levels, (2) a high degree of continuity in ship types from generation to generation, and (3) relative simplicity in the planning process. It also results in a high degree of organizational autonomy as programs are developed in isolation and outside agents have difficulty monitoring those programs because they lack the necessary competence. It also results in considerable pressure to maintain the status quo. That is, once a given program is well established, the tendency of reviewing authorities is to ask "why not?" rather than "why?" But "drop-dead analysis" implies something else: that the impetus underlying the establishment of "essential" requirements is not, after all, an objective evaluation of force requirements but the "essence" of the organization concerned. It is because of this pervasive quality called organizational "essence" that intuitive notions of what the organization needs often wind up masquerading as analytically derived requirements.

The connecting link between professional self-image and drop-dead analysis can be called the "revolution of rising expectations." In the past this term has been used to describe the increasing social demands evidenced in emerging nations, but the parallel seems highly relevant to organizational growth. The significant feature of this revolution as it pertains to military organizations is that objectives can be expressed not only in terms of quantifiable goals, but as roles and missions. Expanded missions will normally require more in terms of capabilities than exist or are

*In the current vernacular, the organization would be willing to "fall on its sword" (in obvious reference to the Japanese hara-kiri rite) if it is obliged to take further cuts in its essential requirements.

programmed. But as capabilities are expanded to match the commitments, it is predictable that the organization concerned will strive to reinterpret its missions or to add new ones, thus beginning the cycle anew. For this reason, professional self-image and drop-dead analysis are never fixed once and for all: in each successive iteration the organization will certainly not begin by asking for less, and will most likely ask for more if it is politically feasible to do so.

It is clear that a revolution of rising expectations has been going on in the Soviet Navy at least since the mid-1960's. Its most recognizable aspect is the effort of Fleet Admiral Gorshkov to redefine the Soviet Navy's missions to give it a broader base for additional growth and for new avenues of development. It is significant that at first Gorshkov was careful to keep his arguments closely tied to the newest goal of Soviet foreign policy "to support the national liberation movement and to effect all-round cooperation with the young, developing countries,"[11] but that his references to this foreign policy goal have gradually decreased as the Soviet Navy's concept of professional self-image has continued to evolve. What seems to have happened is that specific naval goals such as growth, modernization, and "balance" have increasingly become ends in their own right. Gorshkov's most recent arguments tend to stress general reasons why a navy is a good thing for a world power to have rather than how the Soviet Navy would support specific existing goals of the Soviet Union.

**Explaining Soviet Naval Developments.** Considering these distinctive naval perspectives sheds light on the reasons for the 1964 Soviet decision to move to forward deployment. Having just had its self-respect and expectations heightened by the impressive ships which began to enter the fleet, the Soviet Navy received two embarrassments in the early 1960's by virtue of its inability to do anything effectively about the American naval efforts, first in Cuba and then in Vietnam.

At about the same time, political events were making it possible for the Soviet Navy to develop along the lines which its professional self-image would suggest. With the ouster of Khrushchev, three significant changes took place in the Soviet Union's national strategy. The first change was in the basic Soviet military doctrine. The "all-or-nothing" strategy of Khrushchev was replaced by the notion of "flexible response," as Sokolovsky's 1964 revision of *Military Strategy* pointed out.[12] The second change was the shift in the Soviet approach to a foreign policy which Brezhnev called "active and thrusting while at the same time showing flexibility and circumspection."[13] Brezhnev's more pragmatic approach to foreign policy was formally endorsed at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966. To support this foreign policy, a need clearly existed for a general purpose navy capable of operating at greater distances from the homeland than had previously been required. If the political leadership of the Soviet Union had not yet seen that, it is nonetheless certain that this thought had occurred to the leaders of the Soviet Navy, as Gorshkov's first mention of "supporting state interests" as a mission for the Soviet Navy appeared in 1967. The third major change was the replacement of Khrushchev's one-man style of rule with an increasingly bureaucratic set of procedures. This provided greater autonomy to subordinate organizations, including the Soviet Navy, to pursue institutional goals along with national ones.

Taken together, these factors provided both the opening and the justification for Gorshkov to issue his famous order to the Soviet Navy to "sail upon the oceans of the world." If the full capabilities to operate and support an oceangoing navy were not yet available,

that could be dealt with in time: the important thing was to get the policy itself approved and implemented. The ships which began to be designed and built from that point on (*Kresta II, Krivak, Kara* and *Kiev*, all of which began to appear in the early 1970's) reflected ideas that a naval professional would be expected to hold about how a fleet should look and what it should be capable of doing.

**The Conceptual Phase in Naval Development.** Implicit in this discussion of how professional self-image, drop-dead analysis, and the revolution of rising expectations have pertained to the Soviet Navy is that there is something more to the origin of a navy—and any particular aspect of a given navy—than the rhetoric by which it is justified, the hardware it builds, and the doctrine by which it operates. There is, in short, a preliminary stage in the evolutionary cycle which can be termed the "conceptual phase" of naval development. The conceptual phase is heavily influenced by the perspectives of the naval leadership. To a significant degree it in turn influences the rationale used to justify future developments, the specific features designed into new ships and weapons, and, most of all, the doctrine which guides the employment of the fleet. Understanding that this conceptual phase is a factor in naval development, how it works and what it consists of at a specific time will be of assistance to us in understanding and predicting the future development of any navy. The writings and utterances being used to justify certain developments, the sequence and purpose for which hardware is built (whether or not it is in consonance with the rationale being used), and fleet exercises and operational deployment patterns are all clues to what a navy's professional self-image is at any given time. But historical examples of what the professional self-image of other navies was at similar stages of development provide other valuable indicators. In any case, it is important to keep in mind that since professional self-image itself evolves, it must be understood more as a dynamic process of organizational self-fulfillment than as a single fixed concept. For that reason, while professional self-image will never be easy to analyze, any explanation of a navy's development will be incomplete if not totally incoherent without it.

Including specific naval perspectives in considerations of the Soviet Navy leads to some revealing insights regarding the future. The first of these is that as the professional self-image of the Soviet naval leadership is not shared by high-level political leaders, the Soviet naval leadership may be marching to a different drum than that which official Soviet policy is beating. This being the case, the "dream navy" of Soviet naval officers may be responsive to Russian geostrategic and defense considerations only where it is expedient or politically imperative that it be so. This in turn could lead to some gross anomalies between what Soviet political leaders say is policy and how the Soviet Navy actually develops. For example, because of the increasing autonomy with which the Soviet Navy seems to be operating, those who would argue for increased capabilities for the Soviet Navy will have a surprisingly wide degree of latitude in arguing for the programs they want so long as they couch their arguments in the proper rhetoric. For this reason, it is important for observers to be wary of accepting at face value anything which Soviet naval leaders say or write about future developments.

Moreover, because of the influence of professional self-image, it is predictable that whatever the reasons originally given for building certain ships, once they are delivered those ships for the most part will be operated in accordance with the Soviet naval establishment's intuitive feelings about how a first-class navy should operate

rather than strictly in accordance with stated wartime missions. In this respect, James Cable's observation that "the motives for which warships are built seldom foreshadow the actual nature of their employment"[14] seems applicable.

Finally, it is quite clear that the Soviet Navy has not had to look very hard to find a model for how a modern first-class blue-water navy should look and operate. Since 1945 the U.S. Navy has been capable of going almost anywhere and doing most anything once it got there. In recognizing the American Navy as the main threat to be countered, the Soviet Navy has also, consciously or unconsciously, become envious of the specific hardware in the American naval arsenal, and has been using the U.S. Navy as the model of its aspirations. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Admiral Gorshkov spent a substantial portion of *Sea Power of the State* discussing the many effective ways in which the American Navy has been used since World War II.[15] He concluded that it had done so for imperialistic reasons and thus had been wrongly motivated. Significantly enough, he never claimed that the actions themselves were improper ones for a navy to have taken, the clear implication being that the Soviet Navy could be used in the same ways and the actions would be quite proper. If the Soviet Navy is patterning itself after the American Navy, then it is predictable that it will eventually include among its forces flush-deck aircraft carriers, mobile amphibious forces, and a considerable blue-water endurance capability consisting of shore facilities or large fleet oilers, even though none of these would seem to be justified by geostrategic or threat-related considerations. It is not certain that the Soviet Navy will ever develop to this point, as such factors in the Soviet system as the increasing economic demands of the civilian sector and the still-preeminent position of the Soviet Army are increasingly serving to constrain further naval development. Hence if CVAs, mobile amphibious forces, and blue-water oilers do *not* enter the Soviet fleet, analysts will have to look not only at the Soviet Navy but at other features of the Soviet system. For it will not be because the leaders of the Soviet Navy did not want them, were not asking for them, and were not striving to get them.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lieutenant Commander McGruther was graduated from Dartmouth in 1965 and holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies from Brown University. He has served in minesweepers, destroyers, frigates, and most recently as Operations Officer of U.S.S. *Leahy* (CG-16). He is a graduate of the Naval War College (where he was the first winner of the Colbert Prize Essay competition) and has served in OPNAV. For the past year he has been conducting independent research and writing at the Naval War College under the Navy's Professional Development Program and is now en route to U.S.S. *Joseph Strauss* (DDG-16) in which he will serve as Executive Officer.

## NOTES

1. Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Considerations* (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. xxiv. See also Ken Booth, *Soviet Naval Developments III* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1974).

2. Michael MccGwire, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy 1960-1974," chap. 28 in Michael MccGwire, et al., eds, *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

3. J.W. Kehoe, et al., "Observations of the KIEV," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 25-41.

4. The proceedings of the "Maritime Workshop" of the Centre for Foreign Policy Affairs (see notes 1 and 2 above) have elaborated this point at length with respect to the Soviet Navy.

5. See for example Grahem T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and Martin Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974).

6. John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1971).

7. The term has been adapted from Warner Schilling, "Admirals and Foreign Policy 1913-1919." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.: 1953.

8. Halperin, pp. 28-62.

9. John Garnett in "Defense Against What," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,* December 1970, p. 20, argued that governments are always tempted to design defense policies against threats they can afford to counter rather than against those which actually exist. See also Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 198.

10. Peter H. Vigor, "Soviet Understanding of 'Command of the Sea'" in MccGwire, et al., eds., p. 607.

11. *Istoriya Vueshnei Politiki* SSR, Moscow, 1971, ed. by Ponomarov, et al., vol. 2, p. 496. (Official History of Soviet Foreign Policy).

12. The differences in the discussion of the significance of local wars are reflected in the 1962 and 1963 editions of V.D. Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy*. The first edition was translated by Rand (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); the second edition appearing as *Voennaia strategiia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963). See also V.D. Sokolovsky and M.I. Cherednickenko, "Military Art at the New Stage," *Krasnaya zveszda,* 28 August 1964, and Michael MccGwire, "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy," Chapter 16 in *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 203 for further discussion of this era.

13. *Pravda,* 5 Junc 1973, as quoted in Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973* (London: Oxford University, 1975), p. 3.

14. James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 131.

15. See for example Gorshkov's discussion in *Seapower of the State* (U.S. Naval Intelligence Support Center translation), pp. 314-321.

*Despite the American Federation of Government Employees membership recent rejection of a proposal that its organizing activity extend to military personnel, the unionization debate persists. The European experience is cited in argument by both sides but in this article the assumed analogical link between that experience and the U.S. case is shown to be nonexistent.*

# MILITARY UNIONS FOR THE U.S.: THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

by

Colonel William J. Taylor, Jr., U.S. Army

The purpose of this brief paper is not to analyze the development of military unions in specific countries of continental Western Europe and Scandinavia. That has been done more or less well already in a number of studies available in several languages. Rather, the purpose here is to examine a fundamental, implicit assumption behind the arguments by both proponents and critics of the fledgling movement to establish unions in the Armed Forces of the United States. Although one major public union, The American Federation of Government Employees, has seriously considered and rejected the idea of unionizing U.S. active-duty military personnel and although federal legislation to prohibit unionization of the U.S. Armed Forces may be passed, analysts on both sides of the debate would be well-advised to continue their research into the short-term future.

**The Nature of the Debate.** Both sides insist on using analogies to the Western European experience with military unions. Proponents generally argue that military unions for U.S. active-duty military personnel would be good for the following reasons:[1]

1. Pay, benefits, and prestige of the U.S. All-Volunteer Force (AVF) are being eroded.

2. Grievance procedures and due process in the AVF are inadequate.

3. No one in the executive branch, the Congress or the courts has been able or willing to do anything significant about 1. and 2. above.

4. Public sector unions have been successful in addressing these kinds of problems for rank and file public employees at the federal, state and local levels in the United States—and could do so in representing military personnel.

5. Union representation of military personnel would not be unique to the United States. Military unions have been successful in these endeavors in Western Europe.

6. Military unions in Western Europe are not only effective in representing the interests of military people, but also have not detracted from military effectiveness.

7. The right of U.S. active-duty military personnel to join a union of public employees is protected by the first amendment "freedom of association."

Thus,

8. Military unions for the United States are desirable and legal, and, as the European experience shows, practical and feasible.

Most critics of the movement to unionize the U.S. Armed Forces rely on lines of argument that almost always include analogies to European military unions:[2]

1. To the extent that military pay and benefits are being eroded (some argue that such erosion does not exist); and to the extent that grievance procedures and due process are inadequate (again, some argue that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the chain of command, the Inspector General System and the individual right of petition are adequate protections), the appropriate remedies reside in the constitutional mandate to Congress, i.e. (Sec. 8, cls. 12, 13, 14):

> Congress shall have the power . . . to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a Navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

2. Military unions in the U.S. Armed Forces would be divisive of the chain of command, would erode military esprit de corps, could strike and would be inimical generally to the national security interests of the United States.

3. Although the unionized military establishments of Western Europe have missions different from U.S. Armed Forces, and although none of them have been tested in combat since World War II, the results of the experience in some European military establishments are instructive:

a. They lack discipline and high military standards. The personal appearance of their service personnel is low. They have long hair, unshined brass and unpressed uniforms. They do not salute.

b. Military standards are indicative of military preparedness. The combat readiness of some unionized military establishments is questionable.

4. The advent of military unions in the United States would be unnecessary at best. More important, they would be impractical, infeasible, and dangerous for the deterrent and war-fighting missions of American military forces.

5. Military unions should be prohibited by Department of Defense directive or by congressional legislation.

**A Fundamental Assumption.** The lines of argument drawn above generally are not overdrawn on either side. Shades of gray are not common in the ongoing debates concerning military unions in America. Proponents and critics are far apart in their positions and most argue viscerally.

Other elements of the arguments notwithstanding, the central issue to be addressed in this paper is the relevance of the European analogy which is taken as an assumption by both sides. This is an assumption not to be taken lightly. One might test the assumption here by identifying, at a very high level of generalization, the political *milieux* within which these military unions had their inceptions and by examining briefly the relationships between the various military establishments, trade unions and governments under which they have developed.

**The West European Experience.** Military unions exist in Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Belgium. (See Figure 1.) Frequent references are made nowadays to military unions in the Netherlands. In fact, Dutch military personnel are not "unionized." The VVDM and BVD that have pushed so hard for "soldiers' rights" are many things, but they are not military unions, are not formally affiliated with trade unions and do not have the same formal relationships with government agencies outside the Ministry of Defense found in the countries discussed in this paper. For these reasons, one must conclude with Ezra S. Krendel that "There is no trade union movement in the Netherlands armed forces."[3]

**Austria.** Austria's first experience with military unions was during the period 1920-1934. In fact, this 14-year period constitutes the world's only experience with a unionized *volunteer* force. All subsequent military unions have developed in conscripted military establishments. The basic authority for this first Austrian experience was

| Country (Armed Forces) | Year Estab. | Percent Membership of Armed Forces | Unions (Number or Name) | Government Relationship |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federal Republic of Germany (495,000) | 1954 | 80 | DBV<br>OTV | Vocational<br>Lobby |
| Netherlands (112,500) | 1897 | 75-80 | 35 | Consultation |
| Belgium (87,000) | 1973 | 50 officers (assoc.)<br>75 enlisted (assoc.)<br>10 (union) | SYNDIC<br>CGSM | Consultation<br>Negotiation |
| Austria (52,000) | 1967 | 66 officers<br>75 NCO | Govt. Employee Union | Negotiation |
| Denmark (34,400) | 1922 | 98 officers<br>92 enlisted | 52 | Negotiation |
| Norway (35,000) | 1835 | 90 officers<br>70 enlisted | BFO | Negotiation |
| Sweden (750,000) | 1965 | 98 enlisted | Officers<br>Warrant Officers<br>NCO | Negotiation |

From Colben K. Sime, Jr., "The Issue of U.S. Military Unionization: Genesis Current Status and Resolution," Student Research Report No. 110, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 7.

**Fig. 1—European Unions and Associations**

the Norwegian Federation of Labor (LO) and the Joint Organization of Officers and Sergeants (BFO). The LO represents the vast majority of labor unions in their national negotiations and serves effectively as a participant in government. The issues addressed by the LO in negotiations with the government are generally the same for the military as for other career, public servants in a society with a strong Socialist tradition.

The legitimacy of military unions has seldom been an issue. Almost all regular officers and noncommissioned officers (the rank distinction has been officially removed) are members. Conscripts, who serve for only 12 to 15 months, are not represented by the military unions, but they do have a voice through conscript associations. The conscripts do, of course, maintain their civilian union memberships for the occupations to which they will return.

**Sweden.** As in the case of Norway, Swedish trade unions have a long history. Also like Norway, the Social Democrats have been predominant as the governing party. Social Democrats, either alone or in coalition, controlled the government from 1932 to 1976, with the exception of a few months in 1934. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) provides the major financial support and membership of the Social Democratic Party. Trade unions have been and remain more than contenders for political power; they constitute an important element of the government.[12] Traditionally, at least since the 1930s, the views and positions taken by the trade unions toward employee rights and security and toward management responsibilities have permeated the Swedish culture. Much as in the case in Norway, there is little distinction between the social rights and responsibilities of the military and the rest of society.

Although conscripts are not members of formal military unions, almost 99 percent of the personnel in the regular military belong to one or more of the three major military unions—the Commissioned Officers' Union (SOF), the Warrant Officers' Union (KOF), or the Noncommissioned Officers' Union (POF). Each of these has a long tradition dating to their organization as social or professional activities in the early 1900s. The SOF belongs to and is represented by the Central Organization of Swedish Professional Workers (SACO). The KOF and POF are represented by the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO).[13] As in the case of the FRG and Norway, labor unions negotiate with the government under the auspices of umbrella unions, the largest of which is the LO. Although there was some early resistance from the LO against military unions, especially officers' unions, the LO represents their interests regularly.

**Belgium.** Belgium was the first continental European country to undergo thorough industrialization.[14] After several false starts, the unionization process and mobilization of the working class took place in the late 1800s. Since World War II the growth and success of Belgium trade unions have been spectacular. Government, especially with the push of the Socialist, has encouraged unions and has intervened often to achieve labor satisfaction. "Labor leaders possessed a power with which ministers were forced to reckon,"[15] and, in fact, a large number of government officials have labor backgrounds.

Military professionals were slow to organize. It was only in 1960 that military associations were formed. However, in a social climate of trade union activism and increasing civilian pay and benefits in which the military did not share generally, military professionals became frustrated. After a running battle with the newspapers in a period of severely strained civil-military relations in the late 1950s, the officer corps

established the *Association des Officers en Service Actif* (AOSA), the legal status of which was disputed. In 1972, the AOSA gave birth to several military syndicates which formed under a central military syndicate (CGSM), the common trade union for all Belgian military personnel. In January 1975 a new law gave active-duty military personnel the right to join trade unions which are recognized as representing personnel in the civil service. They were also permitted by the same law to align themselves with a political party. The future of Belgian military syndicates in a society plagued by economic crisis, unemployment, political fragmentaton and linguistic quarrels is uncertain. But one suspects that their success in union bargaining activities will vary with the political power of the Belgian Socialists.

**The European Experience and the United States.** Some advocates argue that, with some differences, the societal trend of industrial democracy now occurring in the United States is part of the broader movement originating in Western Europe; that the growth of military unions in Western Europe is instructive for the present American conditions, that military unions have been "successful" in Western Europe and, *ipso facto*, can be so in the United States.[16] It is true that most of the evidence available indicates that these unions have been more or less effective in achieving improvements in military prestige, working conditions and compensation, comparable with similar improvements for Western European employees in general. It is correct, too, that none of these unions have struck, despite the confusion in the minds of some concerning the temporary "lockout" of the Swedish military by striking government officials in 1971.[17]

On the other hand, one can argue that there are fundamental differences between the Western European case and the situation of the United States differences which render analogies irrelevant at best. First, there may not be a valid "European model" for military unions. Such unions developed differently for different reasons in different Western European countries.[18] Second, most Western European countries with military unions also have conscription systems; the United States does not. Third, the trade union movements in Western Europe and in the United States are not at all analogous. The governing Social Democratic Parties in most Western European countries came to power largely because of the strength marshalled by trade unions. To the contrary, American unions have grown not only as adversaries to private management, but as political adversaries of federal, state, and local governments over those issues related to the rights of American labor. In the continental European case, where strikes by military unions are prohibited (excepting Austria and Sweden), the government "bargains" with or consults with elements of its own power base in the trade unions with which its interests are closely identified. In the American case, military unions would bargain in an adversary relationship with government management whose political power base rests upon a span of interests of which organized labor is only one.

The major "rights" enjoyed by unionized armed forces personnel in Western European countries are *not* rights secured by military unions through collective bargaining. In the main, they are rights secured by social legislation under social democratic governments in countries with strong Socialist traditions and strong trade unions. As examples, in Sweden, the 40-hour work week was legislated by the Social Democrats for *all* Swedish citizens, not simply as a collective bargaining agreement with one or more trade unions representing one or more of the Swedish military unions. The right of married couples in the Swedish

military to decide whether the civilian working wife or the military husband will stay home to care for a newborn for the first 6 months is the legislated right of *all* Swedish couples. Although it may appear ludicrous to many Americans that a soldier could simply inform his commanding officer, "my wife just had a baby; see you around in six months," the right to do so was important and "just" to the Swedish Parliament which passed the legislation.

This line of argument does not suggest that European military unions do not serve well both their constituencies and their societies. The point is that the societal context of such unions is simply different from that of the United States.

Other opponents argue or imply that unionized military establishments are undisciplined, referring to long hair, unkept uniforms, lack of saluting, 40-hour work weeks, etc.—"rights" secured by military unions. Still others argue that "unions strike," an intolerable situation for the Armed Forces of the United States. Of course, these latter arguments (based on European analogies) are full of logical traps; one cannot have it both ways. For example, one cannot argue that unionized American military personnel would strike when the European analogies show that the unionized military do not strike. One cannot argue that where European military personnel have unionized, standards of appearance related to discipline have degenerated for one might be forced in debate to extend the argument to prove conclusively (and causally) that mission capability has degenerated. This would be a difficult and probably counterproductive undertaking. Foreign analogies should be rejected.

Would unions involving active-duty U.S. military personnel strike? There are no precise precedents to which one may turn, but there are sound analogies in the United States. Unions of public employees in the United States generally are prohibited from striking at both the federal and state levels. But the postal unions struck in 1970 and were successful in their demands.[19] Police and firemen's unions are prohibited from striking in all 50 states, but many have done so in effect, through work stoppages such as "sick outs" lasting as long as 5 days.[20] Clearly, strike prohibitions in executive orders or statutes do not serve as ironclad deterrents to strikes by strong unions of public employees. Can a union prevent its membership or part thereof from striking? The late Clyde M. Webber, former President of the American Federation of Government Employees stated:

> There isn't any way to stop those things. They don't ask me to go on strike. They don't ask their national vice president to go on strike. . . . But the thing about it is that you cannot control individual elements of an organization whether it happens to be the United States Army as has been demonstrated a couple of times in the last three or four years, or the Navy or the Air Force or The AFGE. People take into their own hands what they think they have to.[21]

There remains one additional consideration concerning analogies from the European experience. Professor Ezra Krendel, whose research on military unions was among the earliest, and who will now grant me the highly fragile nature of European analogies, still maintains that there are lessons in due process and management to be learned from the European experience. That connection, too, should be severed. The nature of civil-military relations in Western Europe is far different from the American setting. Americans are unwilling to consider the active-duty Armed Forces of the United States as just another part of the labor force.[22] Several major court decisions have spelled out the ways in which the military establishment is considered

"different," and the reasons why certain first amendment rights of military personnel are limited.[23] Too, one might suggest that most Americans continue to expect standards of conduct, discipline, dedication and self-sacrifice from their military which they are not prepared to have bargained away at the behest of any labor union.

Thus what is acceptable to various European publics is not acceptable to Americans. The analogical link is not only highly tenuous; it does not, in fact, exist.

**Conclusions.** The ongoing debate concerning the desirability and feasibility of unions of active-duty U.S. military personnel is important. There are many real issues to be debated. The relevance of the European experience to the U.S. case should not be considered one of them. Our brief survey of Western European military unions indicates that the sociopolitical context of the European experience is different from the American case. European analogies should be dropped from this debate once and for all, and analytical focus should be directed to more productive endeavors.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Colonel William J. Taylor, Jr., Ph.D. is on the tenured faculty of the Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy where he teaches courses on national security and American foreign policy. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations and frequent contributor to various books and journals, his most recent articles appear in *American Defense Policy* and in *Public Administration Review*. He is currently co-authoring a text, *The Elements of National Security*.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, David Cortright, "Unions and Democracy," *AEI Defense Review*, February 1977, *passim*, and "The Union Wants to Join You," *The Nation*, 21 February 1976, pp. 206-09.

2. See Strom Thurmond, "Military Unions: No," in *AEI Defense Review*, February 1977, *passim*.

3. See Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard L. Samoff, eds., *Unionizing the Armed Forces* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), p. 152.

4. See Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "Military Unions and Military Effectiveness: Austria as a Case Study, 1920-1934," in William J. Taylor, Jr., et al., eds., *Military Unions: U.S. Trends, Issues and Alternatives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977). This 18-chapter interdisciplinary work, including contributions from both military and civilian scholars, provides detailed analysis of many of the points made in this brief paper.

5. See Joseph P. Mockaitis and Donald E. Johnson, "An Analysis of Military Unionization in Austria, Denmark and Sweden." Unpublished manuscript at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 20 September 1972, p. 17.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

7. See Bernhard Fleckenstein, "The Military and Labor Union Organizations in Germany," *Armed Forces in Society*, Summer 1976, p. 499.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 504-05. See also Ezra S. Krendel, et al., "The Implications of Industrial Democracy for the United States Navy," Technical Report No. NKG-10, prepared under the Navy Manpower R&D Program of the Office of Naval Research, January 1975, pp. 177-85.

9. See Mockaitis and Johnson, p. 41.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

11. See Ezra S. Krendel, et al., p. 186.

12. See Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard L. Samoff, eds., p. 148.

13. See Annika Brickman, "Military Trade Unionism in Sweden," *Armed Forces in Society*, Summer 1976, pp. 530-31.

14. See Martin O. Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium," in Martin O. Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe* (New York: McKay, 1974), p. 190.

15. Victor Werner, "Syndicalism in the Belgian Armed Forces," *Armed Forces and Society*, Summer 1976, p. 490.

16. See, for example, David Cortright, pp. 30-42.

17. For a brief and accurate explanation, see Adam Roberts, *Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 68.

18. See Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, "Trade Unions in Armed Forces." A Working Paper presented to the 1976 Conference of the British Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces, Holly Royd College, University of Manchester, 16-20 April 1976, pp. 1, 4-14.

19. The postal strike of March 1970 resulted in an 8 percent pay raise for postal employees (PL 91-375). It should be recalled that the U.S. Army was called in to operate some post offices during this strike. One wonders what the result might have been had the Army personnel been members of a union of federal employees.

20. See Ezra S. Krendel, et al., pp. 147, 152.

21. "Unionizing: An interview with Clyde M. Webber, National President of the American Federation of Government Employees," *The Times Magazine*, 24 September 1975, p. 43.

22. See George Gallup, "Unions in Military Not a Popular Idea," The Newburgh, New York *Times Herald*, 7 July 1977, p. 64.

23. See William J. Taylor, Jr., "Military Unions for the United States: Trends, Issues and Alternatives," in Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., *Blue Collar Soldiers? Unionization and the U.S. Military* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1977), pp. 11-54.

# SET AND DRIFT



## CRUISE MISSILES: OFFENSE IN BREADTH ADDED TO DEFENSE IN DEPTH*

by

Commander David G. Clark, U.S. Navy

Historically, a new weapons system has had to offer increased capability in one or more of three areas—range, precision, or destructive power—in order for it to be accepted over existing systems. Trade-offs among these three criteria were permitted and encouraged by the asymmetrical development of the respective technologies. Gaining sufficient warhead size to destroy a given target may have required accepting reduced ranges or accuracy; the ballistic dispersion of long-range delivery may have demanded larger warheads to ensure that the target was brought within the weapon's damage radius; and extended range capabilities, of course, were desired to permit earlier attacks against more targets, even if a smaller warhead were used. As technology progressed (e.g., from smooth-bore casemate guns to stabilized naval rifles triple-mounted in turrets), more desirable balances could be obtained. Large nuclear warheads on ICBMs and tons of iron bombs hung from aircraft compensate for system inaccuracies; a 60-mile range was accepted for Harpoon to permit firing a weapon with a 500-pound warhead from existing AAW launchers.

The new generation of cruise missiles offers a system to permit destruction of hard and heavily defended targets at long range, without the cost and collateral damage of ballistic missiles or manned aircraft. Cruise missiles can never totally replace aircraft or ballistic missiles for all targets because of the restrictive trade-offs among sophistication, speed, warhead, and range which must be made when designing a missile for a launcher of fixed size and the missile's inapplicability for missions against large areas, dispersed/hidden targets, and targets demanding a high level of discrimination or damage assessment.

The United States, as a maritime nation surrounded by oceans and with

*This article is an adaptation of the Executive Summary of a study prepared under the auspices of the Naval War College Center for Advanced Research. A limited number of copies of the full study are available from the Dean of Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, RI 02840

overseas interests critical to its survival, depends upon continued use of the ocean for its economic well-being in peacetime and for the movement of large quantities of aircraft, armor, munitions, troops, and supplies in time of war. Our principal potential enemy, primarily a landpower with territorial buffer zones and limited strategic dependence on the oceans in wartime, can build a navy which emphasizes sea denial forces to inhibit our use of the seas. Over the past 30 years, peacetime measures of efficiency and economies of scale have driven the U.S. Navy to ever larger platforms, concentrating capabilities into fewer units. New systems have been justified time and again on the greater quantity of old ones they would replace. Meanwhile, guided munitions fired from durable platforms—first the homing torpedo and manned aircraft, later the long-range cruise missile—have forced us into increasingly defensive tactical concentrations. Through a generation of tactical and procurement measures we have provided defense in depth for our high-value ships. As a result, surface combatant ships and (more recently) submarines have lost their desirable mobility to become escorts in a diminishing number of task groups.

A few concentrations of valuable and heavily defended ships may constitute the most efficient force structure when viewed within peacetime programs, but they fall far short of meeting requirements of war in which attrition is a reality. The discriminating surveillance permitted by today's technology gives the cruise missile the ability to destroy or severely damage even the largest of ships with a single conventional or nuclear weapon. This one-shot kill ability is of greater significance now than when it took weeks to find the enemy and months to deploy a force that could destroy him. To balance the situation, an immediate requirement exists to provide the capability to fire cruise missiles from our own ships, surface and submerged. Forces so equipped can then be operated at a greater distance from tactical airbases or independently, thus assuming the character of mobile armor rather than massed infantry guarding their artillery. Air cover is most desirable for surveillance and targeting, but the aircraft performing these supporting functions need not have the high-performance characteristics required for air superiority. These aircraft may be either organic to the surface force (V/STOL, including LAMPS, or even RPVs (Remotely Piloted Vehicles)) or provided from larger airbases ashore or afloat. Of course, the carriers (and all valuable ships) will still require defenses, but letting SLCM-armed (Ship-Launched Cruise Missile) ships operate well ahead of them—just as the ALCM (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) and SRAM (Short-Range Attack Missile) would do for the B-52 and B-1 today—would permit the force of these intensive power projection units to be husbanded until they are needed and not risked in the early days of a conflict before the political objectives, levels of commitment, rules of engagement, and alliances on both sides have been ascertained.

Changes to tactical employment and deployment policies can be accomplished rather quickly. The availability of cruise missile technology to the navies of both sides has implications for change to force structure and ship design which will require substantial time and other resources to effect. Considerations of budget stability simply do not permit casting out the old and starting anew, even if desired. A credible future navy must have survivable war-fighting capabilities, apparent and real, against land-based systems, even after expected attrition. Such a force must include many more multimission ships, similar in concept to those built during past wars when the painful lessons of attrition were re-

learned. If such a force restructure were attempted, while holding constant or increasing current capabilities, then this new navy of dispersed capabilities would be much larger; very costly to build, man, and maintain; and extremely demanding of technology—a combination of factors arguing strongly for retention of some quantity of large carriers and support ships not too different from those at sea today.

Several superjacent issues (moral, strategic, political and economic) are now combining to inhibit progress in cruise missiles. For years others have deployed similar weapons, including ones which could cause greater damage than those we now have in development. No agreement sought nor unilateral action taken should prevent the addition of a missile-firing system to U.S. ships. Intentions can change overnight; attaining true capabilities takes years. If programs are not pursued today, then the moralists, strategists, economists and politicians who will be responsible for this nation's well-being in future years may be forced to select from a dangerously narrow range of options in discharging their responsibilities.





# THE BAROMETER

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20362

19 October 1977

VADM James B. Stockdale, USN
President, Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Admiral Stockdale:

I am writing about the review of *How the Battleship MAINE was Destroyed* which appears in the Fall 1977 issue of the *Naval War College Review*. There are two points I want to raise: the qualifications of the reviewer, and the function of the *Naval War College Review*.

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As the surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Your reviewer, Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, failed to meet his responsibility.

He admits that the technical appendix is the heart of the book. Yet he also admits that he lacks the background and expertise to evaluate most of the technical points raised. Nonetheless, he continues his review. His admissions should have warned the editor of the *Naval War College Review* that Dr. Cosmas--by his own testimony--was not the man to write the review.

Another inconsistency is also troubling. Dr. Cosmas states that the true explanation of the loss of the *MAINE* has remained an unresolved question; that my book comes about as close as is possible to settling this issue; but the book will not radically alter the historiography of the coming of the Spanish-American War, since most recent historians have *assumed* that the *MAINE probably* was destroyed by accident. Between a close approach to truth and an assumption of probability there is a great distinction.

The major flaw he finds is that I did not write the book that *he* thinks I should have written. This is a fallacy common in most reviews, and a major

reason why they are of so little use. I—with the help of others—investigated the technical evidence that might shed light on the loss of the *MAINE*. Because I have been engaged in directing naval engineering matters for over half a century, I believed this expertise might make a contribution. I could approach the problem technically, and this I did. I did not "avail" myself of the "opportunity" to make a full historical study of the interplay of administrative, political, personal, human, and technological factors in the loss of the battleship since this was not my intention and, further, there were limitations of time and professional qualifications in these areas. Nor did I write a psycho-history—a morass into which historians too often descend. Dr. Cosmas criticizes me for restricting myself to areas of my knowledge and experience. I would have criticized myself if I had gone beyond them.

And yet, almost unwittingly, Dr. Cosmas raises an important issue. It is almost eighty years since the *MAINE* was lost. Nearly all American historians agree that the war that followed marked an important transition in American history. Why has it taken "professional" historians of the Spanish-American War so long to investigate the matter—to study the vast interplay of forces that Dr. Cosmas feels should be made? If my book only substantiates the verdict of conventional historical inquiry, why then have not historians examined the questions he raises? The documents have been available for decades.

What appalled me when I first began to study the loss of the *MAINE* was how little first-rate historical scholarship has been spent on the subject. That, indeed, was why I felt compelled to write a book, and not a brief article as I had planned. Perhaps, to paraphrase, history is too important to be left to "professional" historians.

The *Naval War College Review* purports to be a learned journal. A true learned journal can be an important source of information for those who have heavy demands on their time. From my experience, such a journal is no better than its reviews; and institutions are no better than their journals.

Why is it necessary to have the *Review* at all? There are several publications already covering the same fields with greater specialization. Also, the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* includes the areas of particular interest to naval officers and was founded for that purpose. It is published at no expense to the government. I am sure that articles by staff and students would, if worthy, be published by it. In these days when the government is attempting to reduce paperwork, do away with superfluous employees, and save money, eliminating the *Review* would be a noteworthy, precedent-setting action by the War College.

I assume this letter will be published in the *Naval War College Review*.

Sincerely,

/s/

H.G. Rickover



# PROFESSIONAL READING

Bennett, Geoffrey. *The Battle of Trafalgar*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 256pp.

Captain Bennett is well-known to readers of British naval history as a writer specializing in detailed accounts of battles in the First and Second World Wars and as a biographer of Nelson and Beresford. Having dealt with the battles of Jutland, Falkland Islands, the River Plate, and the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, Bennett now turns his attention to a narrative of the most famous battle in English naval history. The story of Trafalgar is an old one that has been told many times, but it is a story worth retelling and Captain Bennett has done justice to the tale. The book may be recommended as an authoritative and accurate account of the battle written by an author thoroughly familiar with the technical aspect of naval affairs.

The specialist in seventeenth and eighteenth century naval history will have some reservations about a number of statements in the first two chapters. The background which the author provides on the general history of the Royal Navy and the essay on "fighting sail" contain a number of inaccurate or poorly chosen descriptions. For example, it seems inappropriate to describe the Royal Navy as "cutting its infant teeth" in the Anglo-Dutch wars. It is clearly debatable whether the war of 1689-97 is accurately described as the War of the English Succession, and it is a gross oversimplification to state that the Trafalgar Campaign had its genesis in the storming of the Bastille. On the technical side, experts may well argue that a square rigged ship could not sail as close as $50^0$ off the wind. Six points off the wind would seem more accurate for ships in the period under discussion. In general, the military and political background of the war is weak. What is mentioned shows no new insights into the broader significance of the battle and there is no evidence that the latest scholarship on the encompassing aspects of the period has been used. Bennett has confined himself to the naval side of the story. But one must also evaluate carefully his claim to have told the story "anew, not from the many versions published, but from contemporary records." Oddly enough, there is not a single reference to an archival source and the select bibliography lists among the standard secondary sources, the well-known documents published by the Navy Records Society, Desbriere, the Nelson letters, and the 1913 "Report of the Admiralty Commission to Inquire into the Tactics of Trafalgar."

Captain Bennett has given us, not a new view based on wider research or newly found material, but a reexamination of old evidence. The result does not significantly alter the accepted view of the battle. However, the book does correct and reassess a number of details as well as provide a well-written summary of the traditional view of the battle.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Blumenson, Martin. *The Vildé Affair: Beginnings of the French Resistance.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 286pp.

Frequently history may seem removed from the lives of ordinary people because it deals with major figures, important decisions, and broad trends. But history is the record of what people have done. It is people who make it, who experience it, and who record it. Martin Blumenson's brilliant and sensitive account of the beginnings of the resistance in France is really an account of how a few educated men and women —representing the best examples of civilization—first viewed, then responded, and finally suffered under the Nazi occupation, which exemplified the most brutal, savage and dark side of man. It is a detailed history of the travails of individual men and women under extraordinary conditions.

The fall of France in June 1940, the subsequent German occupation of the northern portion of the country, and the establishment of a rump government at Vichy under the octogenarian Marshal Pétain left Frenchmen stunned. The German occupation was heavyhanded and oppressive even at first and later as food, clothing and other necessities became scarce, it was obvious to all that the Germans were looting the country. In addition, the mere presence of a foreign conqueror virtually insured unrest.

At the Museum of Man in Paris a group of intellectuals recognized from the first that the Nazis were the antithesis of civilization and all that makes life worthwhile. This group included an art historian, an anthropologist, and a librarian, among others. It was led by Boris Vildé, a gifted linguist, a remarkable man and a charismatic leader. Working slowly and cautiously, they succeeded not only in helping prisoners of war to escape from France, but also in obtaining and transmitting to the British detailed plans of the base at St. Nazaire. They published and distributed several issues of an underground newspaper, *Résistance*. They were the first to use the word "résistance," which later became synonymous with the fight of the French people to liberate themselves.

Important as the political and historical implications of their activities may have been, they pale beside the real importance of Vildé and his group: nothing less than the triumph of man over the forces of evil and barbarism. It is true they were betrayed, captured and tried (surprisingly in a relatively fair trial with a scrupulous and conscientious military judge). Finally, seven were executed. Blumenson has used diaries and letters from Vildé and his group and he has exhaustively sought out and interviewed their friends and relatives, as well as survivors. Leaving no loose ends, he describes in clear, simple, lucid prose—the most difficult of all to write—how these cultivated men and women not only responded to extraordinary political and social conditions, but also how they courageously adjusted and reconciled themselves to the universals of love, hope and death. The import of this fast-paced, gripping and beautifully written book was summed up by the writer Claude Aveline, a surviving member of the Vildé group. "They would not accept a defeat a thousand times worse than military defeat—the defeat of man."

Alas, Vildé and the six others who were shot with him were only a few of the many courageous French men and women who died refusing to accept a defeat of man. In doing so, they reaffirmed the worth, the strength and the vitality of civilization.

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON III

Brereton, Lewis H. *The Brereton Diaries.* New York: Da Capo Press, 1976 [c. 1946]. 450pp.

The occasion for the republication after 30 years of *The Brereton Diaries* is

not readily apparent. Nothing at all has been added (as, for example, a new introduction or statement of purpose), and one can only assume that this standard reference, long out of print, is needed by libraries whose original copies have disappeared. Lewis Hyde Brereton (1890-1967; USNA, 1911) served with the Air Force and its predecessor organizations continuously from 1912 to 1948. He had entered the Naval Academy in 1907 only because he couldn't get into West Point, and upon graduation switched to the Coast Artillery Corps and, a year later, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps.

These diaries cover the period from 3 October 1941 through 8 May 1945, a period during which Brereton held an unmatched series of senior appointments in all major theaters of the war: Commander, Far East Air Forces at the opening of the war; then Commander, 5th Air Force; Commander, 10th Air Force (India, 1942); Commander, Middle East Air Forces (June 1942); Commander, 9th Air Force (Europe; October 1943); and Commander, 1st Allied Airborne Army (August 1944, in time to be in overall command of the airborne forces who sought out, under his deputy, British Lt. Gen. F.A.M. Browning, *A Bridge Too Far*). A paragraph written by Hanson W. Baldwin (USNA, 1924), when the book first appeared in 1946, remains valid.

> 'Louey' Brereton pulls no punches; he is aggressive and quick in sizing up a . . . situation and he can be frank to the point of tactlessness. From such a man one might expect, therefore, war diaries of startling impact. Yet the reader will find little that is exciting and not too much that is new in the present volume. Neither in content nor in style do they reflect the same reckless, restless vigor that personifies the author.

Despite Baldwin's disappointment, the account has value as an insider's view of many important decisions, campaigns, and personalities of the war. For that reason it is still considered an integral part of the semiofficial literature of World War II.

DAVID MacISAAC
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy

Bond, Brian and Roy, Ian, eds. *War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977. v. II. 196pp.

The noted British military historians Brian Bond and Ian Roy are the editors of this collection of essays and book reviews. The editors state in the introduction of this yearbook that their purpose was "to provide a forum for the scholarly interest in war and its repercussions which has increased and broadened in recent years." Unfortunately, this thin volume fails to accomplish the purpose of its editors. Readers intent on finding a scholarly collection of essays on war comparable to E.M. Earle's *Makers of Modern Strategy* or Michael Howard's *The Theory and Practice of War* will be disappointed. The items that are of value in the yearbook are obscured by this volume's defects.

One drawback is its prohibitive price of $25. For this amount the reader receives a poorly bound volume with typescript printing. The general impression thus created is that of a collection of undergraduate senior essays finished the night before the deadline, rather than a collection of thoughtful essays on a serious subject. Another drawback is that there is no connecting theme to the essays and reviews. Articles covering social, political, administrative, medical, diplomatic and archival aspects of military history appear in this volume without any meaningful introduction by the editors. Because of these drawbacks the reader is bound to ask himself whether time should be spent in the reading of this volume when the editors do

not seem to have spent much time preparing it.

Yet these drawbacks of high price, poor quality, lack of sufficient editing, and no central theme could have been overcome if the individual essays were of high quality. Unfortunately the quality of the essays must be described as uneven: several of them are superficial and without focus, while others are precise and thought-provoking pieces. One of the better essays is "Colonial Africa and its Armies" by V.G. Kiernan. This is a superb study in an area neglected by historians of European imperialism in the 19th century: in their focus on the economic aspects of imperialism, like markets and raw materials, they have neglected the value of colonies in providing manpower for military purposes. With the exception of Britain's Indian Army, military historians in the English-speaking world also have paid little attention to the colonial armies of the great imperial powers. These armies played an important role in the imperial adventures of the great powers in Africa and Asia. Also, the colonies provided huge manpower resources that were tapped by the great powers in the First and Second World Wars. For example, the French brought 1,918,000 men from their colonies to France during the First World War. Kiernan concludes that the French empire proved "itself an asset, instead of a liability, to national defence." This conclusion has important consequences in the debate over whether imperialism paid.

In another essay entitled "War and Social Change: The Black American in Two World Wars," Neil A. Wynn provides an historical perspective to the racial problems of our own day. This essay, based on Professor Wynn's book *The Afro-American and the Second World War*, is full of insights connecting the various strands of foreign policy, military affairs and domestic racial problems. Wynn concludes that the United States' increased involvement in world affairs "encouraged Americans to continue the progress in civil rights." This conclusion is an excellent starting point for a study of the racial turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, and how it affected our armed forces and foreign policy during the Vietnam War.

Another of the better essays, entitled "Staff Training and the Royal Navy, 1918-1939," by Anthony R. Wells, describes how the Royal Naval Staff College languished in the interwar period, despite the efforts of the eminent British naval historian Adm. H.W. Richmond during his tenure as president of the Royal Naval War College. In 1912, Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, injected some elements of staff training into the courses of the Royal Naval War College in order to train officers for the Naval War Staff that he had also just created in that year. Churchill hoped these two institutions would provide the Royal Navy with officers educated to perform staff duties professionally. However, neither fared well during the First World War, where poor staff work greatly contributed to British reverses at the Dardanelles and in trade protection. Despite this dismal showing, the importance of staff training continued to be ignored in the interwar period, with the result that many mistakes committed at the Dardanelles were repeated in Norway. Wells thinks the most important failure of the interwar period was the lack of any significant cooperation between the Naval Staff and the Staff College; this meant that "by 1939 Churchill's original aim, that the RN Staff College should become the 'brain' of the Naval Staff was still a pipedream."

The remaining essays and reviews suffer from a variety of flaws. "The American Navy in the World of Franklin and Jefferson, 1755-1826," based on a lecture delivered by its author John B. Hattendorf, is too short and general to be of much value. Suzann Buckley's

"The Failure to Resolve the Problem of Venereal Disease among the Troops in Britain during World War I" is a narrative essay lacking any imaginative insight. "German Air Power and the Munich Crisis," by Williamson Murray, is too short; but does show how unprepared the *Luftwaffe* was for war in 1938. "The Introduction of War Office Selection Boards in the British Army: A Personal Recollection," by Brigadier F.H. Vinden, is a chatty little memoir. Stephen Brooks' essay "Liddell Hart and His Papers" is informative about the material in the Liddell Hart archive, but makes no attempt to shed any light on the many controversies that surround this popular British military commentator. The rest of the volume is devoted to short reviews of recent works in military affairs.

In conclusion, this volume does possess several essays of merit; but, as a whole, it must be considered a disappointing failure. The editors Brian Bond and Ian Roy are probably correct in their view that "there is sufficiently wide interest and potential readership to justify" a yearbook of military history. They have not, however, produced a volume of sufficient quality, breadth or vision to satisfy the demands of this patient readership.

JOHN H. MAURER
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Byrne, Edward M. *Military Law*. 2nd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 745pp.

Books shipped in plain brown wrappers usually offer tantalizing text and enticing photographs. *Military Law* offers neither. With its "brown-side-out" exterior, fine print, and complete absence of graphics of any kind it has all the visual appeal of an issue of the *Federal Register*. In a society where it is said that the medium is the message, one would have to strive to produce a book less appetizing in appearance. At least the first edition has gold seals on the cover.

In fairness to Commander Byrne, as a law text *Military Law* is not much more drab than traditional law books. However, this needn't be the case. Lawyers claim to be communicators, yet we are light years behind educators and industry in the use of graphic presentations. After 10 years' exposure as a trial judge to the dull presentations of the vast majority of lawyers I have to wonder whether lawyers are ever going to learn how to sell their product. While not advocating placing on the cover a photo of Cat Futch dancing aboard the U.S.S. *Finback*, surely the Naval Institute Press could have found something appropriate to liven up the book; perhaps an artist's sketch of the famous Brig O' War *Somers*, which is mentioned inside.

One should not judge a book by its cover; however, it is a shame that with today's visual communication techniques and the public's conditioning toward interesting learning displays, few potential readers will venture past this book's dreary exterior. This is unfortunate because in *Military Law* Byrne has combined some delightfully interesting case discussions with some well-analyzed information. The author's stated dual mission of text and reference book is unfortunately only partially successful. Because of rapid changes in the military law, the book is not functional as a practicing lawyer's reference work; but it would make a fine textbook for a college course on military law. It would also be good background reading for a line commander or civilian lawyer with his first military case. The book lacks sophistication for law school use, again largely because some areas of the book are already obsolete as a result of the "born again" changes in military law, courtesy of the current Court of Military Appeals. The book also lacks a table of cases, which is standard in legal texts.

Is the book practical? During a

recent 2-week tour of active duty, while training at a large military facility, I requested a number of enlisted legal clerks to examine *Military Law* with an eye toward its value as a reference work. All agreed that they did not need the textual materials and that the appendixes were available in existing service manuals. One trial counsel borrowed the book to check a jurisdictional issue that had arisen in one of his cases. Unfortunately, and through no fault of the author, he found the book out of date on that issue. The book was not in the base law library, and, in fact, was unheard of among the lawyers. I did find the first edition in the base library but its checkout history was sparse.

In sum we have a book, dull in appearance, not current enough for the military trial lawyer, unnecessary for legal clerks, and only valuable as a college text or background reading for an inexperienced lawyer or a line officer. Even they read it at their peril (except for the value of its historical perspective) due to the dynamic state of military law in this country today, and the book's resulting obsolescence. Regretably, given the book's discouraging appearance, it will take a well-disciplined officer, or one on a very lonely watch to venture past the cover unless it is given as a classroom assignment.

At this point, although it is currently fashionable in reviewing a book to grind all one's pet axes without informing the reader just what the book is about, a brief summary of the contents of *Military Law* is in order. The book contains 443 pages of text and 278 pages of forms and self-quizzes. It begins with a chapter on the history and background of military law, from earlier civilizations to the present, concluding that, "The most recent alterations have resulted in what is probably the most liberal system of military justice in the world today" —a charming understatement. The author then follows the process of military justice, in sequence through the trial stage, in a logical and coherent fashion. Apprehension, investigation, types of offenses, alternative dispositions, counsel, court, evidence and trial procedures are all covered. Also, brief reference is made to administrative bodies and misconduct determinations—basically, information found in present military manuals. Textual materials are followed by discussion cases and self-quizzes, with answers in the back of the book. These quizzes suggest that the author is attempting to reach the barracks student, in that law-school casebooks rarely contain answers in the same volume, but rather send them to the professor or sell them separately. I must admit to liking Byrne's all-in-one-book format because the questions were interesting and provocative and the answers not always apparent but easily checked. In addition to the usual indexes, the book contains a glossary of words and phrases which will be of value to the uninitiated.

The cases for discussion extracted by Byrne are gems. They comprise the most fascinating reading found in *Military Law*. Exemplary of this material is the discussion of the *Somers* Mutiny, in which, in 1842, the Navy hanged an aspiring pirate, who also happened to be the son of the Secretary of War. This hanging has affected the Navy's policy toward the death sentence ever since. Included also is a discussion of the famous Dreyfus case, which has secured the place of Emile Zola in history and reportedly inspired French Premier Clemenceau to utter the classic statement, "Military justice is to justice what military music is to music." Famous modern day military criminals such as Lieutenant Calley and Captain Levy receive attention in these discussions along with others less famous such as Private Wartsbough, who liked to wear silver bracelets, and Captain Cullins, who should have stayed on the bridge. Byrne writes a good college-level

textbook and has an eye for interesting cases. He also knows what technical materials are needed by those working in the military justice system. In his next effort he would be better served eliminating altogether the idea of a handbook-deskbook, and splitting up his project into two separate books: one, a readable, fascinating and sometimes humorous book on military trials —with the appropriate graphics—and the other, a college textbook with reduced appendixes and perhaps a sketch of the *Somers*.

JUDGE TIM MURPHY
Superior Court, Washington, D.C.

Cave Brown, Anthony, ed. *The Secret War Report of the OSS*. New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1976. 586pp.

"If foreign policy is the shield of the republic, as Walter Lippmann has called it," proposed Sherman Kent of Yale, "then strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the shield to the right place at the right time; it is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword." *The Secret War Report of the OSS*—a condensation of the larger, recently declassified "Official War Report of the Office of Strategic Services," written in 1947—is the definitive account of United States participation in clandestine intelligence operations against the Axis powers in Europe, and of the OSS attempt to guide Kent's metaphorical sword.

While it lacks the literary style which characterizes the official history of one of its British counterparts, M.R.D. Foot's *Special Operations Executive in France*, the *Report's* description of OSS is candid and extensive. Part I recounts the origin and structure of the OSS, from the inception of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the forerunner of OSS, through the interminable political conflict that shaped both the centralized concept and structure of the Office. Part II chronicles the nature and extent of OSS activity in the European and related theaters of operation. Cave Brown has arbitrarily excluded OSS involvement in the Far Eastern theater, but only, it would appear, to emphasize strategic operations in Europe, where OSS made its principal contributions in support of the French and Italian resistance and in the clandestine preparations for Operations TORCH, ANVIL, and OVERLORD.

The appearance of the *Secret War Report*, with only slight censoring and some 30 years after it was written, will inevitably revive a number of controversial issues. Preeminent among them will undoubtedly be the question: What does the book reveal concerning the significance and effectiveness of the OSS contribution to the clandestine war in Europe?

Perhaps what is most compelling about the *Report* is its remarkable objectivity. It does not contend that OSS won the secret war with Germany. Nor does it contend that it won the secret war in collaboration with the British. Rather, it awards full credit to the British intelligence services—the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE)—and acknowledges the inestimable British contribution both to the establishment of OSS and to the success of Allied intelligence collection and special operations. The *Report* does show, however, that the United States, with the proper assistance and its own intellectual resources, created within 30 months an intelligence service that had taken other countries over 30 years to establish, and then, confronting those services, proved their equal. Moreover, it shows that in the closing months of the war in Europe the OSS began to surpass the British services in the agent penetration of Germany.

Concerning the founder and Director of OSS, Maj. Gen. William J. "Wild Bill"

 

Donovan, the *Report* discloses little about the flamboyant bravado and reckless personal abandon that earned him his sobriquet. But it does reveal some of doctrinaire conservatism and political naivete that caused great uncertainty within the OSS on policy in Italy and France, and increasingly aroused the suspicions of the British about his competence. And yet it also confirms that whatever success OSS achieved in clandestiness—indeed whatever credibility was won for the principle of a permanent central intelligence agency—was largely the attainment of Donovan and of the excellent men that he personally recruited.

If this volume indicates anything about the efficacy of OSS as an intelligence service, nowhere is it more apparent than in its discussion of the funding of secret operations. Here, for the first time in print and relatively uncensored, is the story of unvouchered funds and clandestine banking operations as it was then and, presumably, at least to some extent, remains today. It is unfortunate that, despite a cogent analysis of secret funding and the surreptitious acquisition of foreign currencies in his Introduction, the editor does not include all material on financial operations from the verbatim OSS Report. Not only would it have delighted scholars, but it would have further substantiated perhaps the book's most astounding claim of OSS effectiveness: that "as of August 1945, no case had been found of an OSS agent who was captured due to the fact that he had been supplied with insecure funds." Although such comparisons are misleading, this is one claim that neither SIS nor SOE could reasonably make.

Not everyone, of course, will be impressed with the preceding indications of OSS effectiveness. After all, the measure of a clandestine service in wartime is its proficiency in secret intelligence (espionage) and special operations.

Although it effected such strategic intelligence coups as the secret negotiations for the surrender of all German forces in northern Italy, the OSS Secret Intelligence Branch (OSS/SI) seemed inhibited by two factors which prevented it from realizing its full potential—the British and the ULTRA Secret. At the operational level, animosity developed between OSS/SI and SIS as OSS officers increasingly perceived that SIS was more committed to the preservation of the British empire than it was to the effective prosecution of the war. At staff levels this animosity was exacerbated when the British proposed the complete SIS control of espionage in Europe, a proposal that Donovan unceremoniously rejected. A second hindrance was the ULTRA Secret. With this British penetration of the German Enigma machine-cipher in virtually all of its modes, conventional espionage was compelled to take a backseat in the acquisition of intelligence. ULTRA's speed, accuracy, and profound reliability exceeded even the most sophisticated spy network.

In special operations—the physical subversion of the enemy—the OSS ostensibly had parity of control. In reality, however, the field of special operations was very much a British play, performed on a European stage. The salient OSS contribution to the Normandy invasion came in the critical area of supply, and only as more men and materiel from America arrived in England did OSS exert a decisive influence on special operations policy in France.

One may criticize Cave Brown's editorial selectivity, such as his failure to include the full extent of the official text on secret financing, but not his ability to provide illuminating commentary. For it is only through the commentary that we learn of the identities of the actual participants, of the intricate exploitation of sources by Allen Dulles as "OSS/Bern," or of the extraordinary courage of such junior

OSS officers as B.M.W. Knox and William Colby behind enemy lines. He succeeds in capturing the spirit and behind-the-scenes sensation of perilous operations in perilous times, and reminds us that events were nowhere as prosaic as the *Report* describes them. At times, his editorial comments display a discernible British bias. It is true, for instance, that many young OSS operatives were inexperienced, naive, liberal, and idealistic, and "evinced quite definite fits of Anglophobia." But to brand them as "unstable" and a "very strong left-wing strain in young OSS politics," simply because they recognized the imperialist motives of the British services for what they were, is an overstatement.

The lifespan of the OSS was actually less than 3 years. For what its *Secret War Report* can tell us about the nature and effectiveness of that brief existence makes the book an invaluable source. And, as the first publication of an official classified intelligence history, it is a unique historical document, as well. If the past is prologue, however, this volume may be most useful not for what it can tell us about OSS, but for what it can tell us about the foundations of its successor and the beleaguered concept of a central intelligence agency for the United States.

RONALD D. VANDEN DORPEL

Jentschura, Hansgeorg, et al. *Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945.* Translated by Antony Preston and J.D. Brown. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 284pp.

The genesis of this book was in 1942 when, at the request of Hitler, the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Admiral Wenneker, was granted permission to inspect a *Yamato*-class "super battleship." Wenneker then sent a detailed description to Hitler's HQ. Upon the fall of the Third Reich, Erich Gröner, historian of the German Navy, retrieved this material to be used as the frontpiece of his projected book on Japanese warships. For this project, Gröner exchanged information with Shizuo Fukui, a Japanese naval constructor, who was writing a similar book. Fukui furnished a great number of photographs, line drawings, and technical material for Gröner's use.

When Gröner died, the project was continued by the above authors. This volume was first published as *Die Japanischen Kriegschiffe 1869-1945* by J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1970. The English edition was translated by Antony Preston and J.P. Brown with the help of seven technical assistants. The English edition, however, was more than a literal translation. Considerable new material was added and amendments made. This edition was printed in England in 1977 by Lionel Leventhal Ltd.

The book is a monumental encyclopedia of all Imperial Japanese Navy warships, including even the *Daihatsu* barge-like landing craft. It will probably never be equaled in quality and the profuse photographs, line drawings and technical detail. Esthetically, it is a beautiful book.

Its encyclopedic nature presents to the reviewer a serious problem. How does one review an encyclopedia with no comparable work to check the technical details? Watts and Gordon, *The Imperial Japanese Navy,* is not this comprehensive and in places must be used with caution. *Jane's Fighting Ships* is inadequate because the Japanese Navy Ministry was reluctant to furnish ships' details, particularly after 1931.

The one area open to checking is where the authors present the "Career" of each ship. Definitive sources for such checking include the microfilm reels prepared by the U.S. Naval Archives (Washington, D.C. Navy Yard) from among the half million pages of seized

IJN documents. Equally applicable are the approximately 100 volumes published by the Japan Defense Agency War College, War History Division, entitled *Senshi Sosho*. The Joint Operations Monograph Series, No. 116, *The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II* (also on microfilm in the U.S. Naval Archives) prepared by the U.S. Army in Tokyo using the Japanese Navy Ministry's records covers all damages, sinking, by what means, time and location for all Japanese combatant and noncombatant ships in World War II. It must be used with caution, however. Some eight discrepancies can be noted in the book under review.

1. p. 47. The authors state the destroyer *Kazagumo* (not as written: *Kazegumo*) and *Yugumo* were ordered to scuttle the fleet carrier *Hiryu* and did so on 5 June 1942 (West of Date Line). It was the *Kazagumo* and *Makigumo* that stood by the *Hiryu*. It was the *Makigumo* that was ordered to scuttle the carrier. She launched two torpedoes; one hit. The destroyers then left the *Hiryu* but the carrier was still afloat and with almost 100 survivors still onboard the next morning. She finally sank late that morning from battle damage.

2. p. 86. The heavy cruiser *Mogami* was not heavily damaged on 5 June (West of the Date Line) by U.S.S. *Enterprise* planes, but by a collision with the heavy cruiser *Mikuma*. Her bow was bent back to a right angle configuration. She later underwent an attack from the *Enterprise* planes and suffered additional moderate damage.

3. p. 109. The light cruiser *Sendai* was not sunk by TF 39 planes in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay 2 November 1943, but by TF 39's cruisers' radar-controlled gunfire and by DesDiv 45's torpedoes. Her survivors were rescued by a submarine. There is the possibility that as a derelict she was still afloat and sunk by planes but the Japanese attribute her loss to ship battle damage.

4. p. 109. The light cruiser *Jintsu* 12 June 1943 in the Battle of Kolombangara was fatally hit by the radar-controlled gunfire of allied cruisers of TF 18 and almost immediately exploded. There is no reliable evidence she was also hit by USN destroyers.

5. p. 207. According to the official Japanese assessment, the minesweeper *W-2* was not sunk by a mine 1 March 1942 in Bantam Bay, Java but by torpedoes launched by the destroyer *Fubuki* at the cruisers *Houston* and *Perth*.

6. pp. 252-255. The section "Merchant Ships Used as Fleet Tankers" does not include the *Seiyo Maru*. This tanker, accompanying Admiral Ozawa's First Mobile Force en route from Tawi Tawi to the Battle off the Marianas (IJN title) collided on 14 June 1944 with the destroyer *Shiratsuyu*. The tanker was damaged and the destroyer sank the next day. The "Career" of the *Shiratsuyu*, p. 147, does show the *Seiyo Maru* in this accident but on p. 278 the details are stated differently and are in error.

7. p. 278. The transport *Sakura Maru* is described as being sunk by coastal batteries at *Bantam Bay*, Java on 4 March 1942. The transport was lost on 1

advanced society," or by our "disordered times?"—they are not obtrusive. He makes his "study of Roman history . . . its own reward." So much so that one wants to know more about what the author of *The Political Uses of Sea Power* thinks about Roman seapower in earlier and later eras. Augustus' fleet, in Chester G. Starr's words, "was not to fight battles but to render them impossible." From Actium until Constantine defeated Licinius in the Hellespont in A.D. 324, naval forces—and Dr. Luttwak's comments on them—were confined to "waterborne support of the land forces." But it would be good to hear him in the long debate—in which Clark Reynolds has recently participated—over the primary characteristics of ancient land powers and thalassocracies. From Polybius to Procopius (the historian of Justinian's (518-565) wars), when they had to, the Romans also mastered the art of war at sea. It would have been news to Justinian or to his great captain Belisarius, both of Slavonic extraction, that they were not as Roman as the African Septimius Severus, because the strategic center of Polybius' world, which Rome again controlled, had shifted to Byzantium. Belisarius' secretary Procopius, born in Palestine, may have bit a bit more "Byzantine" and Greek, but nobody can be sure of it.

To paraphrase Polybius, only people so stupid as not to want to know how Rome controlled "practically the whole inhabited world" for more than 7 centuries, will not enjoy this book. After the moral decay, miscegenation, slavery, lead dishes, long hair, and lack of industrial investment explanations, the rise and decline of Roman industry needed a three-star military study. This one is well worth a special trip to the bookstore or library.

THEODORE ROPP
Duke University

MacIntyre, Donald. *U-Boat Killer*. Foreword by Adm. Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 175pp.

Captain Donald MacIntyre, DSO, DSC, RN gives his diary account of convoy operations during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II in this poorly titled, gripping and fast-moving narrative which rivals Alistair McLean's fictional account of the same action in *HMS Ulysses*. First published in 1956, the book is the first in a series of poignant, factual accounts of World War II from the participant's perspective. MacIntyre sets the reader on the pitching deck of a convoy escort in the cold, stormy seas of the Atlantic, shepherding materiel-laden vessels whose numbers were being diminished at rates as high as 500,000 tons monthly by the unrelenting U-boat offensive: the setting is bleak as darkened ships proceed without benefit of radio or radar. A crude sonar searches for the U-boats. Once found, the battle might rage for hours and include such primitive forms of warfare as ramming, pistols, or, occasionally, aircraft-dropped dive bombs.

*U-Boat Killer* opens with MacIntyre as a young sublieutenant and we steam with him until his retirement from the Royal Navy in 1954 through thousands of miles and seven confirmed kills as an escort commander. Tracing the evolution of convoy operations and the ships and men who manned them, MacIntyre sketches fascinating first-hand vignettes through the book in a casual, classically understated way:

- As leading "ace" of the U-boat force, Otto Kretschmer had sunk 245,000 tons of allied shipping by March 1941. After an almost medieval duel with a destroyer, *U-99* surrenders and Kretschmer turns to a more civilized battle at the bridge table as a prisoner of war.
- Royal Navy escort commanders wargaming against a notional wolfpack maneuvered by a group of tactically experienced WRENS.

- Ripping a full one-fourth of *Hesperus'* hull after ramming, and sinking *U-357*.
- Trying to sink submarines capable of 600-foot depths with depth charges bureaucratically set to explode at 350 feet.
- Development of the wolfpack tactics and the successes and failures of the Coastal Command's ASW aircraft.

The painstakingly slow evolution of tactics and equipment paralleled by the startling numbers of ships being sunk continues despite a production geared for war on both sides. For the Germans, the Lone Hunter became the centrally controlled wolfpack, the snorkel arrived, and depth capabilities increased. For the Allies, radar, H/F D/F equipment, use of aircraft, radio, hedgehogs and acoustic noisemakers finally helped to turn the tide of the war in 1943.

Students of World War II are undoubtedly already familiar with MacIntyre's series. However, for those who are not *U-Boat Killer* provides incisive analysis interestingly described and wholly enjoyable. For everyone, Chapter 15, "The Future," is the author's projection of tomorrow's naval dilemma. It is disarming to realize that these insights were conceived over 20 years ago, and for the most part, accurately describe the situation today. MacIntyre's story does not bore the reader with lengthy descriptions of the slate-blue sea, the young ASW officer's girlfriend, or the pedestrian life aboard a ship; MacIntyre has viciously cut his own repertoire of sea stories to a concise, interesting account which leaves one asking "is this fact or fiction?"

JOHN MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Pechman, Joseph. *Setting National Priorities—The 1978 Budget.* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977. 435pp.

This year's edition of The Brookings Institution's *Setting National Priorities* differs from its six predecessors in three respects. First, this is the first of the volumes which deals with a budget prepared by one Administration and revised by another. Second, this is the first volume which analyzes and criticizes the programs and policies of a Democratic administration. The previous reports, prepared during the Nixon-Ford years, earned the Institution the reputation of a Democratic government-in-exile. Indeed Charles Schultze, who directed the initial budgetary analyses, served as Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Lyndon Johnson and is now the Chairman of President Carter's Council of Economic Advisors. Third, this is the first volume in which substantial portions of the report were written by people not associated with Brookings. The chapter on Social Security was written by Alicia Munnel from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Welfare Reform by George Carcagno and Walter Carson from Mathematica, and Energy by Milton Russell from Resources for the Future.

The most interesting portions of the study deal with the authors' criticisms of the Carter economic and administrative initiatives. They find fault with the new Administration in five areas.

First, the study points out that it is extremely unlikely that President Carter can fulfill his campaign pledges to aid the cities, reform the welfare system, and achieve other social goals if he insists on balancing the budget in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981. According to the report, the budget margin available in FY 1981 will be no more than $50 billion. This means that growth in the defense budget, real increases in existing domestic programs, and any new programs will have to be accommodated within that figure if the budget is to be balanced.

Second, the authors feel that President Carter's anti-inflation proposals really contain nothing new and are unlikely to be any more successful than

 

those of his predecessors. According to the study: "Neither the scope of the individual policies nor the magnitude of the expected benefits offers a great deal of encouragement."

Third, the report concludes that the new energy program would add to the general inflationary pressures and would worsen rather than relieve the shortage of natural gas. According to the study, "... these energy proposals will not eliminate the gas shortage; they will partially disguise it and extend it to the markets that are now uncontrolled."

Fourth, the study argues that zero-based budgeting (ZBB) at the federal level has more drawbacks than merits. Theoretically, zero-based budgeting is supposed to eliminate the preference given to old programs in their competition for funds with new ones because all parts of the budget are treated comprehensively and equally. In practice, ZBB diverts large amounts of scarce managerial time for limited results and forces policymakers to focus on the upcoming year rather than multiyear budgeting. Moreover, ZBB is inappropriate for that large portion of the budget which is spent on indirect operations, such as grants and transfer payments.

Fifth, the study concludes that government reorganization will not lead to increased efficiency as the report notes: "... the real payoffs are not in efficiency but in redistributing political influence, altering public policies, and signalling the administration's intentions to the rest of the government and to the country."

Discussion of the defense budget is comparatively small. It consumes only 14 percent of the book. The analysis, written by Barry Blechman and others, is at once excellent and somewhat disappointing. The chapter is excellent because it contains a useful overview of nearly all of the major defense issues, but disappointing because it contains very little that is new or innovative. Most of the proposals put forth by Blechman and his colleagues have been presented in previous editions or in the Institution's "Studies in Defense Policy."

LAWRENCE J. KORB
Naval War College

Ruse, Gary Alan. *A Game of Titans.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976. 283pp.

The serious professional will sometimes disdain the novel as not being realistic and thus not worth his time. This shows a lack of appreciation for the unique place and role of the serious novel in literature as a stimulator for and vehicle of critical thinking about issues. *A Game of Titans,* ostensibly a story of a confrontation at sea between the Soviet air-capable cruiser, *Kiev,* and a hypothetical U.S. LTA rigid airship, *Grand Eagle,* touches on much of today's strategic thinking and serves up several conceivable future situations.

The author, a young former military journalist, has an important idea to convey: that the United States would be well-advised to redevelop and deploy the lighter-than-air dirigibles of a bygone era. Ruse makes large airships sound quite plausible. They have their limitations, but their strengths are more compelling. Perhaps he is right. Ruse's *Grand Eagle* is four times the size of *Macon* and *Akron* and is armed with defensive and offensive weapons (including the ubiquitous laser gun). It is nuclear-powered and equipped with multisensor and communications systems. Remotely piloted aircraft, eight V/STOL light fighters (advanced Harriers), and helicopters round out the combat/reconnaissance suite carried in *Grand Eagle.* Interestingly, the airship is built and operated by the U.S. Air Force and its latter-day antagonist is the Soviet Navy's princely capital ship, the sometime aircraft carrier *Kiev.*

The story takes place over the mid-Pacific and involves secret agents, a

defector, two love stories, Polynesian legends and a SAR subtheme. Curiously, there is no submarine or antisubmarine action.

In the battle, *Grand Eagle* wins over *Kiev*, though not without paying a price. Importantly, their contest is one for limited objectives, and World War Three does not erupt as a result of the actions of these two contemporary titans and their masters. With all of *Grand Eagle's* combat, communications and reconnaissance capabilities and her grand size and potential, it appears that Ruse's airship might be procured for an outlay significantly less than that for a 60,000-90,000-ton aircraft carrier. With her realistic weaponry, *Grand Eagle* probably is no less nor more vulnerable, nor costly to operate than an aircraft carrier. President Carter has said that what we need is new faith in old ideas. Is this one?

*A Game of Titans* is entertaining and informative. Instruction is perhaps best conveyed by a medium that is entertaining. The book's underlying theme is sea control and the novel creates a plausible fiction to argue for sea control through the use of large airships.

JAMES T. WESTWOOD
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Schandler, Herbert Y. *The Unmaking of a President (Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam).* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 350pp.

For one who was even a minor participant in the Vietnam war years, this is likely to be a difficult book to read carefully. Any good work on this painful era would be, for it is a story whose end we know too well for enjoyment. *The Unmaking of a President* chronicles the succession of events and decisions of the second phase of that war, from 1965 to 1969; from the decisions to make it an American war to the agonizing reassessment which followed the recognition that it could not be. For his account, Schandler draws on the *Pentagon Papers*, command histories, memoirs and on his own reflections as a staff member of OASD/ISA in the central period of the study, 1968-69. Indeed he was the principal author of the two sections in the *Pentagon Papers* which deal with Tet, hence the primary focus of the book an outgrowth of a Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard under Samuel Huntington and Graham Allison. Readers who expect an analytical treatment of the subject matter will be disappointed, however. The style is strictly historical, largely chronological; and therein lies its chief shortcoming. Although there is a final chapter which pays token homage to the theoretical questions so clearly raised by the period, one looks in vain for an Allison-like application of alternative models to explain the differing perspectives involved. Further, Schandler's examination of the decisionmaking process is almost completely confined to the post-Tet 1968 reassessment period, which was previously illuminated by another insider, Townsend Hoopes *(The Limits of Intervention).* Schandler offers few new insights here, and his account lacks the flavor of personal anguish which made Hoopes' memoir so intriguing to potential participants in future policy debates. This is better history, but it lacks the human despair of Hoopes.

The political side of the reassessment is presented quite fully, and Schandler's account will make an adequate single-source document for that explanation. However, the military side of the decisions is not well presented, undoubtedly due the classification of source material. There is no military equivalent to LBJ's *The Vantage Point.* Most frequently, the JCS are presented as hopeless optimists on the one hand (just a few more troops . . .), and hopeless pessimists on the other (without full application of airpower . . . ). They are condemned for failing to examine the ends being sought

in Vietnam, as they should be. But the failure was a common one to both the political and the military professionals. Given the order to March On Regardless, the JCS complied, responding with the Can-Do spirit we prize so highly in our professionals. "Can do what?" "More of the same," and that was answer enough for the time being—until Tet. Moreover, the JCS saw more clearly than many just how much the conflict in Southeast Asia was emasculating the capability of the nation to respond to serious challenges elsewhere, at least after we were fully committed. And they warned the executive regularly, without much effect. McNamara disagreed with many of these warnings.

Schandler does not examine the decisions to expand the war in 1965, and this is unfortunate, because in some ways they are of more intrinsic interest to the military professional. His account suggests a process of incremental decisionmaking easily compared to seduction. As the events gathered strength, they acquired an internal dynamic of their own, and the final result was not considered very carefully by either side in the bureaucratic process of expansion. Further, there is a fascinating implication of bureaucratic imperative involved in this expansion: From on-hand Navy aircraft for reprisal raids to the deployment of Air Force assets for similar duty; from a few 7th Fleet Marines to guard the airbase at Danang to the deployment of Army troops to cover the incountry helicopter advisory bases. Organizational preference for preemptive search and destroy missions over the unattractive defensive role initially approved is equally obvious. At the end of this chain, the entire military capability of the four services (less nuclear weapons—and some wanted to use them) was employed to the limits of political risk-taking. One wonders if each of these decisions was given full political attention in its implication, or were they considered "technical matters" properly within the purview of the JCS? And to what extent did the discussions within the JCS reflect implicit accommodations to let every branch of service participate in accordance with the "roles and missions" charter of 1948? Budgets drive interservice policy, and in those years, Vietnam drove budgets toward General Purpose Forces. Participation meant money for one's branch. These questions await another scholar.

Not surprisingly, Schandler concludes that the decision process for national security policy was confined in this period to a small inner circle within which dissent from the President's policy was "an almost impossible burden." The scholar deplores the lack of an institutional mechanism to ensure debate on serious alternatives of policy, echoing generations of scholars before him. The difficulty, of course, is that any advisory device must reflect the style of the president who is both its author and patron. The mechanism will *never* determine his decisions, and whatever the form, its members must be strong spokesmen for differing viewpoints. Members of any consultative body (formal or informal) bear a responsibility to their nation no less serious than that of their President: To provide honest advice when asked for it; and to proffer resignation when their advice is rejected repeatedly on matters they consider to be of the gravest interest to the nation. There *are* means of dissenting within the system (even within Johnson's system), as Hoopes and Clark Clifford, among others, demonstrated in this period; and those who may someday bear a similar responsibility should be capable of effective dissent in a manner not destructive of the discipline essential to the profession of government and arms when such dissent is required by the situation.

Schandler's book raises more questions than it answers, and it is thus vaguely unsatisfying. But in fairness, he

promises a chronology of Lyndon Johnson's agony in stepping down because of Vietnam. He provides that amply. It is simply not a satisfying tale. It is an authentic tragedy, and Schandler is not Shakespeare.

JOHN B. BONDS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Sherry, Michael S. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 260pp.

It is supposed to be characteristic of soldiers to prepare for the next war by refighting the last one, but the process has rarely been demonstrated as clearly as in this first comprehensive history of postwar planning by the American military during World War II. Indeed Michael Sherry maintains that in at least one area—the Army's campaign for Universal Military Training—preparations were being made for World War III on the basis of lessons learned in World War I.

Sherry's book also treats such topics as postwar force structures, unification of the armed services, the relationship between scientists and the military, perceptions of the Soviet threat, and the strategic implications of the atomic bomb. He is not always successful in weaving these diverse subjects into an integrated narrative, but his account makes up in scope and analytical insight what it lacks in continuity.

Sherry's main thesis is that the emergence of a cold war consensus in the United States cannot be understood solely as either the product of Soviet aggressiveness or the requirements of capitalism. It stemmed as well, he argues, from the development of a firm conviction within both the American military and the civilian policymaking elite that technology alone had rendered the United States vulnerable to postwar aggression, even before it had become clear from what source such aggression might come. "Before the cold war developed," he writes, "there had arisen a cold war mentality, an anxiety about the nation's security and an insistence on mobilizing full resources to protect it."

This is a significant and, on the whole, credible interpretation. It does not depend upon time-worn but unverifiable assertions that both capitalism and military organizations require identifiable enemies in order to survive. It recognizes the importance of the revolution in military thinking generated by the simultaneous utilization during World War II of strategic weapons and long-range delivery systems—a revolution whose implications for the future security of the United States concerned the generals and admirals of that war more than is often realized. Sherry's account also provides the best explanation yet for one of the most puzzling aspects of postwar military planning: the fact that despite this concern over American vulnerability expressions of alarm over the long-range objectives of the Soviet Union were virtually nonexistent until almost the end of the war.

Sherry makes it clear that this particular blindspot grew out of the Pentagon's tendency to plan on the basis of adversary capabilities rather than intentions, and from a narrowly military perception of American postwar interests. Because the Soviet Union had developed neither a strategic air force nor a blue-water navy, it did not fit the new technological criteria of danger planners had established. Obviously the Russians would have a powerful ground army after the war, but from the "purely military" point of view this force posed no threat because it could not attack the United States. Nor was it all that clear, from the same limited perspective, that the United States would have a vital interest in maintaining the postwar balance of power in Europe. Not until 1945 did it become evident that considerations of politics,

economics, even psychology, should enter into the planning process, together with some assessment of the intentions as well as the capabilities of potential adversaries; the result was a very different view of the world indeed. It is sobering, nonetheless, to realize that the American military was one of the last elements in the American foreign policy/national security establishment to become aware of the threat Soviet power posed to stability in Europe, and of the stake the United States had in preserving that stability.

This is not, then, a book to bolster one's faith in the ability of planners to anticipate future contingencies. Precisely for this reason, though, it is one all planners should read, if for no other reason than to "raise consciousness" regarding those habits of intellect and bureaucracies which cause military organizations to tend to plan, as well as fight, the last war.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
Naval War College

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *World War I in the Air: A Bibliography and Chronology.* Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1977. 271pp.

Smith's little book is a gem and will save librarians, students, and buffs from more unnecessary work than any book like it. That much said, reviewers of bibliographies must offer three paragraphs--one each of description, strengths, and weaknesses (the last often reflecting the views of the reviewer rather than the compiler!).

Description: Don't miss the foreword by Stephen W. Thomspon (the first man in U.S. uniform to shoot down an enemy aeroplane) or the preface by Arch Whitehouse (gunner on the aeroplane that was Manfred von Richtofen's 42nd victim, who survived to become one of America's foremost aviation writers). Smith's introduction then sets down the ground rules of selection, the single most important of which is that this is an English language bibliography. (No reference here to Fritz Baur's *Wir flieger!* or René Martel's *L'aviation francaise de bombardement.*) Once that point is clear, the searcher can revel in the 2,035 entries, especially those identifying hard to find scholarly papers, articles, government documents, and both M.A. and Ph.D. theses. Not included are fiction, book reviews, poetry, and general newspaper articles. Then come: a 43-page chronology of the major aviation events in World War I (How many readers of this journal know that the USN Office of Aeronautics was established 17 days before the Aviation Section of the USA Signal Corps?); a list of World War I aces from 11 nations; and a subject index. Hard work, well done.

Strengths: Articles from obscure sources, scholarly monographs not previously listed, and--for all the more important entries--concise descriptions of their contents and author's standpoint. The 2,000 plus entries represent a monument to interest, effort, and scholarship.

Weaknesses (none of which outweighs the pluses): Henry Farré becomes Ferré; G.E. Turnure becomes Turner, and Sholto Douglas becomes Douglas Sholte. A few odd omissions; e.g., Bradshaw's *Flying Memories,* Carisella's *Black Swallow of Death,* and Killen's *History of Marine Aviation, 1911-68.* But these, and at least one garbled title (item #1976), bear far less weight than the strengths mentioned above.

DAVID MacISAAC
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy

Stratton, Roy. *The Army-Navy Game.* Falmouth, Mass.: Volta Company, 1977. 258pp.

This is a book about a unique World War II naval officer in whom I have

more than passing interest. His name is Milton E. Miles and he is dead.

It so happens that I hold the Naval War College Chair in International Relations named in memory of this extraordinary diplomat-sailor-intelligence officer-guerrilla fighter, and thus it is not difficult to understand my professional interest.

"Mary" Miles, as he was so picturesquely called, was a dedicated, talented and controversial man whose trilogy of motivations was his family, the Navy, and China where he had served before the war.

As a naval officer he possessed a high sense of duty, and singleminded commitment. As a man he had rare cultural sensitivity; an ability to perceive and project; as a commander he was a charismatic leader.

When in 1942 FADM Ernest King sent Miles as a commander back to China he gave him simple but vital instructions: prepare the coast for our ships in 3 years and do as much damage to the Japanese as possible.

*The Army-Navy Game* begins at that point. It is the story of one man's unremitting efforts to comply with his orders despite the odds.

The odds were formidable. They ranged from OSS General Donovan who considered Miles an interloper in his clandestine field and General Marshall who could not gracefully accept an independent Navy command on the mainland to Gen. Albert Wedemeyer who believed devoutly in staffing, channels, and organization even if the war had to stop in the meantime. He proved a difficult, narrow, military bureaucrat.

"Mary" Miles ultimately had only one powerful Washington friend, but it proved sufficient. His name was Ernie King.

The stage was set for jealousy, for intrigue, for misunderstanding and for rivalries. And yes, to be sure, there was the war and the heroism of Miles' famous but little-known command, Naval Group China, operating under a controversial but effective Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) agreement.

The agreement put Miles under Chiang Kai-shek's command, subject to General Tai Li, Chiang's feared intelligence chief and indeed to act as Tai Li's chief of staff with the assimilated rank of Major General in the Chinese Army. An unheard of arrangement! Their joint mission: establish coast watcher and intelligence nets, set up weather stations for the benefit of U.S. Pacific air and naval forces, create guerrilla, terrorist and sabotage columns, mine Chinese rivers, harbors and ports. To do this Captain, Commodore, then Rear Admiral Miles over a 2½-year period was given 3,000 sailors, marines and coastguardsmen and 10,000 tons of supplies, fairly cost-effective by present DOD standards.

With these advisors (including one survivor presently on the War College faculty) and with full Chinese cooperation Miles established an operation that ran from Gobi Desert weathermen, to naval cavalry, to Yangtze riverine guerrillas and sappers. By war's end the guerrilla columns held considerable stretches of coast and three ports for the advancing U.S. Navy, were harassing the retreating Japanese, and were deeply involved in rescuing downed U.S. airmen and initiating fleet weather reporting.

To put it bluntly, the U.S. Army liked this not one whit. Land, as is well-known, belongs to the Army. What was this odd lot of sailors doing running about China without proper clearances, uniforms or staff manuals? To add to the bureaucratic maze, "Wild" Bill Donovan was wildly unhappy about Miles' single-minded devotion to the SACO agreement which largely left OSS out in the Burmese cold. Chiang quite simply did not trust OSS, thus he cooperated little with Donovan, causing Donovan to blame Miles and precipitate

the establishment of a rival but unwanted U.S. intelligence network of old China hands considered by Chiang to be "colonialists." Donovan ultimately fired Miles as OSS Chief China, a collateral duty Miles had not wanted because it interfered with his priority relations with the Chinese. Thus was the war fought: a military divided against itself and a military fighting a common enemy. Classic in its way. Tragic in its implications. For it raises once again the question of whether we really learn the lessons of war.

Naval Group China was, to say the least, unique. It was offbeat, flexible, attuned to the Chinese, and committed to its tasks of providing intelligence to the fleet, and guerrilla support for future landings. It was organized to this end, period. This command, living behind enemy lines yet crisscrossing them daily, existed on intelligence, wit, and Sino-American cooperation. Their unorthodoxy kept them—and Miles—alive. Four attempts on Miles' life were made, including one a month after V-J day. Incidentally, one of history's fetching footnotes has Miles shortly after the surrender meeting a young naval lieutenant in Shanghai, the first fleet sailor to approach from seaward. The lieutenant's name: Elmo Zumwalt, C.O. of a prize vessel. Miles was a man with a price on his head, perhaps symbolic of his usefulness and effectivness. No command of this nature from Jeb Stuart to John Vann in Vietnam could have survived if they lived by army theater field manuals. This, in essence, explains the basic dislike of conventional military managers toward unorthodox special operations, for such operators not only elude control but like Miles himself, they tend to fly "a what the hell" pennant which infuriates the rigorous, inflexible military bureaucrat. "Being alone, without the language, and two hundred miles behind enemy lines, does not appeal to a staff planner," remarked one of Miles' former junior officers recently.

*The Army-Navy Game* makes sad but fascinating reading. Unfortunately, Roy Stratton, Miles' supply officer, is no editor. The book is in desperate need of editing. If only his authoress wife, Monica Dickens, had read the "proofs" before they went back to the local job printer. The style is "early memo." The continuities are difficult to find and the paragraphing difficult to comprehend. The story survives despite the prose.

Nonetheless, Stratton has pursued his topic with spirit. His raw research is impressive, and though he is not scholarly trained, the book provides vignettes and insights missing from such better known works as Miles' own memoirs *A Different Kind of War*, Alfred Wedemeyer's *Wedemeyer Reports* and Barbara Tuchman's more recent *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*. It is, as a matter of scholarly interest, very curious that Wedemeyer, who organizationally and childishly plagued Miles, mentions the admiral only once and then to complain to the JCS about Miles not being under his command (which eventually came to be). Tuchman passes Miles off simply as a Navy weatherman, a sad postscript to the residual bitterness.

In looking through Miles' uncut manuscript and papers held at the War College it is evident why he was so cordially hated and feared. He ran a clandestine operation, outside army channels, tied too closely to the Nationalists, responsive only to a five-star admiral and effective in ways no formal bureaucracy (in his case the army) can ever be.

The result, as Bob Komer points out in his organizational critique of Vietnam (*Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*), is a determined hierarchial effort to reduce the irritant, as was tried in Vietnam with Ed Lansdale, the Special Forces, and off and on, with JUSPAO. So too with "Mary" Miles. He was a loner, a "rice paddy" sailor in an army theater. How to get him? That's easy, as any self-

respecting bureaucrat will know. Misrepresent, hold meetings without him, allege mismanagement and inefficiency, and charge the entire business off to a waste of time.

The plain truth is that one cannot quantify guerrilla operations. One cannot, as was shown with body count, guarantee accuracy. One cannot swear as to the lives saved, terror instilled and morale disintegrated. "War in the Shadows," as Ardrey has pointed out, is exactly that. While every infantryman knows that ultimate truth, no theater commander can afford to accept it organizationally.

"Mary" Miles survived and went on to three stars. But to the bitter end, even to the indignity of invaliding this heroic fighter home on an Army Air Corps version of the Toonerville Trolley, the vendetta continued.

It was initially the same with Lawrence, Wingate, and even Gordon. When do you suppose we'll learn?

ROBERT FINLEY DELANEY
Naval War College

Vali, Ferenc A. *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power.* New York: The Free Press, 1976. 243pp.

The rationale for writing this book is plausible. Previous studies on the Indian Ocean as a whole included works sponsored by "legislative bodies," and "scholarly institutions."* Such collective efforts seldom result in coherent, balanced, and unified topics and themes. The author's "synoptic" approach means that the problems of the Indian Ocean "should be viewed both in the context of the global balance of power and in regard to more restricted local power relations" in a single and comprehensive volume.

Against the backdrop of an historical survey of power relationships in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, the study concentrates on the politics of five major subregions, including Australia and Southeast Asia; India and its neighbors; the Persian Gulf; the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area; and the southwest which embraces South Africa and other states in the southern and eastern parts of Africa as well as the islands along their shores. The roles of the United States, the Soviet Union and China on the one hand, and residual influence of the former colonial powers on the other as well as the effects of the problems related to oil, navigation, and the law of the sea on the political issues of the region as a whole also are examined.

Analytically, the study suffers in several respects. Firstly, although it aspires to be a comparative examination of the attitudes and views of the regional powers, the chapters on regional states are primarily descriptive rather than analytical and comparative. Secondly, the discussion of the oil issues reveals a serious misconception of the regional and global meanings of the control of oil production and prices, and the use of oil embargo as a means of economic coercion. The oil problem is viewed primarily from the narrow perspective of the adverse affects of the oil price explosion. Witness: "The timing and suddenness of these monstrous price hikes was 'more than a crime, it was a mistake,' to use Talleyrand's words." From these and similar harsh judgments the oil-producing states emerge as irrational, greedy and irresponsible countries drunk with new power. The author's concern with historical reality, so prominent in other contexts, deserts him surprisingly in the discussion of oil problems. From its inception the oil industry in the Middle East was in fact made inseparable by historical reality from the politics of great powers and their major oil corpo-

*The Naval War College Center for Advanced Research underwrote the foreign travel research costs for the book being reviewed.

rations. The oil-producing nations' bid for the control of production and prices of their only precious and depletable natural resource and its use as an instrument of foreign policy by the Arab states has *not* been a manifestation of greed or the "exploitation" of the West by the East! Rather, it is politically and economically as well as historically a reflection of the fundamental struggle of these nations to control their own destiny. Also, the Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil embargo and the explosion of oil prices on the global shift of the balance of power do not receive the serious consideration they deserve. The pre-1973 assessment of the relatively low importance of the Indian Ocean to the United States has been significantly eroded, if not overturned, by the United States' rapid and substantial dependence on Persian Gulf oil and on the vital and vulnerable sealanes of the Indian Ocean.

Thirdly, the study's great power emphasis results in relative disregard of cooperation, as contrasted with conflict, among the regional powers of the Indian Ocean. To be sure, the region is clearly plagued by multifaceted, complicated, and overlapping interstate conflicts and domestic instabilities and civil wars. But recent patterns of conflict avoidance might foretell a significant trend. Numerous jurisdictional and political disputes over territory, boundaries, and the continental shelf have been settled by frequent resort to peaceful means.

All in all, Professor Váli's contribution lies in a description of the regional context of the great power balance and counterbalance, and a realistic appraisal of the central strategic issues between the superpowers as these relate to the politics of the Indian Ocean region. The analytical shortcomings mentioned above are more than compensated for by the strengths of this study as the first bold, broad and imaginative attempt at synthesizing a vast amount of information in an almost encyclopedic manner within the covers of a single volume.

R.K. RAMAZANI
University of Virginia

van Oosten, F.C. *The Battle of the Java Sea.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 128pp.

This book earns both plus and minus marks. On the plus side, it provides hitherto unpublished data from official Dutch reports and papers. A case in point, in the Battle of Badung Strait, van Oosten corrects Samuel Eliot Morison's Volume 3* statement that the third ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) wave to repulse the Japanese landings at Sanur Roads, Bali, had five MTB's. van Oosten's Dutch records show eight in two waves of four. (The destroyer *Asashio's* Action Report records seeing one of the waves of four.)

The description of the complexities of and the Dutch frustration with ABDA Command affords valuable new insights. The statistical data in 16 of the 17 appendixes (see below *in re* Appendix 14) allows the reader to find necessary material for a comprehensive analysis of the battles to save Java. Many of the 66 photographs, most of which came from the Naval Historical Section of the Navy Staff at the Hague and the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, have not been published previously. The five diagrams and track charts, to some extent, are based on Japanese records.

To preface the minus side, the difficulties of naval historians in arriving at an absolute common denominator for the actions of all sides in a naval battle must be noted. This reviewer follows the rule that if all the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) ships and very few ABDA

*Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947-1962).

ships survived a battle, the official IJN versions are more likely to be correct and complete. IJN data are in microfilm reels in the U.S. Naval Archives (Washington, D.C. Navy Yard). These are in Japanese handwriting (except one reel translated into English) and contain warships' Tabular Records of Movement and Action Reports, and division, squadron and fleet War Diaries and Detailed Action Reports. The outer Netherlands East Indies and Java operations are in Volume 23 (American library designation) of the war history series produced by the Japan Defense Agency War College. War History Section (Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu (now Senshibu), *Senshi Sōsho*) For these operations, IJN track charts are in Volume 23, Supplement.

Although van Oosten utilizes some Japanese sources (and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Interrogation of Japanese Officials* which is unreliable), Volume 23 and its Supplement have material which is at times at variance with his *Battle of the Java Sea* narrative. Moreover, his narrative is unaccountably sparse. To give an example of these variances, van Oosten (p. 51) correctly notes that the Royal Navy destroyers *Electra* and *Encounter* peeled off from Admiral Doorman's force to meet a second torpedo attack by two IJN destroyer squadrons (Desrons). Thereafter, van Oosten and the IJN accounts differ somewhat. Desron 2, eight destroyers, led by the light cruiser *Jintsu*, launched torpedoes towards Doorman's columns at 11,000 yards. They then retired to the northwest and the more immediate danger Doorman faced came from the light cruiser *Naka* and her six Desron 4 destroyers *(Yudachi, Harukaze, Samidare, Murasame, Minegumo, Asagumo)* further south than Desron 2. *Naka* fired torpedoes at 18,500 yards and then retired. Four of her destroyers launched torpedoes at about 10,000 yards and then also reversed course. For some unexplained reason, the *Minegumo* and *Asagumo* continued their charge making their torpedo launch at 6,500 yards.

It was this Desron 4 attack that *Electra* and *Encounter* tried to thwart. *Minegumo* and *Encounter* ineffectually exchanged fire at 3,000 yards, both going north and then northeast, but the real fire fight was between *Asagumo* and *Electra* at a range of 6,000 yards closing to 5,000 yards. The close-range duel went on for ten minutes. *Asagumo* fired 191 main battery rounds and 136 secondary battery rounds. There was no mention of a second torpedo launch in her Action Report. *Electra* hit *Asagumo*, causing moderate damage and killing four of her crew. (van Oosten says five.) In turn, *Electra* was mortally hit and sank. It is puzzling that van Oosten credits *Exeter* and *Witt de With*, and not *Electra*, for the damage to *Asagumo*. (See *Senshi Sōsho*, Vol. 23, Supplement, Plate 5.)

The Battle of the Java Sea has been variously reported. In the actions cited above, Morison has four U.S. Navy destroyers under Commander Binford making the charge against Desron 4. In reality, the old and slow four-pipers were relatively unengaged in the battle and were detached midway through this destroyer attack. Roskill, in general, follows Morison; Kirby is closest to the Japanese account.* The more popular David Thomas, *The Battle of the Java Sea*, has rather unfortunately been neglected, yet he follows Kirby rather closely.

It is regrettable that this otherwise well-researched and useful book is marred by careless proofreading. On the track chart on page 50, it should be *Naka*, not *Naki*. On the track chart on page 62, it should be *Abebono*, not

*Stephen Wentworth Roskill, *The War at Sea, 1939-45* (London: H.M. Stationery; Office, 1954-1960); Stanley Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1957).

*Akabomo,* but the worst error is in Appendix 14 where the column titles are reversed and thus the data in the columns do not apply to the titles. Moreover, this makes the footnote which states the *Minegumo* did not launch torpedoes at odds with the confused table. It can be inferred (and correctly) that she launched eight.

The bibliography is useful in giving Dutch sources but could include better secondary works in English. The index is rather too short to be comprehensive.

Despite the criticisms, if they are that, noted above, this is a valuable scholarly book and certainly deserves a place in any professional navyman's library. van Oosten has provided valuable Dutch Navy data for future naval historians.

PAUL S. DULL
University of Oregon

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 526pp.

Napoleon once said that "History is agreed upon myth." Contrary to the publicity surrounding the publication of Daniel Yergin's *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State,* the cold war still resists the fashioning of any kind of consensus. Yergin, a Research Fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs and a lecturer at the Harvard Business School, has written a facile, entertaining and well-written account of the early years of the cold war. As the "definitive account of the cold war" it raises more questions than it answers.

Yergin's thesis is that two views of the Soviet Union emerged at the end of World War II. One, called the Riga Axioms, was developed by those men who served at the Latvian listening post in the late 1920's and espoused an anti-Soviet view. The other, the Yalta Axioms, urged conciliation with the Soviets and was represented by Franklin D. Roosevelt at Yalta. In the confrontation between the two sets of principles, the Riga Axioms triumphed. The winner then advocated establishing a strong military posture, second to none, in order to contain the Russian menace.

I have difficulty with Yergin's basic premise. To say the Riga school developed an anti-Soviet stance and converted the key decisionmakers to this viewpoint during 1945 and 1946 is to ignore reality for the sake of a model. The reality is that by the late 1920's, anti-Russian sentiment was already rampant in the United States. Arno Mayer's *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919,* Robert K. Murray's *Red Scare* and William Preston's *Aliens and Dissenters* describe the development of this phenomenon. A hatred of Soviet Russia was a legacy of World War I and the Red Scare. I emphasize this because Mr. Yergin intimates that George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, and Loy Henderson all arrived at Riga tabulae rasae and there developed an anti-Soviet position. These men and Harriman, Grew, Acheson, and Truman were products of their times and the climate of the times was decidedly anti-Russian.

The treatment of President Roosevelt and the Yalta Axioms, while perhaps more valid, does not adequately explain why FDR did not support the Riga Axioms. Was he merely trying to keep two disparate nations, whose only bond was a common enemy, together? Or was he, as Yergin would have us believe, deeply committed to a Wilsonian world view? The reader cannot be really sure.

Based on the evidence Yergin presents, it is difficult to accept the second part of his thesis. He believes diplomatic initiatives, which he has illustrated with studies of the personalities of the important policymakers, led to the formation of the national security state. He uses the traditional examples to explain why decisions were made to

"rebuild the arsenal": the fall of Czechoslovakia, the March 1948 Clay telegram, and the Berlin Blockade. By relying so heavily on an analysis of top policymakers, he misses such military factors as the connection between defense budgets and strategy. A national security state could not have developed under President Truman's $14.4 billion budget. In 1948 there were few atomic weapons in the stockpile and even fewer planes modified to deliver them.

Yergin's study of the personalities of the top decisionmakers is important, but in limiting his study he has ignored the role that the bureaucracy played in the formation of cold war policy. In this case the keys to the origins of a national security state exist in the study of policy development, as opposed to personalities, and in a study of U.S. reaction to the first atomic test of 1949.

There are a number of annoying little mistakes which appear: there is no Bohlen interview at the Truman Library, Clay spoke to Secretary Royall in 1948 not 1945 (p. 366), and Leon Keyserling's oral history transcript does not support the position which Yergin tries to make (p. 404).

In spite of my disagreement with Mr. Yergin's interpretation, this is an enjoyable book to read. The vignettes he has pulled together will make it a valuable aid to the teacher of American foreign policy. As the definitive history of the cold war, however, it is sadly lacking.

THOMAS E. KELLY III
U.S. Army Center of Military History

## REVIEW ARTICLE

## RECENT RESEARCH ON THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY

by

Ronald Cosper

A review of Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal, eds., *The Social Psychology of Military Service;* Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping; Vol. VI (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, *Young Men and Military Service;* Vol. V, *Youth in Transition* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Social Research, 1972); and Jacques Van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change; Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the Military* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975).

After a rather belated start, sociologists have turned their attention to the military as a social institution and since World War II, social scientific studies on the armed forces have been appearing with increasing rapidity. It has been observed that sociologists tend to study institutions that are controversial or whose existence becomes threatened in some way. During World War II, sociological study of the armed forces appeared to result in part from the mobilization of large numbers of civilians into military service and the confrontation of lifestyles and social structures that this entailed. In broader terms, the current academic interest in the armed forces can be analyzed as being related to the "crisis of legitimacy," as Van Doorn calls it, that surrounds the military in the West. By "legitimacy" Van

Doorn means "the capacity of a social or political system to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social order and its main institutions are generally appropriate." In the case of the military this decline in legitimacy is said to refer to "the diminishing acceptance of military force, the increasing public criticism of the military," the "civilianization" of the military and the "concomitant loss of institutional identity."

*The Soldier and Social Change* is a broad-ranging work that describes and explains the structure of the military as a social institution in Western society. Van Doorn's work comes out of the European tradition of historical and comparative social investigation: Max Weber influenced him greatly, particularly in his study of the emergence of modern military organization. Curiously, Van Doorn seems to have been unaware of the other major work in comparative military organizations: that of Stanislav Andreski. It is true that Andreski was more influenced by English and American work, and he relies to a considerable extent on non-Western and preindustrial societies for his typology of military structure. Nevertheless, many of Andreski's ideas are very relevant to Van Doorn's concerns. For example, in his treatment of reasons for the contemporary crisis in the legitimacy of the armed forces, Van Doorn stresses the relations between the polity and the military; Andreski, on the other hand, calls attention to the effects of the system of social stratification on "militancy" (following Spencer). It is certainly possible that the less extreme class differences characteristic of industrial societies, in contrast to the castelike structure of agrarian societies, are less consistent with the military form of social organization. Van Doorn attributes the contemporary "high degree of civilianisation, isolation and alienation" of the armed forces to the current world nuclear stalemate, a decline in traditional forms of patriotism, no universal military service, the changing "youth culture," the higher level of education in the population, strong pacifist and antimilitarist sentiments, and pressures on the military for such civilian features as democratization, unionization and politicization.

Unfortunately, these interpretations of Van Doorn, though insightful, are based on but slender evidence. Verification of such suggestions will have to be based on subsequent more systematic empirical research. This reviewer, in fact, believes that it is questionable that armed forces personnel (presumably officers) feel particularly alienated. Isolation from civilian society has always been a feature of military life, and, if anything, it is decreasing at the present time as part of the process of civilianization. Civilianization, which can be defined as the declining distinctiveness of the armed forces from the rest of society in culture and social organization and increasing interaction of military personnel with civilians, has been taking place for a variety of reasons, such as less use of military housing, greater employment of civilians on military bases, more female personnel, and an increasing reliance on technology in military planning and operations. This greater use of technology has meant that the skills necessary to accomplish civilian and military work have become more similar, the social base of recruitment of officers has become less elitist, and contact with civilians has increased. In a broad social and historical sense, however, many of these changes can be attributed to the increasing *rationalization* of society, which refers to the increasing tendency to consciously plan activity so that the means employed are suitable for the ends desired. Thus, the armed forces are presumed to be organized in order to carry out the goals they believe they have. Innovation comes to be valued, even for its own sake, and tradition

comes to be seen as unworthy of serious consideration.

In another essay in *The Soldier and Social Change* ("The Genesis of Military and Industrial Organisation"), Van Doorn points out that, just as the rationalization of economic production that resulted in capitalism was influenced by the Protestant Reformation, so did the rationalization of military organization (exemplified by the planning of Maurice of Orange) first occur in the Protestant countries of Europe (England, Holland and later in Prussia). Moreover, the rationalization of military organization preceded the modernization of economic production by some 200 years and served as its model. (Even the accommodations made with traditional feudal guild organization are analogous in the armed forces and the factory, e.g., the roles of foreman and noncommissioned officer.) However, despite the earlier rationalization in organization of the armed forces, later steps in the rationalization process, such as the technical revolution, occurred first in the economic sector, and the military has to this day been borrowing innovations heavily from industry. That is to say, after an initial period of rapid change, beginning around 1600, the armed forces became rather stable until recent times. One could speculate that a reason that leadership in change passed from the military to industry was the change in the social organization in European society from a class system dominated by the nobility to one dominated by the bourgeoisie. That is, the social structure of the armed forces was modernized to conform to the political needs of the nobility, whereas the production of goods was reorganized to meet the economic needs of the new capitalist class.

Of course, these changes in religious, economic and military organizations in recent centuries occurred as part of the great changes in European culture and society that followed the medieval period. The 16th and especially the 17th centuries saw a major change in modes of thinking from an Aristotelian and theological outlook to an epistemology based on scientific empiricism. The major impact of science on the military was not felt until the 20th century, however, by which time science had become organized on a large scale, professionalized, and regarded as the ultimate authority by large segments of society.

In the 20th century, then, scientific knowledge is being widely used by the military. The advice and opinions of experts are sought and relied upon, not only the physical and biological sciences for such applications as transportation and weapons research, but also the medical and social sciences for the human and organizational problems of the armed forces. In some cases these "experts" work for the military and in other cases for civilian organizations, but in all cases a major or primary portion of the expert's loyalty is to his scientific discipline rather than to the armed forces. However, military tradition is of less and less importance in decisionmaking and "cultural" civilianization proceeds apace. Technology, with all its civilianizing consequences, is thus not only adopted for pragmatic reasons, but because of its rationality and its legitimation in science.

Like many historically based typologies, the foregoing characterization of changes in military organization is an "ideal type"; that is, differences between types are emphasized and similarities ignored. In fact, of course, today's military organization retains many traditional features, and military organization has always been, to some extent at least, rational, as it must have been to insure successful attainment of military objectives. Moreover, medieval society, although overtly legitimated by traditional and religious values, covertly had many rational aspects. In particular, one could cite the Church, itself, as a

model for subsequent bureaucratization in other institutions.

Van Doorn's work is well-worth reading. A variety of additional topics are treated, including the professionalization of the officer corps, the decline of the mass army, the political control of the military during revolutions, ideological justification of military action, and excessive use of violence in counterinsurgency actions. The author's methodological strategy is the development of analytical concepts on the basis of historical analysis, and their testing on comparative historical materials. The strength of *The Soldier and Social Change,* as with other sociological work in this sort of European tradition, is that concepts are developed on the basis of analysis of historical materials, and thus are of some demonstrated utility. The source of sociological concepts in the American tradition, until recently, was not seriously questioned. The disadvantage of the method Van Doorn used, however, is that hypotheses are not systematically and quantitatively tested out on a sample of societies. Hence, one is left with considerable uncertainty about the extent to which the analysis is based on selective reporting, subjective factors, and so on (as well as the integrity of the writer, which is unquestionably high). The last two chapters, in particular, rely almost entirely on data from the Dutch experience in Indonesia. These two chapters are badly in need of summaries and of some speculation as to the applicability of the concept and theories to other societies and situations.

The other two works, by Goldman and Segal, and Johnston and Bachman, are very different in theoretical questions and method from Van Doorn's. These works are very much in the "American" sociological tradition (or at least one American tradition). Their strengths, in general, are quantitative precision, large samples and the consequent ability to make precise statistical inferences from samples to populations. The writer, having been trained in this tradition himself, is very familiar, also, with the faults of this type of analysis. For one thing, questionnaire responses are often uncritically and almost naively accepted and interpreted. For another, in terms of analysis of data, the individual is treated as the unit of analysis in most of these studies: yet the "interpretations," which, with a few exceptions tend to be inadequate, are mostly expressed in terms of concepts applicable to the institutional or societal level of analysis. Therefore, although large "samples" provide the opportunity to verify hypotheses, the inappropriate level of interpretive concepts employed means that the studies end up being basically descriptive case studies. The studies are of American society, and for this reason, should be of practical interest, if nothing else. However, the inadequacies on the theoretical level of most of this work severely limits its usefulness, even practically. In general, the studies are so time and culture bound, and so little consideration has been given to the social and cultural parameters that limit the applicability of the findings, that in 5 to 10 years, most of these studies will be of little applied interest, either.

The reasons for this state of affairs relate partly to internal considerations of the development of sociology as a discipline in the United States. Also, and I suspect more importantly, the reasons have to do with the ready availability of money for research and with the fact that many of these projects are done on a contract basis for various organizations with practical concerns. Most of these studies are so descriptive, in fact, that they appear to have a built-in obsolescence factor which requires that the research be repeated after a short interval, thus guaranteeing continued employment and income for sociologists and their employing organizations for a pro-

tracted period. In making these criticisms, I am not only speaking to "professional" sociologists but to their clients, as well. Ultimately, the most useful sociology is theoretically accurate and predictive, and not merely precise.

Having made the foregoing observations about the genre of research that is exemplified in *The Social Psychology of Military Service* and *Young Men and Military Service*, some examples of the particular strengths and weaknesses of these studies should be given. The first criticism, that questionnaire data is sometimes misinterpreted, is illustrated by Gunderson's paper "Health and Adjustment of Men at Sea" in Goldman and Segal. Gunderson assumes that ships differ in reported rates of psychiatric disturbance because of differences in levels of environmental stress experienced on the ships. He measures this stress by asking crew members aboard 20 ships to rate them on a five-point scale according to such criteria as cleanliness, safety, pleasantness, lighting and noise levels. Gunderson assumes that the responses of his "subjects" reflect an internal nervous state of stress when it would seem more direct to interpret the statements of the crewmembers as merely communications about their objective conditions; i.e., since "responses on most ships were heavily skewed toward 'dirty,' 'hazardous,' 'unpleasant,' and 'too dim,'" it seems more reasonable to interpret these responses as complaints. (These complaints may or may not correspond to external conditions; certainly "griping" is very much the norm in most total institutions.) Gunderson finds that enlisted personnel with blue-collar type jobs have higher rates of psychiatric symptoms than those with "white collar" jobs and attributes this to the greater environmental stresses of these types of jobs. However, he also reports that other differences exist in psychiatric symptomatology: female more than males, 17 and 18 year olds versus those 21 to 35, enlisted more than officers. What all four variables have in common is a distinction in status. It has been shown that even in monkeys, subordinate animals develop psychiatric symptoms as a result of inwardly turned aggression. Another theoretical inadequacy is the assumption that differences between ships reflect necessarily environmental factors, even though ships of the same type frequently differed in rates of psychiatric illness. A more probable explanation of these intership differences would seem to be that diagnostic procedures differ from ship to ship; that is, rather than reflecting differences in actual rates of occurrence of "disease," these differences are the result of different labeling practices. This interpretation is supported by facts that the highest reported psychiatric incidence rates were found on hospital ships and among personnel with medically related job specialties. The foregoing alternative interpretations may or may not be correct. Nevertheless, these types of alternative explanation should have been considered by the analyst and evaluated.

An interesting convergence in the research results of several studies (Borus, "The Re-entry Transition of the Vietnam Veteran"; Jennings and Markus, "Political Participation and Vietnam War Veterans: A Longitudinal Study"; Segal and Segal, "The Impact of Military Service on Trust in Government, International Attitudes, and Social Status") was that, contrary to some popular beliefs, the Vietnam veteran is no more alienated than other veterans. This is not really a surprising finding, and its theoretical significance is obscure, but it is interesting that several researchers started with this hypothesis. The hypothesis is basically one of some transient policy significance, but it is certainly not framed in any sociologically interesting or valuable way. All three studies involved large and expensive research samples, and illus-

trate the lack of theoretical sophistication behind much American military research. Borus, for example, notes that the myth of the disturbed and maladjusted Vietnam veteran is laid to rest, but fails to go on and ask why the myth is there in the first place. That is, this type of research generally operates on the individual level and does not try hard enough to comprehend the *social* level of reality. One could do an analysis of the myth of the disturbed Vietnam veteran, find examples of the myth in the mass media, and study the functions of the myth (such as possibly to support a political position, make the war a matter of individual morality, and so on). Borus also seems disappointed that the military did not act on his recommendations after they had requested that he do the research. He apparently did not realize that one function of an organization's getting research done is to give the *appearance* of doing something about a problem. Actually *doing* something about a problem is altogether a different matter.

Borus also found that the well-adjusted veterans, in contrast to the legally or emotionally maladjusted, were better educated, held higher rank, were older and were more frequently drafted into service. He tries to explain the operation of these factors one by one but, again, all these factors (at least the first three) have in common an indication of higher status and power in the military. (The draftees too, may have come from higher class backgrounds than the enlistees, or this variable may be an independent influence on adjustment). This finding is similar to the one in Gunderson's study, but with an added twist: in this case legal maladjustment can be as much created by the authorities as by the soldiers. That is, studies of sentencing of persons of different class and ethnic backgrounds in the United States have shown that courts are more likely to label the unpowerful as deviant because they encounter less opposition. In a social organization such as the armed forces, where discipline is important and conformity to a new system difficult to maintain, occasional scapegoating is a great help.

The best article in the Goldman and Segal collection is Stoddard and Cabanillas' "The Army Officer's Wife: Social Stresses in a Complementary Role." The authors display a good knowledge of the literature in military sociology as well as in other relevant areas. The problem is well posed in terms of the occupational literature. It was hypothesized that as the age of the officer and his wife increase, role conflict and role stress should increase for the wife. The army wife is referred as the "complementary wife" who is felt to be similar to the ambassador's wife because of the way her activities complement her husband's career. The research methods were suitable for the problem and involved the indepth interviewing of 50 officers' wives. It was found that stresses and conflicts mounted until midcareer, when they began to decline. By midcareer most officers realized they were going to retire after 20 years, and further efforts by the wife to obtain promotion for the husband were not likely to be fruitful. Role stresses were low at the beginning of their marriage, because the career-building phase had not yet begun. The authors hypothesize that, for officers who go on to advance after 20 years to top leadership positions, the strains will not abate. In addition to the test of the main hypothesis, there are many useful insights as to the functions of the wife's role and on the informal social structural patterns among officers' wives. The only real criticism that could be made of Stoddard and Cabanillas' piece is that the "role stress" framework is not very productive. It is more or less a dead end sociologically, with principally applied implications. There are also serious measurement problems with the

concept "stress." On the whole, though, the article was analytical and yielded new insights.

"Young Men and Military Service," by Johnston and Bachman, comes off rather better than most of the articles in the Goldman and Segal volume, although the book-length nature of the former provided a greater opportunity for elaboration and development. Like most of these studies, it is technically of high quality, particularly in sampling, and research design has marked advantages. The problem posed by the authors is to "search for the reasons why some young men choose to enlist after high school rather than take a civilian job or continue their education." A nationwide sample of tenth graders in high school was studied at three successive times, the final one during the students' first year out of high school. The authors theorize, on the basis of the psychological literature, that self-concept is an important determinant of choice behavior. Their findings indicate that having a self-concept as a "military-type" person does seem to predict enlisting instead of going to college or taking a job, but that the desire to avoid the draft is a stronger predictor. The authors also looked at "conditioning factors" beyond the immediate choice situation. They report that certain job and political attitudes are related to attempted enlistment, in particular, "tolerance for hard work" and support for the Vietnam War. However, the authors' use of a particular statistic (eta) in these and other examples is inappropriate because eta does not take into account the order of the classes of a variable. (Gamma, and partial and multiple gammas, would have been better statistics in these instances.) When the order of the categories is examined, youth's attitude toward the Vietnam War appears to be a rather strong (not a "weak") determinant of enlistment, and it appears to be not so much their tolerance for hard work, but their acceptance of an occupation that involves a different style of life and work from that pursued by their civilian counterparts. Looking at the two attitudinal items together, it appears that those who enlist do so, not out of a desire for the material rewards of a civilian and middle-class society, but out of a commitment to a distinctive pattern of work and ideology. It seems that, even though civilianization is proceeding in many areas of the armed forces, a certain proportion of youth perceive life in the military as distinctive and worth pursuing. This finding has some implication for military recruiting policy, which has been oriented to a considerable extent to assuring volunteers that they will be able to pursue a civilian style life even though they are in the armed forces. This policy may be misguided, in that the military can never hope to do as good a job replicating civilian conditions as civilian jobs themselves do, and enlistment appeals addressed to the distinctive features of the armed forces may meet with more success.

Although Johnston and Bachman's data can be interpreted as indicating that enlistment appeals to the more committed or motivated young men an equally important finding was that those enlisting were largely from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and were less successful academically. (If gamma, rather than eta had been used to test the relationship between social class and enlistment, the relationship would have been even stronger.) This is not to say that military service selects positively for working and lower-class men. What happens is apparently that college education is a positive attraction for middle-class youth and for better students. Those not going to college, then, either find jobs or go into the armed forces, and there is little class or ability difference between those selecting enlistment, as opposed to employment in other occupations. These findings are

also consistent with the respondents' own perceptions of the reasons for the choices they made. Nearly two-thirds said they had never even considered enlisting and when asked why indicated either that schooling was more important or that military life just didn't appeal to them.

A few criticisms could be made of *Young Men and Military Service*. The original theory is social psychological; this is appropriate for a design that explores individual differences. However, most of the interpretation of data is on the sociocultural level, and most of the interpretations are consequently rather speculative and exploratory. Moreover, the authors introduce little new literature throughout the work, (other than methodological notes or references to their own work), and the sociological and explanatory value of the study is thus greatly limited. Missing is any substantial reference to other sociological research or theory on the military and society, recruitment into occupations, social class structure, and so on. Liska (1977) has referred to this as the tendency toward the "dissipation" of social psychology, and notes the damaging consequences for any development of systematic theory.

It should come as no surprise that enlistees in the U.S. military service are mostly working-class men. The armed forces in all Western countries are highly stratified, with a great deal of difference between officers and the ranks in terms of responsibility, nature of duties, prestige, authority, and freedom. Officers in the past came from the nobility and in the United States, as recently as 1950 (Janowitz, 1964) were overwhelmingly from upper classes. There has been some trend recently, especially in the more technologically and less traditional services, toward more middle-class recruitment of officers. It appears, however, that enlisted personnel are still mostly of lower and working-class background (Moskos, 1970). Thus, despite the contemporary "crisis of legitimacy," and the trend toward civilianization, the military remains, in Western society, a distinctive occupation, with its own culture and traditions, social organization and sense of community. It probably is a functional necessity for the military to have a rather authoritarian structure, and, in societies committed ideologically to democracy, such patterns will lead to some conflict, distinctiveness, separation and "crises of legitimacy."

One final suggestion—social scientific research into the military could be much improved. We very much need studies other than the two rather extreme types discussed here. Social psychological research should be based on, elucidate and expand on existing social psychological theory. In particular, parallels need to be drawn between the military and other institutions, both from an organizational and a social-psychological perspective. Comparative research on the military in different societies and times is also needed, and ultimately, these comparisons should be systematic and quantitative, as well as historical and exploratory. Expensive, large-scale interview surveys are only as good as the theoretical knowledge they produce. Military sociology requires more studies based on other techniques, such as indepth interviews, comparative and historical work, observation, content analysis, and all the theoretical sophistication and insight that can be brought to bear. Only in this way can progress in scientific understanding be achieved and knowledge useful for society be produced.

**Reference**

Andreski, Stanislav. *Military Organisation and Society.* 1st ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.* New York: The Free Press, 1964.

Liska, Allen E. "The Dissipation of Sociological Social Psychology." *The American Sociologist,* Vol. 12, no. 1, February 1977, pp. 2-8.

Moskos, Charles C., Jr. *The American Enlisted Man. The Rank and File in Today's Military.* New York: Russell Sage, 1970.

## RECENT BOOKS

**Seleeted Accessions of the Naval War College Library**

**Annotated by**

**Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook**
**Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos**

*Alcoholism: Interdisciplinary Approaches to an Enduring Problem.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976. 857pp. $27.50; paper $13.50

Of interest to all those working in the field of drug abuse, this volume brings together up-to-date information on the causes, processes, and treatment of alcoholism. While varying levels of analysis and theoretical orientation are presented, the dominant view is that "alcoholism is not simply a disease but an array of disorders of similar topography."

Aluko, Olajide. *Ghana and Nigeria, 1957-1970.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976. 275pp. $17.50

At the time they achieved independence in 1957, Ghana and Nigeria declared their mutual desire to work together in close cooperation. This is a study of why the two nations have, from 1957 to 1970, become more caught up in discord than the cooperation they both seek.

Booth, Ken. *Navies and Foreign Policy.* New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 294pp. $18.75

Professor Booth of University College of Wales describes his volume as a guidebook for the delver into naval matters. In Part One he surveys navies as instruments and influences in statecraft, while in Part Two he explores the fundamental domestic and international factors controlling and affecting the formulation of naval policy.

Burgess, Chester F. *The Fellowship of the Craft: Conrad on Ships and the Sea.* Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1976. 160pp. $9.95

Passages from Joseph Conrad's sea tales are analyzed in an attempt to go beyond the usual generalizations of Conrad's love for the sea, and to determine more specifically his ideas on seamanship, especially what he meant by "the fellowship of the craft."

Crozier, Brian. *The Man Who Lost China: the First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek.* New York: Scribner, 1976. 430pp. $12.95

A former East Asian correspondent for *The Economist* collaborated with journalist Eric Chou to write this comprehensive biography of Chiang Kai-shek.

Dayton, Edward R. *Tools for Time Management: Christian Perspectives on Managing Priorities.* Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975, c. 1974. 192pp. $5.95

Drawing upon his experience as a manager and as a minister, the author presents the techniques of time management using a humanistic and Christian orientation. Ideas are arranged alphabetically rather than sequentially, so that the book can be approached in several different ways.

Destler, I.M., et al. *Managing an Alliance: the Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976. 209pp. $9.95

This study of the alliance between Japan and the United States from World War II to the present emphasizes that an understanding of the relationship between a country's internal political system and her foreign policy is vital to productive international negotiations.

Dingman, Roger. *Power in the Pacific: the Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 318pp. $19.00

This book traces the domestic political forces in England, Japan, and the United States which produced competitive naval expansion before the First World War, and later guided the negotiators in the talks which culminated in Washington in 1922. Source materials for this study included official and private archives, interviews, and printed biographical and secondary works from the United States, London, and Tokyo.

Earle, M. Mark, Jr., et al. *Selected Near-Nuclear Weapon Countries and Nonproliferation.* (SSC-TN-3295-3) Arlington, Va.: Stanford Research Institute. Strategic Studies Center, 1975. 147pp. (Contract AT(49-1) 3678)*

The incentives and disincentives for proliferation in five near-nuclear nations are analyzed in this study. Related issues such as nuclear-free zones, the usefulness of limited nuclear weapon capability, and the effectiveness of the Nonproliferation Treaty are also treated.

*For price information, contact Stanford Research Institute, 1611 North Kent Street, Rosslyn Plaza, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

Glover, Michael. *General Burgoyne in Canada and America.* New York: Atheneum, 1976. 254pp. $19.95

London sophisticate and occasional playwright, General John B. Burgoyne became a scapegoat for British losses during the Revolutionary War. The

author vindicates Burgoyne's abilities as a military commander and shows how he came to bear the blame for the indecisive leadership of General Sir William Howe.

Goldmann, Kjell. *Tension and Détente in Bipolar Europe.* Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1974. 256pp. $11.00
In this quantitative analysis of the current political climate of détente, the author measures the variations in European tensions and bloc formations during the postwar era.

McHenry, Donald F. *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed.* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977. 260pp. paper $4.95
The author examines American policy toward Micronesia since the islands were placed under United States trust in 1947; he feels that the alternatives available to Micronesia in resolving her future status have been unfairly narrowed, as her strategic importance to the United States has taken precedence over the right of the Micronesians to self-determination.

McLellan, David S. *Dean Acheson: the State Department Years.* New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976. 466pp. $17.50
Using extensive interviews with Acheson and his opposite numbers in foreign governments, as well as intensive personal research, Professor McLellan has produced an interesting analysis and evaluation of Acheson's services during his years as Undersecretary and Secretary of State. Commended for his efforts to coordinate State Department operations, his establishment of strategic dealings with the Soviet Union, and his successful European and U.N. diplomacy, Acheson is judged to have failed in Far Eastern policy, in German rearmament attempts, and in the maintaining of a strategic perspective between communism in Europe and in Asia.

Murphy, Brian. *The Business of Spying.* London: Milton House Books, 1973. 208pp. £5.00
A profusely illustrated, popular-style volume discussing the nature of spying and offering a wide selection of historical cases ranging from Biblical times to Watergate. A special chapter is devoted to training for espionage, giving the structure and career patterns/opportunities of the international intelligence systems of the three leaders in the field—the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great Britain.

Newman, Edwin. *Strictly Speaking.* New York: Warner, 1974. 239pp. paper $1.95
Edwin Newman's humor and deep concern are aimed at the torturing of English by contemporary Americans addicted to professional, academic, and political jargon.

Oates, Stephen B. *With Malice toward None; the Life of Abraham Lincoln.* New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 492pp. $15.00
This first full-scale biography of Lincoln in 17 years is based on solid scholarship and written with both objectivity and interpretative style; the intention is to represent Lincoln the living man rather than the folk hero/saint. He is portrayed as an ambitious, proud, self-made man of political

shrewdness and judgment, with a character distinguished by complexities and contradictions both politically and temperamentally.

Parry, Albert. *Terrorism: from Robespierre to Arafat.* New York: Vanguard Press, 1976. 624pp. $17.50
Written by an expert on Russian affairs, this wide-ranging survey of political terrorism is intended for the general reader. It includes examples of both totalitarian and revolutionary violence which have occurred throughout the world during the last 200 years.

Pye, Lucien W. *Mao Tse Tung: the Man in the Leader.* New York: Basic Books, 1976. 346pp. $12.95
In this example of psychohistory, the author examines Mao Tse-tung's private life and its effect upon his public actions and political theories.

Samuels, Catherine. *The Forgotten Five Million: Women in Public Employment.* New York: Women's Action Alliance, 1975. 298pp. paper $6.00
A project of the Women's Action Alliance, this publication addresses the problems of sexual discrimination experienced by the five million women in the public work force, where women are offered less pay, less chance of advancement, and less professional respect than men in comparable jobs. The major portion of the book is devoted to a discussion of remedies for the situation: documentation, legal measures, affirmative action, and organizing for power.

Schroeder, Richard D. *The Politics of Drugs: Marijuana to Mainlining.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1975. 216pp. paper $5.95
A study of the need for rational, humane drug control legislation that is based on consistent and extensive research, rather than on reaction to fear and incomplete information.

*Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions.* New York: Praeger, 1977. 657pp. $40.00
Interdisciplinary in approach, the papers in this collection were presented at a seminar on Soviet naval developments held at Dalhousie University in 1974. They include hard data on current Soviet capabilities and deployment, and analyze Soviet naval policy from the Soviet point of view.

Stanford Arms Control Group. *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. 444pp. $18.50; paper $12.95
Based on lectures presented to undergraduates at Stanford University, this book treats major issues in international arms control from technological, ideological, cultural, and political perspectives. It also includes the texts of arms control agreements concluded in recent years.

Townsend, Peter. *The Last Emperor: an Intimate Account of George VI and the Fall of His Empire.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976. 352pp. $9.95
This historical-biographical review offers a chronology of the dramatic developments and reactions within the various areas under British dominion—

India, Burma, South Africa, the Middle East, and Ireland–during the 70-year span from the acclamation of Victoria as Empress of India in 1876 until the Atlee-precipitated dissolution of the British Empire in 1946. A star-studded cast of leaders throughout the Commonwealth and Empire is featured, with King-Emperor George VI as the chief focus of the author.

*The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs.* New York: New York University Press, 1976. 216pp. $8.95

This presentation of the Council on Foreign Relations consists of trenchant analytical articles contributed by experienced and knowledgeable specialists William Barnds, Gregory Henderson, Young Kun Kim, Robert Scalapino, and Donald Zagoria, treating foreign policy and political trends in North and South Korea. The issue of U.S. military commitment in Korea is a major consideration.